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Approaches to  
environmental change 
The causes and consequences of environmental change have been hotly debated 
by academics, policy makers and the public at large since at least the 1960s. The 
prevailing literature focuses on evaluating environmental change against a 
baseline (such as pristine Nature) to assess whether the outcome is environ-
mentally neutral, or one of environmental degradation or improvement. The 
most commonly used models analyze environmental change by highlighting one 
or more causative agents, including the so-called ‘population bomb’; factors 
ascribed to colonialism and imperialist power struggles such as conservation 
policies and political ecology; ecological exchanges (such as those involved in 
the spread of diseases and in biological imperialism); economic globalization, 
for example the rise of capitalist markets; and new developments in technology 
(such as the use of firearms and steel). The case of north-central Namibia serves 
to demonstrate how these global models give rise to different and often contra-
dictory interpretations even within a single approach that cannot be simply 
explained away as alternative readings or mis-readings of the same process. 
Twentieth-century north-central Namibia experienced dramatic deforestation 
and reforestation as a result of population pressure, and the area witnessed the 
deglobalization of a precolonial global resource (cattle). Diamond’s trinity of 
‘guns, germs and steel’1 – the unholy alliance of imperialism, ecological ex-
changes and technology – is certainly revealing. But global flows of microbes, 
                                                 
1  Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel. 
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firearms and iron technology shaped local southern African environments in 
nonlinear and unexpected ways. Some invasive germs caused deadly virgin soil 
epidemics in Africa, echoing the impact of smallpox in the Americas and 
paving the way for colonial conquest. But some of the invasive germs and guns 
and steel turned against colonialism, and caused colonial projects to veer 
sharply off course with unexpected environmental consequences. Whether 
caused by colonialism, population pressure, technology or invasive species, 
environmental change consequently should be understood to be multidirect-
ional, involving multiple sub-processes with plural outcomes. 
Despite path-breaking research in the past two to three decades, the study of 
local and global environmental change is constrained by the conceptualization 
of change as a singular process that is both linear and homogenous. Such a 
conceptualization creates two paradoxes that cannot satisfactorily be explained 
within the current frameworks and that are here referred to as the Palenque 
Paradox and the Ovambo Paradox. 
Depicting environmental change in linear fashion within a Nature-Culture 
dichotomy has been rejected in theory. In practice, however, environmental 
change overwhelmingly continues to be assessed in terms of singular and ex-
clusive degradation, improvement or stability/equilibrium outcomes. The de-
gradation-or-improvement-or-equilibrium framework is derived from the mod-
ernization, the declinist and the inclinist paradigms, all of which share the 
premise that environmental change occurs along a single and irreversible 
Nature-to-Culture pathway. 
The modernization paradigm posits environmental change as a progression 
from a primitive state of Nature to an advanced state of Culture, resulting in a 
state-controlled and scientifically exploited environment.2 The declinist para-
digm regards human interference in pristine Nature as a disturbance that leads to 
a downward-spiraling process of environmental degradation that ultimately 
                                                 
2  Goudsblom, for example, describes the progress of humankind through the domes-
ticcation of fire in Fire and Civilisation. Nash argues that scientific conservation in 
the United States arose with the closing of the frontier, in American Environmenta-
lism, pp. 69-112. But Grove traces the roots of Western conservation much farther 
back, in Green Imperialism. For critical overviews of the modernization paradigm 
see Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution: Ecology and Food Production in 
West Africa, pp. 31-40; Blaikie and Brookfield, Land Degradation and Society, pp. 
xviii-xix. On modernization and Nature-to-Culture change, see Merchant, Reinvent-
ing Eden, pp. 20-186, and Ecological Revolutions; Thomas, Man and the Natural 
World; Bassett and Crummey, African Savannas, pp. 13-15; Worster, Dust Bowl, pp. 
182-229; Stilgoe, Common Landscape of America; White, The Organic Machine, 
pp. 59-88; and Arnold, The Problem of Nature, pp. 1-74. 
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might cause the destruction of ecosystem Earth.3 In contrast to the largely 
pessimistic outlook of the declinists, and similarly to the modernizers, the in-
clinists are optimistic about humans’ ability to mitigate the degrading effects of 
environmental change.4 
But the presence of the urban ruins of Palenque and other ‘lost cities’ in the 
jungles of the Americas, Asia and Africa creates a paradox: if Culture once 
dominated the last remaining wildernesses of Planet Earth, how can these areas 
constitute (pristine) Nature? Moreover, environmental change is understood as a 
homogenous and singular process. The preoccupation with outcomes (and base-
lines) leads to a relative lack of appreciation for the dynamics of the process of 
environmental change itself. The liberal and often uncritical use of models from 
the natural sciences as an analytical shortcut to connect a particular environ-
mental outcome to a specific past environmental baseline seems to make under-
standing the details of the process of environmental change less urgent. After all 
the models appear to explain how the outcome resulted from the baseline. Dis-
agreements about the trajectories and the outcomes of environmental processes 
were attributed to different interpretations or misreadings of what was es-
sentially the same process. Ambiguities in the process and the outcome, how-
ever, may also reflect contradictory subprocesses. Moreover, different sub-pro-
cesses of environmental change may not be fully synchronized, suggesting the 
need to reconceptualize environmental change as a pluralistic set of processes. 
Descriptions of the late 1800s precolonial landscape of the Ovambo floodplain 
in the Angolan-Namibian border region closely match the area’s late 1990s 
postcolonial appearance, suggesting little change between the precolonial base-
line and the postcolonial outcome. Yet, paradoxically, dramatic deforestation 
and reforestation marked the area’s twentieth-century history.  
Models of environmental change 
Population pressure has been identified as a major if not the major driver of 
environmental change in the twentieth century. The process of population 
pressure-induced environmental change typically is depicted in mechanistic-
                                                 
3  Seminal works were Carson’s Silent Spring and Worster’s Dust Bowl. For global 
perspectives, see, for example, Westoby, Introduction to World Forestry; Chew, 
World Ecological Degradation; Williams, Deforesting the Earth; Myers, Deforesta-
tion Rates in Tropical Forests; Jepma, Tropical Deforestation. For a history of the 
declinist paradigm, see Merchant, Reinventing Eden, pp. 187-203. 
4  Bassett and Crummey, African Savannas, pp. 1-4. Henkemann, Persoon and Wier-
sum identify an emerging paradigm that stresses the human capacity for innovation 
in “Landscape Transformations of Pioneer Shifting Cultivators at the Forest Fringe”, 
p. 55. See also Fairhead and Leach, Reframing Deforestation, p. 191. 
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linear terms. This is especially true in the case of (neo-)Malthusian models: 
population growth outpaces the growth of food production, leading to the over-
use of natural resources and, eventually, environmental and societal collapse.5 
In other words, population pressure leads to the destruction first of Nature, and 
subsequently of the Culture that depends on it.6 The environmental impact of 
population pressure, however, is contested: Boserup and others argue that 
population pressure triggers technological innovation and more effective natural 
resource management, making it possible to sustain larger populations without 
destroying Nature.7 Both the Malthusian and the Boserupian models identify 
population pressure as a critical driver of environmental change, but they 
evaluate the outcome of the resulting process of change in diametrically op-
posite ways: Malthusian Armageddon versus Boserupian Utopia. It is undenia-
ble that ecosystem Earth cannot support unlimited population growth, but the 
co-existence of two opposing views suggests at the very least that the trajectory 
of population pressure-induced change historically and theoretically is not pre-
determined or linear. As a result, the trajectory of population pressure-induced 
environmental change and its outcome may not be unambiguously negative (as 
in a declinist model) or positive (as in an inclinist model). 
Moreover, until the 1940s or 1950s, in north-central Namibia, as elsewhere 
in Africa, population movement associated with a climate of political insecurity 
was a more critical variable than (natural) population increase. The impact of 
population and population pressure needs to be stressed not only as an abstract 
quantitative factor, but also as qualitative a factor that affects the environment 
through social and political processes. 
A political ecology approach highlights the extent to which ideas, policies 
and practices related to the exploration and conquest of Africa and the admini-
stration of colonial empires are factors that shape the perception and direction of 
environmental change, a set of issues that Grove labeled ‘green imperialism.’ 
Colonial conservation and development priorities and projects shaped the non-
Western environment physically and conceptually – often in very dramatic 
ways. The hunting and gathering of forest products, for example, was redefined 
                                                 
5  Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population; Ehrlich, The Population Bomb; 
Ehrlich and Ehrlich, The Population Explosion; Cleaver and Schreiber, Reversing 
the Spiral. 
6  A good example is Diamond, Collapse. 
7  Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth; Pingali, Bigot and Binswanger, 
Agricultural Mechanization and the Evolution of Farming Systems in Sub-Saharan 
Africa; Tiffen, Mortimore and Gichuki, More People, Less Erosion. 
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as poaching when colonial administrators created game and forest reserves.8 
Moreover, the insecurity brought about by colonial conquest and the draconian 
punishment meted out to maintain colonial law and order – including conserva-
tion regulations – often caused massive population displacement with dramatic 
environmental consequences. In north-central Namibia, colonial officials in-
creasingly enforced international and internal colonial borders to limit the 
movement of people and animals, and colonial policies restricted hunting and 
tree harvesting. Policies that had an even greater impact than proclaiming game 
reserves in the area, however, included disarming the local population in the 
1920s and 1930s, and fencing the international, internal and game reserve 
boundaries in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Old World biological invaders that accompanied European conquerors, most 
dramatically smallpox germs, sheep, cattle, horses and a host of plants, deci-
mated precontact American indigenous human, animal and plant populations, 
destroying the local environment, and creating a Neo-Europe. Biological in-
vaders coincidentally (and sometimes intentionally on the part of the con-
querors) facilitated European conquest.9 Overall, the biological invasion is 
portrayed as a unilinear, mechanical and progressive process of environmental 
change from Nature to Culture. The overall effect was the transformation of the 
earth into a unified ecosystem dominated by Western culture and Western 
(domesticated and/or ‘weedy’) species. In north-central Namibia, biological in-
vaders included lungsickness, rinderpest and foot and mouth germs, as well as 
donkeys and horses. Lungsickness, rinderpest, foot and mouth and donkeys are 
ranked as major environmental scourges across southern Africa. The histories of 
biological invaders in the region, however, complicate linear narratives of en-
vironmental change. The impact of lungsickness and rinderpest in Africa mir-
rors the destructive impact of smallpox in the Americas. These germs caused 
dramatic domestic and wild animal losses, weakened preconquest societies and 
the environments they depended upon, and paved the way for colonial conquest. 
Lungsickness triggered the collapse of South Africa’s Xhosa society and 
rinderpest had an enormously destructive impact across southern Africa in 1896 
and 1897. In contrast, while reported outbreaks of foot and mouth in the 1950s 
and 1960s terrified colonial officials, the disease did not kill a single animal in 
north-central Namibia. Unable to eradicate foot and mouth or lungsickness, 
colonial administrations cordoned off the infected domestic and wild animal 
herds. The history of donkeys also undercuts linear and progressive Nature-to-
                                                 
8  See, for example, Grove, Green Imperialism; Anderson and Grove, Conservation in 
Africa; MacKenzie, Imperialism and the Natural World and The Empire of Nature. 
See also Guha, The Unquiet Woods, and Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People. 
9  Crosby, The Columbian Exchange and Ecological Imperialism. See also McNeill, 
Plagues and Peoples. 
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Culture narratives. Unlike, for example, European sheep, which became a 
plague in Mexico, donkeys initially did not thrive in north-central Namibia at 
all, and their introduction does not adhere to the invasion-followed-by-explo-
sive-growth-and-subsequent-implosion model that typifies biological invasion 
narratives.10 
Economy-driven (market) models of environmental change are premised on 
the dichotomy of a precontact, local, barter-based moral economy that is re-
placed by a global market economy. The level of analysis is often abstract, with 
the driving force being identified as ‘capitalism’ or ‘the market’. In Africa, it is 
often argued that population growth in semi-arid regions is accompanied by 
explosive increases in livestock numbers, resulting in overgrazing. These argu-
ments build on the premise that human agency in livestock management is 
circumscribed by local culture or tradition, which in turn is determined by the 
limitations imposed by the natural environment. For example, in the ‘cattle 
complex’ model, cattle numbers increase beyond sustainable levels because 
cattle are not consumed or sold, but rather are hoarded as a symbol of status and 
wealth. Yet, hard evidence for the existence of either a cattle complex or a sub-
sequent livestock population bomb resulting in overgrazing is as lacking in 
north-central Namibia as it is elsewhere.11 North-central Namibia’s cattle own-
ers readily exported cattle across southern Africa and the Atlantic world before 
colonial rule, a practice that contradicts the ‘precolonial’ or ‘traditional’ origins 
of the presumed cattle complex phenomenon and the existence of a precolonial 
moral economy. This trajectory casts fundamental doubt on colonialism’s repu-
tation as an economic globalizing force. In north-central Namibia, colonial rule 
in fact in many ways deglobalized local economies. A linear mechanical model 
of market-driven overexploitation of natural resources thus seems too mono-
dimensional. 
A final important model of environmental change highlights the agency of 
Western technology. The model is premised on the assumption that new 
technology automatically creates its own demand because it is inherently and 
transparently superior, leading to the wholesale replacement of pre-existing 
technology. In the model, Western scientific technology (as a globalizing force) 
typically replaces local, traditional and primitive (labor-intensive) technology. 
Diamond argued that the West colonized the non-West (including Africa) rather 
                                                 
10  Melville, A Plague of Sheep. Donkeys are native to Africa but not to the southwest 
of the continent. 
11  Herskovits, “The Cattle Complex in East Africa”; I. Scoones, “Range Management 
Science and Policy: Politics, Polemics and Pasture in Southern Africa”, and W. 
Beinart, “Soil Erosion, Animals, and Pasture over the Longer Term: Environmental 
Destruction in Southern Africa”, pp. 34-53 and 54-72 respectively. See also 
Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison, and Jha, The Myth of the Holy Cow. 
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than the other way around because of the West’s early acquisition of superior 
technology, which paved the way for Western world dominance.12 But sub-
Saharan Africans produced steel before it was produced in the West and 
Africans resisted European dominance with guns that they obtained from the 
West by exporting slaves, cattle, gold and ivory. Because the northern Ovambo 
floodplain polities were well supplied with firearms, it took over two decades of 
heavy fighting – in which Western military forces suffered a series of crushing 
defeats – before the inhabitants of the region were subjugated and disarmed. 
Firearms mostly were imports, but African blacksmiths repaired and sometimes 
even manufactured them. Twemuna, a famous Ovambo floodplain blacksmith, 
reputedly even forged a breechblock for a captured Portuguese cannon, and 
restored the cannon to working order. Moreover, the floodplain blacksmiths’ 
steel hoes, axes and blades were regarded as far superior to Western iron 
imports until well into the colonial era. Although Western industrially produced 
tools were available since well before World War I, local blacksmiths held their 
own until World War II. 
Whereas the global models outlined above highlight causes of environmental 
change, the assessment of the trajectory (degradation, stability or improvement) 
and the outcome of such change varies according to one of the three dominant 
paradigms mentioned above: the modernization paradigm, the declinist para-
digm or the inclinist paradigm. 
The modernization paradigm 
Works employing the modernization paradigm identified Western science, 
modern Westerners, and the species they had domesticated or adopted as the 
means and objectives for a state-controlled and state-exploited environment. 
Although his intent is to illuminate why the West colonized America, Asia and 
Africa rather than to celebrate the global dominance of Western modernity or 
Western science, Diamond’s path-breaking analysis lies squarely within the 
modernization paradigm. Diamond identifies the early European adoption of 
domesticates from elsewhere – their dissemination facilitated by geo-environ-
mental conditions – as ultimately providing Europeans with the technological 
and biological cutting-edge to conquer the world.13 
If they raised environmental concerns at all, modernizers were confident that 
science and technology could remedy any problems that might arise, and, more-
                                                 
12  Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel. 
13  Ibid. Diamond’s emphasis on how a linear process of domestication enables human 
domination over Nature (i.e. civilization or Culture) is similar to that of, for example 
Sauer and Goudsblom. See Sauer, Seeds, Spades, Hearths, and Herds, and Gouds-
blom, Fire and Civilisation. 
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over, they judged a measure of accompanying environmental degradation to be 
an acceptable price for progress. For example, in Zimbabwe, the colonial-era 
authorities – otherwise strong proponents of game conservation – exterminated 
large numbers of wild animals to control tsetse fly infestation and to protect the 
development of white commercial cattle ranching.14 
The main objective of conservation was to prevent the irrational and wasteful 
use of ‘natural’ resources and to protect wildlife and forest resources from 
‘primitive’ Western and non-Western farmers and pastoralists.15 In the 1930s, 
the British colonial administrations in Africa became increasingly convinced of 
the necessity of direct intervention in how African subjects used the land.16 
Colonial officials and experts viewed ‘the natives’ as potential sources of pollu-
tion and disease, in addition to perceiving them as abusing or underutilizing the 
land. As a consequence, the officials believed that the local indigenous popu-
lation should not have any rights whatsoever to lands that were not actively 
inhabited or cultivated. The characterization legitimized the practice of taking 
over as state land vast expanses of fallow, pasture lands and forests, as well as 
hunting and gathering grounds.17 Although colonial officials initially regarded 
select indigenous peoples simply as part and parcel of Nature (e.g., as Stone 
Age hunters and gatherers) and consequently preserved them in the newly 
established reserves and parks, by the 1950s, the officials had removed the last 
groups of local residents from the conservation areas.18 
To the modern colonial and postcolonial state, forests and trees especially 
were highly valuable economic resources that should be managed and exploited 
by professional foresters under the aegis of scientific forestry.19 Tropical rain-
                                                 
14  Mutwira, “A Question of Condoning Game Slaughter”. 
15  See MacKenzie, Imperialism and the Natural World and The Empire of Nature; 
Anderson and Grove, Conservation in Africa, esp. pp. 1-12; Grove, Green Imperi-
alism; Carruthers, The Kruger National Park. 
16  Anderson, “Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought”; Berry, No Condi-
tion Is Permanent, pp. 46-54. 
17  Cronon, Changes in the Land, p. 53. On land takeovers, see M. Colchester, “Forest 
Peoples and Sustainability”. On the view of Africans as sources of disease, see 
Farley, Bilharzia, pp. 13-20, 137-139. 
18  Konrad, “Tropical Forest Policy and Practice during the Mexican Porfirato”. On 
removals of indigenous people from parks, see Colchester, “Forest Peoples and 
Sustainability”, pp. 61-95; Ranger, “Whose Heritage? The Case of the Matobo 
National Park”; Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 129-154; Merchant, Reinventing 
Eden, pp.152-154. 
19  For conventional forestry see Wiersum, Social Forestry, pp. 27-36, 54-60; Williams, 
Deforesting the Earth, pp. 145-168, 242-275, 383-419; Guha, The Unquiet Woods, 
pp. 35-61; Peluso, Rich Forests, pp. 44-160. 
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forests were valuable because they were a source of hardwoods.20 In contrast, 
woodlands without desirable timber stands were viewed as wastelands that 
could and should be transformed into agricultural lands, for example, for the 
scientific production of sugarcane, cotton, cocoa, tea, coffee or other market 
crops.21 In practice, however, colonial and postcolonial states frequently lacked 
the coherence, the capacity or the will to enforce their own conservation regu-
lations or rationally to exploit the forest and other environmental resources. This 
was especially the case when colonial authorities met fierce resistance from 
populations that depended on forest access.22  
The declinist paradigm 
Some authors have emphasized continuity between the modernization and de-
clinist paradigms: both highlight the danger of environmental decline.23 The 
declinist paradigm, however, differs from the modernization paradigm in that it 
identifies (Western) modernity itself as the major cause of environmental de-
cline.24 Even the neo-Malthusian population bomb ultimately can be understood 
as having been caused by modern science: Western medicine brought mortality 
rates down so radically that population growth soon outpaced food production. 
Many historians who focused on environmental and/or agricultural change in 
the non-Western world have written from a declinist perspective. Often, de-
clinists explicitly or implicitly portray precontact non-Western environments as 
being suspended in a state of (pristine) Nature, and precontact societies as living 
in harmony with Nature. Declinists argue that the modern Western economy 
(including capitalism, market forces and the resulting commodification of en-
vironmental resources and labor) caused overexploitation (of timber or such 
game animals as elephant, tiger, beaver or bison) or the diversion of precious 
land and labor away from food production and local resource management, re-
                                                 
20  Tomlinson and Zimmermann, Tropical Trees as Living Systems focuses on the tro-
pical rainforest. 
21  See Budowski, “Perceptions of Deforestation in Tropical America”, p. 1; and 
Tucker, “The Depletion of India’s Forests under British Imperialism”; Kajembe, 
Indigenous Management Systems as a Basis for Community Forestry in Tanzania, p. 
10. 
22  See D. Anderson, “Managing the Forest: The Conservation History of Lembus, 
Kenya”; Guha, The Unquiet Woods, and Peluso, Rich Forests; MacKenzie, “Experts 
and Amateurs”. 
23  Fairhead and Leach, Reframing Deforestation, pp. 172-173; and Peluso, Rich Fo-
rests, pp. 44-160. 
24  See, for example, Worster, “Introduction”, in Ends of the Earth, pp. 4-5; Pyne, 
World Fire. 
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sulting in environmental and general collapse.25 The introduction of commercial 
crops or livestock also led to the clearing of forest and bush land. Some of the 
crops, for example, coffee and cotton, caused soil erosion.26 Colonizers also 
introduced modern agriculture through large-scale commercial plantations for 
crops and trees, and, where lands were suitable for European settlement, 
through imported white farmers. Colonial administrations typically allocated 
prime agricultural lands to white settlers or metropolitan companies, trans-
forming the local populations into squatters or removing them to marginal 
lands.27 A related argument stressed structural imbalances in access to land and 
other resources as the underlying cause for deforestation: a small elite that con-
trolled the arable land pushed poor, landless farmers into the forest wilder-
nesses.28 
A political ecology focus within the declinist perspective emphasizes how 
the modern colonial and postcolonial states sought to control – especially 
through conservation – not only Nature but also how the local population used 
and managed natural resources. Colonial administrators proclaimed forest as 
reserves to facilitate scientific exploitation; gazetted game reserves and national 
parks to protect wildlife; brought upper water catchments under government 
stewardship; and imposed draconian punishment to suppress indigenous burn-
ing regimes.29 Although these measures proved difficult to enforce, they never-
theless restricted local populations’ access to important environmental resources 
(e.g., game meat, forest products and grazing) and led to the erosion of in-
digenous environmental resource management. In East Africa, indigenous 
practices that previously had contained the impact and the spread of the 
trypanosomiases-carrying tsetse fly in Africa withered away.30 The introduction 
                                                 
25  See, for example, Palmer and Parsons, eds., The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central 
and Southern Africa; Pyne, Vestal Fire; Marks, Tigers, Rice, and Salt, pp. 38-40; 
Walker, The Conquest of Ainu Lands; Dean, With Broadax and Firebrand. 
26  See, for example, Geertz, Agricultural Involution; Stein, Vassouras; Isaacman and 
Roberts, Cotton, Colonialism, and Social History in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
27  See, for example, Beinart, Delius and Trapido, Putting a Plough to the Ground; 
Bundy, Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry; Arnold, The Problem of 
Nature, pp. 119-168; Dunlap, Nature and the English Diaspora. 
28  See Colchester and Lohmann, The Struggle for Land, pp. 1-60, 99-163. On land 
conflict, see, for example, Durham, Scarcity and Survival in Central America. 
29  See Anderson and Grove, Conservation in Africa, pp. 1-39; Grove, Green Imperi-
alism; Beinart, “Soil Erosion, Conservationism, and Ideas about Development”; 
Pyne, Vestal Fire; Guha, The Unquiet Woods; Peluso, Rich Forests. 
30  Kjekhus, Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History; Gib-
lin, “The Precolonial Politics of Disease Control in the Lowlands of Northeastern 
Tanzania”. On the limits of colonial policies, see also Grove, “Colonial Conserva-
tion, Ecological Hegemony and Popular Resistance”. 
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of soil conservation projects offers a continent-wide example. During the 1930s, 
colonial administrations, fearing the collapse of African food production sys-
tems under the strain of environmental change and population pressure that 
coincidentally largely was caused by economic, political and conservation colo-
nial policies, introduced terracing and contour plowing throughout rural Africa. 
Given the required extra labor demands on the local population, however, these 
projects often exacerbated matters, although the full weight of such policies was 
only felt after World War II.31 
Biological imperialism offers a third prism through which to consider 
declinist environmental change. The introduction of new animals, plants and 
microbes or the selective favoring of indigenous species unleashed such pests 
and plagues as, for example, smallpox, yellow fever and sheep in the Americas, 
rinderpest and lungsickness in Africa, and rabbits in Australia. Some authors 
have emphasized that colonialism, or, more recently globalization, multiplied 
the impact of invading and indigenous microbes because it weakened or de-
stroyed pre-existing environmental management arrangements.32 Often, as is the 
case in the modernization paradigm, declinists depicted the scenario in terms of 
a precontact ecological balance.33 
Although declinist analysis identifies modernity as the main culprit of envi-
ronmental destruction, in practice, conservationist intervention often targeted 
indigenous communities in an attempt to change their environmental manage-
ment and use strategies. Declinists sometimes admired indigenous knowledge 
and technology, but regarded it as traditional and static, and thus unable to cope 
with the new challenges brought by the modern economy and population 
                                                 
31  Beinart and Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa; Showers, Imperial 
Gullies; Journal of Southern African Studies 15 (1989), Special Issue on Conserva-
tion in Southern Africa. 
32  See Crosby, Ecological Imperialism; Grinde and Johansen, Ecocide of Native 
America: Environmental Destruction of Indian Lands and Peoples; Fenn, Pox 
Americana; Melville, Plague of Sheep; Kjekhus, Ecology Control and Economic 
Development in East African History; Giblin, “Trypanosomiasis Control in African 
History”; Lyons, The Colonial; Rolls, They All Ran Wild. 
33  Headrick, Colonialism, Health and Illness in French Equatorial Africa. Kjekhus 
attributes epidemic sleeping sickness to “ecological imbalances” associated with 
colonialism, Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History, 
p.166. Brooks, Webb, Johnson and Anderson and Mandala show that desiccation, 
drought and famine also occurred in precolonial Africa, implying that a general 
ecological balance did not exist. See Johnson and Anderson, The Ecology of 
Survival, for example, the chapter by Pankhurst and Johnson, “The Great Drought 
and Famine of 1888-92 in Northeast Africa”, pp. 47-70; Brooks, Landlords and 
Strangers; Webb, Desert; and Mandala, Work and Control in a Peasant Economy, 
pp. 15-97. 
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growth.34 A series of devastating droughts in Africa in the 1970s and 1980s and 
the notion that the tropical rainforests of Africa, Latin America and Southeast 
Asia constituted the last and most prized remnants of pristine Nature added a 
sense of urgency, paving the way for radical interventions.35 
To counter deforestation, Western experts introduced agroforestry (trees in 
fields) and social forestry projects in Africa, Latin America and Asia, with the 
goal of facilitating the reforestation of lands outside the protected forests. 
Focusing attention on people and their social networks and on forests and trees 
outside the formally declared forests, however, largely was instrumental. Be-
cause the practice of protecting existing forests from human intrusion was 
considered to be a failure, foresters sought to boost forest production outside the 
actual forests as an alternative source for the fuel wood and other products that 
local populations previously had gathered in the forests.36 
In Africa, the communal woodlot approach met with little success, an out-
come that in the late 1970s and early 1980s contributed to increased attention to 
the role of on-farm trees and farmers in agroforestry and social forestry research 
and projects. Yet, this micro focus was short-lived. After farm-level projects 
appeared to favor men over women and the wealthy over the poor, the pen-
dulum swung back to a macro level of analysis in the 1980s and the early 
1990s. Moreover, fuel wood did not emerge as a key issue for farmers.37 In-
stead, multipurpose trees took center stage in agroforestry and social forestry, 
with an emphasis on the ability of trees, especially such ‘miracle trees’ as the 
                                                 
34  Richards noted that colonial officials discovered indigenous knowledge before 
World War II; during the war, however, the paradigm shifted to state-led scientific 
approaches, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution, pp. 31-40. Colchester claims that 
the myth of the tragedy of the commons prevented a real assessment of indigenous 
natural resource management systems, M. Colchester, “Forest Peoples and Sustaina-
bility”, pp. 61-95. On the view of indigenous knowledge as outdated, see Le 
Houérou, The Grazing Land Ecosystems of the African Sahel, and Browse in Africa, 
pp. 485-486; Núñez and Grosjean, “Biodiversity and Human Impact During the Last 
11,000 Years in North-Central Chile”. 
35  On desertification, see Bassett and Crummey, African Savannas, pp. 15-17 and 
Swift, “Desertification”. On shifting cultivators as deforesters, see Myers, Deforest-
ation Rates, pp. 4-5, 30, 45-48; and Jepma, Tropical Deforestation, pp. 17-21, 104-
109. 
36  On agroforestry and social forestry, see King, “The History of Agroforestry”, and 
Nair, “Agroforestry Defined”; Hobley, Participatory Forestry, pp. 56, 66-81; and 
Wiersum, Social Forestry, pp. 54-81, 166-170. 
37  Wiersum, Social Forestry, pp. 1, 3, 62-67; Wiersum and Persoon, “Research on 
Conservation and Management of Tropical Forests: Contributions from Social 
Sciences in the Netherlands”, pp. 3-4; Leach and Mearns, Beyond the Fuelwood 
Crisis, pp. 23-40, 66-67; Schroeder, “Shady Practice”. On the failure of communal 
woodlots, see Kerkhof, Agroforestry in Africa, pp. 87-111. 
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lead tree (Leucaena leucocephala), to enhance and maintain soil fertility and 
agricultural production.38 The interest of the state, particularly forestry depart-
ments’ interventions in extra-forest agroforestry, social forestry and community 
forestry, partly was driven by forestry imperialism legitimated in the name of 
conservation and rural development.39  
The inclinist paradigm 
In the mid-1990s, Fairhead and Leach turned the declinist paradigm thesis about 
the direction of environmental change on its head and identified forest islands 
not as relics of natural or climax forest vegetation (as in a declinist reading), but 
as a human creation.40 A major departure from the modernization paradigm, 
however, was that the inherent optimism of the inclinist paradigm derived not 
from a belief in Western science, but from confidence in the dynamic potential 
of indigenous knowledge.41 
An important second root of inclinist revisionism stemmed from the rejec-
tion of the declinists’ alarmist claims, which were based on the use of prejudi-
cial colonial information and contemporary data that were estimates at best. In 
his highly influential 1989 study Deforestation Rates, Myers predicted that little 
forest would be left by the end of the twentieth century. His dire prediction is 
still far from reality, although deforestation continues to be a major concern. 
Moreover, the 1976 to 1998 deforestation statistics were based on only two sets 
of primary sources that were themselves estimates: an FAO/UNDP analysis that 
                                                 
38  On the exaggerated wood fuel crisis and the association of forestry with agriculture, 
see Leach and Mearns, Beyond the Fuelwood Crisis, pp. 23-40. On trees and soil 
fertility, see Young, Agroforestry for Soil Management, and Huxley, Tropical Agro-
forestry, p. 280. 
39  See, for example, J. van den Bergh, “Diverging Perceptions on the Forest: Bulu 
Forest Tenure and the 1994 Cameroon Forest Law”; Fairhead and Leach, Reframing 
Deforestation, p. 170. See also Guha, The Unquiet Woods, pp. 44-45. The forest 
services of Indonesia and Thailand control 74% and 40% respectively of the national 
territories, M. Colchester, “Forest Peoples and Sustainability”, p. 75. 
40  This argument was first made in Fairhead and Leach, Misreading the African Land-
scape, pp. 55-85. Fairhead and Leach extended the argument to other West African 
countries in their Reframing Deforestation. 
41  Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution, pp. 12, 70-72, 84-85, 128-139, 151-
152, 155; Leach and Mearns, Beyond the Fuelwood Crisis, pp. 26-40; Fairhead and 
Leach, Misreading the African Landscape. On the dynamism of African peasants, 
see also Berry, No Condition Is Permanent, pp. 49-52; Tiffen, Mortimore and 
Gichuki, More People, Less Erosion, pp. 226-245; Mazzucato and Niemeijer, Re-
thinking Soil and Water Conservation in a Changing Society. 
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relied partly on satellite data and Myers’ own study.42 Boserup’s Conditions of 
Agricultural Growth, which argues that population pressure gives rise to techni-
cal innovation and the intensification of land use, further strengthens the inclin-
ist world view.43 
In the inclinist paradigm, indigenous knowledge and indigenous manage-
ment and use of forest resources take center stage as points of departure for re-
search and intervention.44 The definition of what constituted ‘forest’ further was 
expanded to include the dry forests (including the miombo expanses of Africa) 
and woodlands that support much larger populations than the rainforests.45 
Inclinists consider indigenous populations not as an environmental threat, but as 
a critical part of the solution.46 Social forestry included transferring ‘forest’ 
management from the state to local communities, although in practice, officials 
and scientists overwhelmingly proved incapable or unwilling to relinquish real 
control over conservation areas and experiments.47 In India, for example, the 
                                                 
42  See Leach and Mearns, Beyond the Fuelwood Crisis, pp. 1-9; Fairhead and Leach, 
Misreading the African Landscape, pp. 1-85, 121-136, 182-197, 237-278; McCann, 
Green Land, Brown Land, pp. 79-107; Bassett and Crummey, African Savannas, pp. 
4-15, 24; Lehman, “Deforestation and Changing Land Use Patterns in Costa Rica”, 
p. 67. Although all the contributors in Steen and Tucker acknowledge deforestation 
as an important issue, a number of them reject declinism as a straightjacket; see, for 
example, the chapters by Pierce (pp. 40-57), Lehman (pp. 58-76), Graham and 
Prendergast (pp. 102-109) and Balée (pp. 185-197). See Myers, Deforestation Rates, 
p. 4, and Williams, Deforesting the Earth, pp. 477-479, 453-457. 
43  Boserup, Conditions of Agricultural Growth; Pingali, Bigot and Binswanger, Agri-
cultural Mechanization. See also Leach and Mearns, Beyond the Fuelwood Crisis, 
pp. 1, 53; Tiffen, Mortimore and Gichuki, More People, Less Erosion; and Siebert, 
“Beyond Malthus and Perverse Incentives”, p. 29. 
44  Leach and Mearns, Beyond the Fuelwood Crisis, pp. 23-40. Franzel et al. emphasize 
the importance of building on Indigenous Technical Knowledge (ITK), Franzel, 
Cooper, Denning and Eade, eds., Development and Agroforestry, see especially the 
contributions by Denning (pp. 1-14), Haggar et al. (pp. 15-23), Weber et al. (pp. 24-
34) and Wambugu et al. (pp. 107-166). See also Balée, “Indigenous History and 
Amazonian Biodiversity”. 
45  See Westoby, Introduction to World Forestry, pp. 147, 169-170. On the miombo 
woodlands, see Campbell, The Miombo in Transition. 
46  Several chapters in Franzel and Scherr underline the importance of on-farm parti-
cipatory research with farmers but stress that the scientists need to remain in control, 
see Franzel et al., “Methods of Assessing Agroforestry Adoption Potential”, and 
Scherr and Franzel, “Promoting Agroforestry Technologies: Policy Lessons from 
On-Farm Research”. 
47  On indigenous farmers’ participation and its limits, see Leach and Mearns, Beyond 
the Fuelwood Crisis, pp. 230-231; Denning, “Realising the Potential of Agro-
forestry: Integrating Research and Development to Achieve Greater Impact”; 
Haggar et al., “Participatory Design of Agroforestry Systems: Developing Farmer 
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state continued to set the agenda in joint state-local community forest manage-
ment projects, a practice that resembled colonial indirect rule because it relied 
on (unpaid) ‘traditional’ local leaders for enforcement.48  
Paradoxes of environmental change 
The modernization, declinist and inclinist paradigms each offer important 
insights into the dynamics of environmental change. Because they are cast as 
being competing and mutually exclusive, however, the paradigms create para-
doxes about the process of environmental change. The first paradox is the 
presence of such remnants of urban settlements as, for example the ruins of 
Palenque, Mexico, in pristine forest. The urban environment was and is a 
powerful symbol of the dominance of Culture over Nature, representing the 
apex of civilization to modernizers, and Nature’s nadir to declinists. The urban 
environment also is seen to be the antithesis of wilderness in the Nature-Culture 
dichotomous framework that the three paradigms share.49 The benchmark 
environment against which environmental change is assessed and measured is 
variously referred to as wilderness, Nature, pristine Nature, State of Nature/-
Natural State, precontact environment (indigenous Edens or people-Nature 
balances) or vegetation climax.50 The defining characteristic essentially is the 
same: the absence of human action in shaping the environment. As humans 
affected the environment, it changed from its pre-human contact state. The 
closer the human communities are perceived to be to the ‘Natural State’, the less 
they are thought to change their environment (either for the worse or for the 
                                                                                                                       
Participatory Research Methods in Mexico”; Weber et al., “Participatory Domesti-
cation of Agroforestry Trees: An Example from the Peruvian Amazon”; and Wam-
bugu et al., “Scaling Up the Use of Fodder Shrubs in Central Kenya”. 
48  Sundan, “Unpacking the ‘Joint’ in Joint Forest Management”. See also Peluso, Rich 
Forests, pp. 124-165; Hobley, Participatory Forestry, pp. 59-60, 80, 130, 139-157, 
191-193, 244, 251, 259-260; Fairhead and Leach, Reframing Deforestation, pp. 192-
193. 
49  The classic study on the concept of wilderness is Nash, Wilderness in the American 
Mind. Cronon and White argue for a Nature-Culture (urban-rural and wild-domes-
ticated) continuum, see Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, pp. 17-19; and White, The 
Organic Machine, pp. 105-109. 
50  Blaikie and Brookfield, for example, posit an Edenic point of departure; see Land 
Degradation and Society, p. xx. On discomfort with the climax concept, see Long-
man and Jeník, Tropical Forest and Its Environment, pp. 13-14, 20-21, 25; Koz-
lowski, Kramer and Pallardy, The Physiological Ecology of Woody Plants, p. 100; 
Pimentel, Westra and Noss, Ecological Integrity; and L. Westra et al., “Ecological 
Integrity and the Aims of the Global Integrity Project”, ibid., pp. 19-41. For a criti-
cal overview, see Fairhead and Leach, Reframing Deforestation, pp. 10-11, 20, 24, 
164-166. 
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better, depending on the paradigm). For example, until recently, conventional 
wisdom maintained that indigenous people who live by Nature as hunter-
gatherers do not shape their environment. The impact of indigenous peoples on 
the environment at the turn of the twentieth century became hotly debated.51 
Indeed, the very idea of assessing and measuring environmental change 
along a Nature-Culture gradient with Nature as the point of departure and 
Culture as the outcome created a paradox. The principal remaining vestiges of 
unspoiled Nature, that is, the forest regions of Central and South America and 
Southeast Asia, as well as the proverbial last Wilderness Continent, Africa, 
contain such ‘lost cities’ as, for example, Palenque in Mexico’s rainforest and 
Thulamela in South Africa’s Kruger National Park.52 
Neither Palenque nor Thulamela were exceptional or isolated anomalies in 
an otherwise pristine wilderness. Thulamela was associated with Great Zim-
babwe, which stood at the center of a trade network that linked it to a global 
hinterland that stretched through much of southern Africa and across the Indian 
Ocean to India, Southeast Asia and China.53 For comparison, modern Van-
couver’s hinterland is 318 times the actual size of the city, with the city and its 
population using the biophysical output of 3.6 million hectares scattered across 
the entire globe. Chicago’s urban growth similarly consumed the resources of 
an enormous hinterland, dramatically transforming the city’s environment in the 
process.54 The lost cities in the African, the Latin American and the Southeast 
Asian wilderness similarly must have left extensive environmental footprints. 
Even before the twentieth century, the primordial forest and woodland of much 
of the Americas, Southeast Asia and Africa were shaped heavily by human use. 
The forests that hide the Maya ruins might be no more than four hundred years 
old and they differ in composition from the pre-Mayan era woody vegetation. 
The pristine rainforest of Suriname in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries  
 
                                                 
51  For hunter-gatherers as living by Nature, see Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, p. 27; 
and Lee, “What Hunters Do for a Living”. For critiques of the concept of a pre-
modern human-nature balance, see Krech, The Ecological Indian: Myth and History; 
Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison; Wingard, “Interactions between Demo-
graphic Processes and Soil Resources”; and MacLeod, “Exploitation of Natural 
Resources in Colonial Central America”. 
52  On Palenque, see Stuart and Stuart, Lost Kingdoms of the Maya, pp. 19, 31; and 
Perera and Bruce, The Last Lords of Palenque, pp. 10-26. On Thulamela, see David-
son, “Museums and the Reshaping of Memory”, pp. 150-151. On Africa as the last 
wilderness, see Adams and McShane, The Myth of Wild Africa: Conservation with-
out Illusion, chap. 1. 
53  Hall, The Changing Past, pp. 91-116. 
54  Meggers, “Natural Versus Anthropogenic Sources of Amazonian Biodiversity”; and 
Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, pp. 17-19. 
 APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSERT MAP 1 
 
 
 CHAPTER 1 18
was the locus of a thriving plantation system that collapsed with the abolition of 
slavery. Today’s forests in the northeastern United States grew on abandoned 
agricultural lands. The jungles of Kalimantan cover the ruins of mighty 
Srwijaya, which thrived from the sixth to the fourteenth century AD. The forest 
‘wilderness’ of southeastern Borneo in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
was not only extensively used for shifting cultivation and permanent agricul-
ture, but also for commercial agriculture.55 Africa’s ‘wild’ landscapes similarly 
are arguably human creations: for example, the West African forest islands that 
Fairhead and Leach studied were human-made and the extensive miombo 
woodlands of eastern and southern Africa have been modified by human use. 
Indeed, the very idea of ‘Wild Africa’ is a myth.56 
Whereas the Palenque Paradox problematizes unilinearity and static out-
comes, the Ovambo Paradox suggests that deforestation and reforestation may 
occur simultaneously and that environmental change cannot be understood as a 
singular process. Violent Portuguese conquest of the northern Ovambo flood-
plain (in modern southern Angola) during the first two decades of the twentieth 
century caused massive population displacement into the uninhabited wilder-
ness area of the middle Ovambo floodplain and the Sandveld to its east (in 
modern northern Namibia). As the refugees settled the wilderness areas, they 
deforested land in order to construct farms, fields and villages. The impact of 
                                                 
55  On the Maya, see Leyden, Brenner, Whitmore, Curtis, Piperno and Dahlin, “A 
Record of Long- and Short-Term Variation from Northwest Yucatán“, and Wingard, 
“Interactions between Demographic Processes and Soil Resources in the Copán 
Valley, Honduras.” For similar arguments regarding northern Mexico and the Ama-
zon, see Alcorn, “Huastec Noncrop Resource Management”, and Becker and León, 
“Indigenous Forest Management in the Bolivian Amazon”. On Suriname, see Boom-
gaard, “Exploitation and Management of the Surinam Forests”. On the United 
States, see McShea and Healy, eds., Oak Forest Ecosystems, pp. 4-5, 13-33, 34-45, 
46-59 and 60-79. On Srwijaya, see McNeely, “Foreword”, in Sponsel, Headland and 
Baily, Tropical Deforestation, pp. xv-xvii. On Borneo, Knapen, Forests of Fortune? 
pp. 189-281. See also Rietbergen, The Earthscan Reader on Tropical Forestry, pp. 
1-2; Boyce, Landscape Forestry, p. vii; Sponsel, Headland and Baily, “Anthropolo-
gical Perspectives on the Causes, Consequences, and Solutions of Deforestation”, 
pp. 7-8; Longman and Jeník, Tropical Forest and Its Environment, pp. 13-14, 24 and 
27. 
56  On Africa, see Adams and McShane, The Myth of Wild Africa, pp. 1-13; McCann, 
Green Land, Brown Land, p. 2; Sheperd, Shanks and Hobley, “Management of 
Tropical and Subtropical Dry Forests”, pp. 107 and 112; Fairhead and Leach, 
Reframing Deforestation; Berry, Cocoa, Custom, and Socio-Economic Change in 
Rural Western Nigeria, p. 66; Webb, Desert Frontier, p. 3; Campbell, The Miombo, 
pp. 1-3; Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chaps. 1-4; Ford, The Role of Trypanosomiases 
in African Ecology; Kjekhus, Ecology Control and Economic Development in East 
African History. 
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the refugee resettlement on the woody vegetation of the area was particularly 
dramatic in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Paradoxically, as the deforestation of the wilderness areas in northern 
Namibia progressed, a process of reforestation followed in its wake. The 
refugee-settlers and their descendants propagated and often introduced the 
majestic fruit trees that during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s shaded many a farm 
in the middle floodplain in Namibia. Deforestation and reforestation, however, 
was neither cyclical (as in a natural return to a vegetation climax) nor discretely 
sequential; rather, multiple contradictory subprocesses of deforestation and re-
forestation occurred simultaneously. For example, a single village consisted of 
both older and more recently arrived households. Some of the latter had only 
just cleared their plots of woody vegetation, while some of the former had done 
so several decades previously, and in the meantime had reforested their plots. 
Thus, overall, north-central Namibia saw dramatic environmental changes in 
less than a century: many areas were heavily deforested and reforested, re-
vealing multitrajectory and contradictory environmental changes.57 
Contradictions and ambiguity in the record of environmental change have 
been noted elsewhere.58 Beyond the recognition that the outcome of the process 
may be evaluated differently by different stakeholders, however, such acknow-
ledgment has not led to questioning the homogeneity of the process of en-
vironmental change itself.59 
The differentiation in the processes of environmental change also is obscured 
by a fixation on the outcome rather than the process itself. Huxley noted that 
“[e]cologists often study the outcome of plant-plant interactions in terms of 
changes in species number. Unfortunately, because the processes involved are 
extremely complex, less is known about these in most cases”.60 Huxley’s ob-
servation is equally relevant to how environmental change as a whole has been 
studied using the modernization, declinist and inclinist paradigms: late twen-
tieth-century research emphasized the outcome of Human-Nature interactions 
(degradation, stabilization or improvement) more than the processes them-
selves.61 For example, a comparison of two photographs or two sets of aerial 
photography/satellite images from different times can show differences in 
                                                 
57  Ibid., pp. 137-180; Kreike, “Hidden Fruits”. 
58  Moore and Vaughan, Cutting Down Trees; Fairhead and Leach, Misreading the Afri-
can Landscape; Meggers, “Natural Versus Anthropogenic Sources of Amazonian 
Biodiversity: The Continuing Quest for El Dorado”, p. 89; Gibson, McKean and 
Ostrom, “Explaining Deforestation”, p. 2; Schama, Landscape and Memory, pp. 9-
10. 
59  Blaikie and Brookfield, Land Degradation and Society, pp. 4-7, 14-16. 
60  Huxley, Tropical Agroforestry, p. 135. 
61  Williams, Deforesting the Earth, p. 237. 
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vegetation cover and facilitate an assessment about, for example, deforestation 
or reforestation, but the comparison provides no information about the process 
of change itself. And, even if no substantial change in vegetation cover can be 
detected between the two measuring points, it is possible that the actual com-
position of the vegetation itself has changed dramatically.62 
Such issues may be more acute in Africa than elsewhere, not only because 
deforestation data (and other environmental statistics) for the continent are 
largely nonexistent or questionable, but also because more of the environmental 
change is caused by individuals and households for their own benefit than is the 
case in Latin America, for example, or in Southeast Asia.63 In Latin America, 
especially in the Amazon, and in Southeast Asia, in particular in Indonesia, state 
and commercial interests play a much more direct role in encouraging defor-
estation through colonization schemes, timber exploitation, plantation agricul-
ture or ranching. State and commercial clearings are larger and more concen-
trated and therefore leave a much more distinct environmental footprint that can 
be detected in aerial photography and satellite imagery. In addition, state and 
commercial enterprises produce more information about their activities because 
they often are controversial. In Africa, forest settlement is more spontaneous, 
and small-scale individual clearings, even if they are numerous, are virtually 
impossible to detect on Landsat images, especially since selected trees and bush 
often are spared when farms are cleared. Such images therefore, cannot identify 
pristine Nature or climax vegetation even if they exist. In short, the images 
cannot unambiguously distinguish rural cultural from natural landscapes.64 The 
analysis that follows seeks to address the challenge outlined above within the 
context of exploring global paradigms and local paradoxes through the case of 
north-central Namibia. 
 
 
                                                 
62  Mazzucato and Niemeijer, Rethinking Soil, pp. 125-127. 
63  Williams, Deforesting the Earth, pp. 401-406; and Gibson, McKean and Ostrom, 
“Explaining Deforestation”. 
64  See Fairhead and Leach, Reframing Deforestation, pp. 8-9; Balée, “Indigenous 
History and Amazonian Biodiversity”, p. 187-188; Vandermeer, “The Human Niche 
and Rain Forest Preservation in Southern Central America”; Williams, Deforesting 
the Earth, p. 477. On Southeast Asia and Latin America versus Africa, see Col-
chester, “Colonizing the Rainforests”, pp. 5-9. 
2 
Tree castles and  
population bombs 
Population pressure has been identified as the major force for environmental 
change in the twentieth century.1 Yet, while macrolevel analysis of the inter-
action between human populations and the environment demonstrates that 
population dynamics relate to environmental change, the correlation does not 
always originate from a direct causal relationship. Moreover, the relationship 
between population pressure and environmental change and the outcomes of 
change is not necessarily linear. Rather the impact of population density on a 
forest environment is ambiguous and multifaceted. Where and how people im-
pacted on local environmental resources was as important as how many people 
affected the environment of north-central Namibia. 
Malthus argued that population increased at a far greater rate than food 
production, and neo-Malthusian analysis identifies population growth as the 
principal cause of deforestation in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Boserup and 
others, on the other hand, stress that population growth can have the opposite 
effect because intensification and technological innovation can permit the same 
resource base to support a larger population without environmental degrada-
tion.2 Both approaches portray ‘population’ and ‘forest’ as undifferentiated and 
                                                 
1  Myers, Deforestation Rates, pp. 20-23, 45-47; Williams, Deforesting the Earth, pp. 
168-209, 334-379, 460-466. 
2  Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population. See also Ehrlich, The Population 
Bomb; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, The Population Explosion; Cleaver and Schreiber, 
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organic entities. Moreover, the relationship between the two variables is de-
picted as being a mechanical, linear, one-way and unequal interaction, i.e. 
human populations are dominant and act upon the forest.3 The population 
pressure model to some extent approximates cultural determinism, as opposed 
to environmental determinism. The underlying causes of population growth, 
however, sometimes are couched in terms of biological determinism; for ex-
ample, in The Population Bomb Ehrlich writes: “our urge to reproduce is hope-
lessly entwined with our other urges”.4 In essence, while humans (or Culture) 
are advanced as the cause of environmental change, they are not really consid-
ered to be independent agents; rather, they are hostages to biological urges. 
Malthusian and Boserupian explanations are particularly influential in the 
case of modern Africa because the continent has the highest rates of natural 
population increase. Two issues, however, complicate matters. First, a number 
of the African countries that are listed amongst those with the highest deforest-
ation rates, including Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville) and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, are underpopulated.5 Second, research suggests that Africa’s popu-
lation began to grow only in the 1940s or 1950s, although environmental de-
gradation related to population growth, notably deforestation and soil erosion, 
became major concerns in the late 1920s and the 1930s.6 Population move-
ments, however, led to the relative redistribution of the existing population, 
with concentrations of specific groups of people and subsequent population 
                                                                                                                       
Reversing the Spiral. On Boserup-inspired approaches see Boserup, The Conditions 
of Agricultural Growth; Pingali, Bigot and Binswanger, Agricultural Mechanization 
and the Evolution of Farming Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa; Okafor and Fernan-
des, “The Compound Farms of South-Eastern Nigeria: A Predominant Agroforestry 
Homegarden System with Crops and Small Livestock”; Tiffen, Mortimore and 
Gichuki, More People, Less Erosion; Quisumbing and Otsuka, Land, Trees and 
Women, pp. 43-79; and Siebert, “Beyond Malthus and Perverse Incentives, pp. 19-
21. 
3  For critiques of the population pressure models, see, for example, Cordell and 
Gregory, African Population and Capitalism, pp. 14-15; J. Koponen, “Population: A 
Dependent Variable”, and G. Maddox, “Environment and Population Growth in 
Ugogo, Central Tanzania”; Fairhead and Leach, Reframing Deforestation, pp. 13, 
178; Mazzucato and Niemeijer, Rethinking Soil and Water Conservation, pp. 124-
164. 
4  Ehrlich, The Population Bomb, pp. 31-32. For a critique, see Koponen, “Population: 
A Dependent Variable”, and Maddox, “Environment and Population Growth”. 
5  Myers, Deforestation Rates, pp. 20-23, 45-47; Westoby, Introduction to World 
Forestry, p. 109. 
6  Koponen, “Population: A Dependent Variable”, and Maddox, “Environment and 
Population Growth”; Notkola and Siiskonen, Fertility, Mortality and Migration in 
Subsaharan Africa, chap. 9; Headrick, Colonialism, Health and Illness in French 
Equatorial Africa, pp. 89, 194-195, 385-394. 
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pressure in some areas, and depopulation and decreasing population pressure in 
others. Thus, until the 1940s or 1950s, population movement in Africa may 
have been a more critical variable than population growth, and indeed mi-
grations continue to play a major role in the population dynamics of modern 
Africa and consequently in environmental changes.7 
In pre-World War II north-central Namibia’s Ovamboland Native Reserve, 
environmental change was driven more by population movements than by 
natural population growth. Insecurity and security concerns are key to ex-
plaining why, how, where and when populations movements are associated with 
deforestation. In the late 1800s through the early 1920s, a general climate of 
insecurity caused people to concentrate in nucleated wooden fortifications – tree 
castles – for purposes of defense. The fortifications were extensive and elabo-
rate, and building them required enormous amounts of wood. From the 1920s 
onward, improved political security allowed people to fan out from population 
centers into the surrounding wilderness. As settlers moved into the wilderness, 
however, they faced a new threat: wild animal populations that had rebounded 
from 1890s lows. To protect lives and livelihoods, the settlers retained the prac-
tice of constructing fortified homesteads, contributing to a high consumption of 
woody vegetation and deforestation.  
Tree castles and insecurity on the eve of colonial conquest 
Warfare and violence associated with the slave and ivory trades and colonialism at 
the turn of the twentieth century caused the inhabitants of modern southern Angola 
and northern Namibia to concentrate for safety and to invest significant resources 
and labor in defensive works. Woody vegetation was the main construction mate-
rial for elaborate fortresses shaped in the form of circular labyrinth palisades or 
enclosures in the Ovambo floodplain that straddled the Angolan-Namibian colo-
nial border. Communities constructed the palisades using nine-to-twelve-foot-high 
poles buried three feet in the soil, resulting in fortifications that were impregnable 
to spears, arrows and even modern small arms. In the kingdom of Okafima, in the  
 
                                                 
7  Iliffe highlights migrations and the colonization of new environments as the main 
characteristics of the history of Africa, see Iliffe, Africa. For examples of studies that 
emphasize the environmental impact of migrations, see McCann, Green Land, 
Brown Land, pp. 19-22, 96-101; Maddox, “Environment and Population Growth”, 
esp. p. 44; Miehr, “Acacia albida and Other Multipurpose Trees”; Kessy, Conserva-
tion and Utilization of Natural Resources in the East Usambara Forest Reserve, p. 
60; Colchester and Lohmann, The Struggle for Land, especially the contributions by 
Colchester (pp. 1-15), Lohmann (pp. 16-34), Plant (pp. 35-60), Colchester (pp. 99-
138) and Monbiot (pp. 139-163); Gray, “Investing in Soil Quality”, esp. pp. 73, 76-
77. 
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Photo 1 Mwanyangapa’s Baobab Castle, Ombalantu 1917. The baobab which served as the 
keep is surrounded by a mud-plastered palisade  
(Iziko Museums, Cape Town, Dickman Collection) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 2 The Ombalantu Baobab, 1993. A fort in the 1910s, the tree was used as a colonial post 
office and a chapel. During the 1970s and 1980s Apartheid Wars, it served as a bar in 
a South African military base. The large door cut in the trunk during the early colonial 
era is pointed out by Joseph Hailwa, the Namibian Director of Forestry  
(Photo by author, 1993) 
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far northeastern Ovambo floodplain, the royal fort was sufficiently large to provide 
shelter to all of its 1,500 inhabitants. In the southwestern part of the floodplain – 
including Ombalantu, Uukwaluthi and Eunda – huge baobabs served as medieval-
style keeps. In Ombalantu, people constructed their homesteads in close proximity 
to such forts. When an attack was feared, women and children sought safety in the 
hollow trunk of the baobab, where water usually was stored, while livestock was 
driven inside the palisade around the tree. Some of the baobab castles had mud-
plastered outer and inner palisades. Archers positioned themselves on platforms 
behind loopholes. The well-known Ombalantu baobab that is now a national 
monument is a good example of such a former keep. A South African official “had 
a doorway cut in and used the room, in which upwards [of] 50 people can stand, 
as a store”. The construction and maintenance of the fortifications consumed 
large quantities of wood and labor. When the Oukwanyama King Weyulu 
moved his palace-fortress over a short distance in late 1895, seventy men were 
engaged in cutting and transporting new poles while others laid out the ground 
plan.8 
Not only did kings and other notables reside in formidable tree castles, but the 
homesteads of the local populations also were protected by palisade enclosures 
which typically consisted of wooden poles. The homesteads required great effort to 
construct, and they contained from twenty to seventy open or closed ‘huts’. In 
1850s Ondonga, the first homestead that the missionary Carl Hugo Hahn en-
countered measured approximately sixty feet across and consisted of poles and 
stalks planted in the earth forming a small labyrinth. There were separate huts 
for each of the wives and separate compartments for livestock. In the early 
1890s northern floodplain, bundled thorn branches were sometimes used to make 
palisades instead of poles; in Ondonga and Uukwambi in the southern floodplain, 
where poles and branches were in shorter supply, palisades constructed from  
 
                                                 
8  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chaps. 2-3; NAN, WAT ww17, S. Davis, “Tour of 
Northern Territories – Some Random Comments and Thoughts”; A 450, 4, Hahn to 
A.W. Hoernle, 21 Sep. 1936; RCO 4, RCO to GRN, 29 Feb. 1916; RCO 8, RCO to 
Sec. SWA, Ondonga, 27 Oct. 1918 and Extract from RCO’s Personal Diary, 10 
March 1917; NAO 104, Anderson to Hahn, 13/4/44 Johannesburg 1882, extract 
diary W.W Jordan copied from the Cape Quarterly Review 2 (1882): 519-539; 
AVEM, RMG 2599 C/i 19, Bernsmann, Omburo, 6 Jan. 1892, and RMG C/h 52, 
Speiker, Visitationsbericht der Station Namakunde, Namakunde 13-18 July 1906; 
Möller, Journey in Africa, pp. 110-112, 117; Lima, A Campanha dos Cuamatos, pp. 
181-183; CNDIH, Avulsos, Caixa 3439, Ribeiro da Fonseca, “Relatório do recon-
hecimento”, Cuamato, 26 Sep. 1913; OMITI 4.4.38. On Dayak village fortresses, 
see Knapen, Forests of Fortune? pp. 86-88. 
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bundles of grain stalks were common.9 A thorn bush fence – which was as ef-
fective as barbed wire – surrounded the palisaded homestead and its fields.10  
Portuguese violence and population flight into Ovamboland 
Colonial conquest and pacification caused massive destruction and large-scale 
population displacement across Africa. In the northern Ovambo floodplain, the 
violence and terror caused by the Portuguese colonial conquest and ‘pacification’ 
of the Ombadjas, Evale and Okafima from 1909 to 1915 and of Oukwanyama 
from 1915 to 1917 made tens of thousands of the inhabitants flee south into the 
South African-controlled middle and southern floodplain. Many refugees from the 
northern floodplain initially resettled in the Neutral Zone, a disputed territory that 
between 1915 and 1927 was co-administered by the South African and the Portu-
guese colonial powers until it was ceded to Portugal. The cession triggered yet 
another large-scale migration to the middle floodplain area south of the new 
colonial boundary. It was then that many refugees who had settled in the Neutral 
Zone moved into the South African-occupied part of the Ovambo floodplain which 
became known as Ovamboland.11 
In 1916, only a few of the refugees had managed to construct fortress-like 
homesteads and the impact of the refugee movement on the vegetation was as yet 
marginal: “this country is a vast flat, covered with more or less thick bush, grass 
and tall antheaps (…). there are also large dry uninhabited stretches (…). Except 
for [the Oukwanyama king] Mandume’s and some principal headmen’s stock-
aded kraals the natives live separated in unimportant little huts scattered about 
in the bush”.12 
By 1933, however, a substantial share of Ovamboland’s population consisted of 
refugees from the northern floodplain polities of Oukwanyama, the Ombadjas, 
Evale and Okafima. Refugees from the northern floodplain escaped to Ondonga 
and Ongandjera in the southern floodplain, and also sought sanctuary in the 
                                                 
9  Lau, Carl Hugo Hahn Tagebücher, vol. 4, 22 July 1857; AVEM, RMG 2599 C/i 19, 
Bernsmann, Omburo, 6 Jan. 1892; Möller, Journey in Africa, p. 126. On the great 
labor investment required, see, for example, AVEM, RMG C/h 52, I. Speiker, Visita-
tionsbericht der Station Namakunde, Namakunde 13-18 July 1906; Wülfhorst, 
Moses, pp. 14-15. The homestead was called eumbo in Oukwanyama and egumbo in 
Ondonga. 
10  See, for example, NAN, NAO 104, Jordan diary; and Lima, A Campanha dos Cua-
matos, pp. 136-140, 159. 
11  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chaps. 1-4. 
12  NAN, UNG, UA 1, RCO to Deputy Secretary for the Protectorate, Ondonga [On-
dangwa], 31 May 1916. Interviewees also recall that their farms initially were small, 
see, for example, Paulus Nadenga, interview by author, Oshomukwiyu, 28 April 
1993. 
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wilderness of the middle floodplain. Colonial Namibia’s tribal district of Oukwa-
nyama, which was nonexistent in 1915, in 1933 counted 41,215 inhabitants, or 
38% of Ovamboland’s total population of 107,861. By 1938, the district’s popu-
lation had increased to 52,580.13 
The impact of flight on the population of what became north-central Nami-
bia was still visible in the 1991 census data. Of the survivors of the generation 
born before 1917, 18% claimed to be foreign born. Of those born between 1917 
and 1926, 15% were foreign born, a figure that decreased to 11% for people 
born between 1927 and 1936; 9% for those born between 1937 and 1946; 8% 
for those born between 1947 and 1976; and less than 5% for those born after 
1976.14  
Internal migration in South Africa’s Ovamboland 
A second settlement movement into the wilderness was the result of internal 
migrations within Ovamboland. By the mid-1920s, the southern and middle 
floodplains had become much less violent spaces and people no longer felt com-
pelled to seek safety in numbers. As a result, settlers struck out into the wilderness 
areas that had separated the old kingdoms. Again, this was a phenomenon that 
was not unique to Ovamboland. During the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, individuals 
and groups of Africans throughout the continent fanned out from defensible 
sites with dense settlement to occupy wilderness expanses.15 
Between 1915 and 1950, migrants entirely transformed the vast wilderness of 
the middle floodplain. By 1928, bush dominated the district, although the flood 
channels themselves mostly were bare of woody vegetation.16 The large majority 
of the area’s modern villages date to the post-1915 era and woody vegetation to  
 
                                                 
13  Kreike, Re-Creating Eden, chap. 4. 
14  Derived from Republic of Namibia, 1991 Census, vol. 1, table A03. 
15  Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, pp. 315-317. For other examples of such 
population dispersals, see Mandala, Work and Control in a Peasant Economy, pp. 
95-96; McCann, Green Land, Brown Land, pp. 147-156; van Beek and Banga, “The 
Dogon and Their Trees”; Miehr, “Acacia albida and other Multipurpose Trees”; 
Maack, “‘We Don’t Want Terraces!’”, esp. p. 155; Richards, Indigenous Agricul-
tural Revolution, p. 54; Mazzucato and Niemeijer, Rethinking Soil and Water Con-
servation, p. 82. Similar processes marked Southeast Borneo and the Jimi Valley of 
Papua New Guinea. Knapen, Forests of Fortune? pp. 252-253; and F. van Helden, 
“Resource Dynamics, Livelihood and Social Change on the Forest Fringe”, p. 87. 
16  NAN, KAB 1, Volkmann, 30 Oct. 1928, Report on the Agricultural and Political 
Conditions at the Angola Boundary; RCO 9, RCO to Sec. Protectorate, 18 Feb. 1917; 
RCO 10, RCO and Hahn, Preliminary Memo re Ovamboland and Chief Mandume 
[1916]. 
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construct farms and fences was abundant during the 1920s through the 1940s. In 
the 1940s, such middle floodplain villages as Omupanda, Oshapwa and Osho-
mukwiyu, for example, contained only a few households, but Odimbo, seven 
miles north of Oshomukwiyu, already was densely settled. Ombadja refugees 
founded a small cluster of villages during the 1920s further west.17 Refugees 
from the northern floodplain also settled throughout the southern floodplain, 
including in Ondonga’s eastern Oshigambo area.18 
In March 1917, the inhabitants of Ombalantu huddled in farms concentrated 
around baobab forts. In 1918, the formidable Uukwaluthi baobab castle was 
abandoned, its walls crumbling, and the “[Eunda] Headman Shituthi (…) in-
formed us he like others made no further forts as (…) [the] necessity for such 
protection had died out”.19 The Ongandjera headman Petrus explained the new 
dispersed settlement pattern to a 1935 colonial commission: “Before we had the 
Union [of South Africa] Government here we had a lot of trouble and each man 
had to try and save his property himself. But now every man is free and can go 
where he likes”.20  
                                                 
17  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chaps. 2-4; NAN, NAO 18, Monthly Reports Ovambo-
land, June-July 1927; A450, 9, Newspaper clipping of an article by G.W. Tobias 
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18  CNDIH, Caixa 4130, Governo do Distrito 31-20 1, Relatorio sobre a occupação, 18 
June 1909, and Avulsos Caixa 3439, Ribeiro da Fonseca, Relatorio do reconheci-
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T’Chipa, 1 March 1920; A450, 7, Native Affairs Report Ovamboland 1924, and vol. 
10, document marked in right top corner “By Shovala 17/9/35”; NAO 18, Monthly 
Report Ovamboland, Sep. 1926; NAO 106, Diaries NCO, Diary 1935-1938, 9 Sep. 
1935 and 30 June 1936; NAO 9, UGR to O/C NAO, Namakunde, 28 Aug. 192 and 
Bourquin, memo re Headman Filemon Shipena of Elope-Ondonga, [22 Jan. 1942]; 
NAO 51, Shimoshili to Master Nakale [Eedes], Olupembana, Uukwambi, 13 Jan. 
and 2 June 1948; Nauyoma Kapeke [to NCO], Uukwambi [received Ondangwa, 3 
April 1948]; NAO 51, NCO to CNC, Ondangwa, 20 July 1948 and appendix, 
Foreign Natives in Ovamboland: Summary: Ondonga Tribal Area, Chief Kambonde 
to NCO, Okaroko June 1948; NAO 90, statement Aihuki Tolongele, Ondangwa, 5 
May 1948; NAO 91, statement Agustinhu Kapetango [March 1954?]; NAO 92, 
affidavit Gallation Shidive, Ondonga, 25 Feb. 1954; NAO 91, statements Thomas 
Kupila, 5 May 1954 and Titus Muatelai Kakonda, Ondangwa, 10 May 1954. 
19  NAN, RCO 8, extract RCO’s Personal Diary, 13 March 1917, and RCO to Sec. 
SWA, 27 Oct. 1918, extracts diary, 9-10 Oct. 1918. 
20  NAN, A450, 12, SWA Commission: Minutes of Evidence, Sitting at Ongandjera, 
Headman Petrus, p. 700; RCO 4, NCO to Sec. SWA, report on Ipumbu, Ondonga, 6 
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To chiefs, headmen and by extension the colonial officials who relied on 
them to administer Ovamboland, the scattering of settlements constituted a 
challenge for at least two reasons. First, subjects who moved into wilderness 
areas beyond the old settled core districts effectively moved outside of colonial 
control. Second, settlers from neighboring districts moved into the middle 
floodplain wilderness and claimed it as their own. As settlers reduced the wil-
derness belts and land became scarce, kings and headmen staked their claims to 
previously unsettled land in what appeared a ‘land speculation’ frenzy: the more 
land a king or a headman could amass to allocate, the more followers he could 
attract (and followers could be taxed and mobilized for labor), and the more 
grazing areas and water he controlled for his and his followers’ livestock.21  
What the colonial officials of Ovamboland began to consider ‘illegal settle-
ment’ in the wilderness areas came to be seen as a major problem by both the 
colonial administration and local kings and headmen. The Ovamboland annual 
report for 1941 stressed that “[t]he large number of kraals established in the 
bush areas, during recent years, is very noticeable”. In 1946, the Ovambo kings 
and headmen urged Native Commissioner C.H.L. Hahn to strengthen their 
authority outside the settled zones proper and Hahn was more than sympathetic: 
The leading natives one and all complain of the growing inclination of their subjects 
to establish themselves outside the proper tribal area in unauthorised bush country. 
They are taking steps to have these people moved to where there are fixed settle-
ments and proper tribal control.22 
In 1947, for example, an Ombalantu headman requested the personal inter-
vention of the Native Commissioner because he was unable to prevent people 
from cutting down trees to clear new farms and fields.23  
As migrants settled beyond the old population centers during the 1930s, 
1940s and early 1950s, ‘intertribal’ conflict over wilderness territory increased 
and kings and headmen often called on the Native Commissioners to support 
their claims. During the 1920s, disagreement about settlement in the wilderness 
that separated the refugee districts of Oukwanyama and Uukwambi turned 
violent. The Ondonga and Uukwambi kings demanded that a “definite and 
visible line [be] demarcated” to prevent any further Oukwanyama expansion 
southwards into their territories. In 1941, the colonial administration resorted to 
                                                                                                                       
Jan. 1922. Ondonga was more secure somewhat earlier and the resulting coloniza-
tion of wilderness areas occurred earlier, see RCO 3, appendices to British Consul, 
Luederitzbucht, 14 Feb. 1913. 
21  See, for example, NAN, A450, 7, Annual Report Ovamboland 1937, and NAO 99, 
Headmen Ombalantu to NCO, Ombalantu, 9 Aug. 1951. 
22  NAN, NAO 21, Quarterly Report Ovamboland, April-June 1946. 
23  NAN, NAO 98, Muanyagapo Mbunda to NCO, Ombalantu, 8 April, 14 July and 30 
Aug. 1947, and NCO to Muanyagapo Mbunda, Ondangwa, 15 April 1947. 
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drastic measures to discourage encroachment on ‘wilderness’ borderland: it 
evicted six households that had settled in the ‘uninhabited bush’ areas of 
Uukwambi and Onkolonkathi and destroyed the homesteads. By 1948, conflicts 
between Ombalantu and Uukwaluthi settlers who encroached on disputed 
‘bush’ border territory were frequent.24 In 1953, the Native Commissioner re-
ported to his superior that “[a]ll the tribal borders in Ovamboland are marked by 
trees being blazed, by Omurambas [seasonal watercourses] or by sections of 
roads. Many disputes about these borders have arisen (…). It would be useless 
and costly to fence these borders”.25  
The colonization frontiers cut into the wilderness even though water was in 
short supply and the construction of new farms and fields was laborious, slow 
and difficult.26 One resource that initially seemed available in unlimited quan-
tities in the wilderness was wood. Even in the Oshigambo Valley of eastern 
Ondonga, which saw a rapid increase of its population as a result of the influx 
of refugees, land and wood were still abundant in the early 1920s.27  
To relieve the congestion in Ovamboland, the colonial administration en-
couraged the colonization of what became known as ‘eastern Ovamboland’ east 
and outside of the floodplain. The settlers faced enormous challenges in eastern 
Ovamboland, not least because of the lack of water resources and the abundance 
of wild animals that threatened their lives, their livestock and their crops. Not 
surprisingly, it proved difficult to recruit volunteer pioneers.28 The eastern 
frontier leapfrogged along three parallel axes. The northernmost route was the 
border road/clearing that marked the Angolan-South West African (Namibian) 
boundary. The Eenhana road was a second axis of advance. The Ondonga-
                                                 
24  NAN, RCO 4, NCO to Sec. SWA, report on Ipumbu, Ondonga, 6 Jan. 1922; Man-
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27  Interviews by author: Paulus Nadenga, Oshomukwiyu, 28 April 1993, and Nahandjo 
Hailonga, Onamahoka, 4 Feb. 1993. 
28  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chap. 7. See also NAO 9, NCO to Sec. SWA, Ondangwa, 
6 Dec. 1932 and NAO 19, Monthly Report Ovamboland, Oct. 1934. 
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Kurungkuru road that was cleared during the 1920s formed a third route to 
penetrate the eastern wilderness.29  
Tree castles and deforestation in the 1920s to 1940s 
The pace and the extent of forest clearing in Ovamboland in the 1920s and 
1930s astounded colonial officials and missionaries. When South African offi-
cers occupied the territory in 1915, only Ovamboland’s southern floodplain had 
been densely settled, while the middle floodplain and the vast expanses east of 
the floodplain appeared to be virgin wilderness.30 The most massive population 
movements from the Portuguese-occupied northern floodplain into the middle 
floodplain took place during the 1910s and 1920s. The scale of settlement and 
the subsequent high demand for construction materials in some areas may have 
quickly depleted the preferred wood resources, leading to the use of alterna-
tives. The latter was more likely a problem in the southern floodplain, which 
received a large influx of refugees, especially in Ondonga, where wood re-
sources already had been in more limited supply before 1916. Subsequently, in 
the 1930s, the South African colonial administration temporarily restricted the 
further influx of Angolan immigrants, especially into the new colonial Oukwa-
nyama district in the middle floodplain. In the 1940s, the Ondonga king threat-
ened to evict a large number of Angolan ‘squatters’ from his district because of 
land shortages.31 
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The refugees and migrants who settled the wilderness areas of Ovamboland 
continued to construct elaborate fortified homesteads that consumed large 
amounts of woody vegetation. In 1925, an Anglican missionary wrote:  
The kraals are built of poles standing 8 feet high on end, and closely tied together 
and supported by horizontal poles. Their diameter varies up to 100 yards, and some 
even larger. This (…) is (…) of great strength against raiding parties, but very waste-
ful of wood.32  
And the District Surgeon for Ovamboland observed in 1937:  
The kraal is a relic of the olden days (…) and (…) was always built with a defensive 
purpose in view. It is more or less circular and averaging from 20 to 120 yards in 
diameter according to the status of the kraal head. It is generally surrounded by a 
stockade of poles about 8 to 9 feet high.33  
Anglican missionaries commented that “[the] waste of timber in a matter of 
25 to 50 years will extend the thirst belt and affect the rainfall and it is the duty 
of the Government and missionaries to encourage tree planting”.34 A newly 
appointed Assistant Native Commissioner for Oshikango in 1931 expressed 
shock concerning the extent of deforestation in the Oukwanyama district.35 But 
his superior, Native Commissioner Hahn, believed these concerns to be exag-
gerated and opposed any restrictions on wood use by the inhabitants of Ovam-
boland because he feared it might trigger political instability.36  
Hahn thought that it was politically inadvisable at the time to impose any 
real conservation regulations regarding tree use, with the exception of limits on 
the use of timber trees for constructing new missions and churches.37 Not only 
did Hahn oppose the introduction of conservation measures to limit clearing 
woody vegetation to construct new homesteads, but he also encouraged the con-
tinued or renewed construction of fortified homesteads. In 1934, for example, 
the Native Commissioner urged Ovambo leaders to construct and maintain 
larger homesteads:  
                                                 
32  NAN, A450, 9, newspaper clipping of an article by Tobias [1925]. 
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Natives have been encouraged to build bigger and more substantial kraals. In certain 
tribal areas it has been found that kraals are becoming smaller and smaller and more 
dilapidated (…). It is in keeping with native order that the chief and headmen live in 
big and strongly built kraals (…). It is the big native kraals occupied by wealthy and 
influential natives which retain tribal order and discipline.38  
Native Commissioner Hahn blamed Christianity and its crusade against 
polygamy for a decrease in household size and a commensurate decline in 
homestead size and quality. A monogamous Christian household, he argued, 
was simply short of hands and could only maintain a part of the former grand 
homestead.39 In brief, Hahn’s colonial policy is derived from his understanding 
of the importance of social relations, with consequences for local decisions 
about the use of human and woody vegetation resources.  
Colonial concerns about overpopulation and deforestation in the 
1950s 
In the 1950s, a new generation of colonial scientists raised anew the alarm about 
overpopulation. The medical officer for Ovamboland in 1953 painted the 
specter of overpopulation, deforestation and deteriorating health conditions:  
The habitable areas are limited chiefly by the terrain and the water supply. Hence the 
density of the population is already becoming a problem in some areas. Scarcity of 
durable and suitable building materials for the construction of kraals, and the over-
grazing of areas denuded of trees, will amongst other things interfere with the water 
supply and multiply the danger of fly and tick borne diseases.40  
In 1956, the administration’s newly appointed Agricultural Officer concluded 
that the two most populous and largest districts of Ovamboland – Oukwanyama 
and Ondonga – were overpopulated and in the throes of deforestation. Worst off 
was the area around Ondangwa, which already was denuded of trees. The most 
densely settled parts of the Uukwambi, Ombalantu, Onkolonkathi and Eunda 
districts were “populated to their full capacity. Any further increase of kraals, 
fields, and livestock will result in overpopulation”.41 
Two years earlier, when the highest South African colonial official for Na-
mibia, the Administrator for South West Africa, visited Ovamboland, he admo-
nished the audience at a ‘tribal meeting’ in Oukwanyama: “You should not cut 
                                                 
38  NAN, A450, 7, Annual Report Ovamboland 1935. 
39  NAN, A450, 7, Annual Report Ovamboland 1937. 
40  NAN, NAO 65, Annual Health Report Ovamboland 1953. 
41  NAN, BAC 133, Van Niekerk, Travel Report Ovamboland for June 1956 to CNC, 
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these beautiful trees. Cut the ugly or dry trees”.42 In 1956, when the colonial 
administration for the first time addressed all of Ovamboland’s chiefs and head-
men in a public meeting, the officials advised against clearing new homesteads 
in wilderness areas because the areas were to become forest reserves: “Chiefs 
and headmen are instructed not to allot sites in wooded areas, but only in strictly 
residential areas”.43 Forest reserves, where tree felling was prohibited and only 
dead wood could be gathered for domestic purposes, however, did not mate-
rialize until decades later, and they proved ineffective. Proclaiming the remain-
ing wooded wilderness areas as forest reserves floundered in the face of dis-
puted claims over wilderness areas between various chiefs and headmen, which 
prevented delimitating the borders of the colonial districts.44 
Ovamboland’s colonial chiefs and headmen continued to have an interest in 
limiting further settlement in the remaining wilderness areas because the 
activities of people in those areas were more difficult to exploit and control. In 
this respect, their interests coincided with those of the colonial administration, 
but collided with the interests of subjects who wanted a farm of their own. For 
example, during a meeting in Ondonga in 1961, when the Bantu Commissioner 
warned the headmen that trees and forests should be protected against deforest-
ation, Amtenya Shenuka spoke up from the audience and stated: “regarding new 
homesteads in the forests. There are many young people without homesteads”.45 
The Ondonga king proclaimed at the same meeting that further expansion in 
western and northern directions would be prohibited to ensure future wood 
supplies; new homesteads could only be made in the eastern and southern 
directions where sufficient land was available. An Uukwaluthi headman pointed 
out that laws existed that prohibited clearing the forest in the border areas 
between the different colonial districts and complained that “[p]eople move 
away and they should return to their land in the inhabited area, where spots to 
make homes are abundant without the need to cut down the forest”. The 
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43  NAN, BAC 44, Minutes of the first general meeting of Chiefs and Headmen of all 
tribes in Ovamboland, Ondangwa, 22 Aug. 1956; BAC 133, Agricultural Officer to 
NCO, Report of travel to the northwestern part of Ovamboland from 20-22 June 
1956, Ondangwa, 4 July 1956 and Agricultural Report Ovamboland 1955-1956. 
44  NAN, BAC 133, Van Niekerk, Travel Report Ovamboland for June 1956 to CNC, 
Ondangwa, 19 Nov. 1956, and Agricultural Officer to NCO, Report of travel to the 
northwestern part of Ovamboland from 20-22 June 1956, Ondangwa, 4 July 1956. 
45  NAN, BAC 131, Quarterly Report Meeting held at Outanga, Oundonga [Ondonga], 
27 Dec. 1961. 
 TREE CASTLES AND POPULATION BOMBS  37
Uukwaluthi king agreed and admonished: “Listen well (…). no forests can be 
eradicated”.46 
Although Ovamboland’s kings and headmen supported colonial officials’ 
attempts to conserve forests outside the village zones, they were not on the same 
page regarding forest conservation policies within the village territories that 
they controlled. Chiefs and headmen were eager to attract followers by offering 
farmland in order to expand their income base for labor, taxes and levies 
(including land fees). They therefore resisted imposing limits on the number of 
households and farm plots per village.47 Moreover, wood within the villages 
could be used to construct and maintain farms, although felling trees for 
homestead poles formally was limited to “only the useless and, where possible 
dead trees (…). Each application should be referred to the Headman”.48 In 1961 
Uukwambi district, for example, growing trees could not be cut down for poles 
or other purposes.49  
Population growth in Ovamboland 
How ‘real’ were the mid-1950s colonial concerns about overpopulation? Popu-
lation figures supplied by the Ovamboland administration must be used with 
care. Before the 1960s, the Ovamboland administration conducted an actual 
population count on only three occasions: in 1933, in 1938 and in 1951. All 
other figures in Ovamboland’s reports until the mid-1950s were based on these 
three counts. In the annual reports, officials either simply repeated the numbers 
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from the last report, or they added a percentage to the figures each year based 
on the assumption that the population was growing at a certain rate. For 
example, in 1946, Native Commissioner Hahn complained about the difficulty 
of conducting an actual census in Ovamboland and eventually submitted esti-
mates rather than actual counts on the required census sheets. In 1948, Hahn’s 
successor Eedes simply copied the population figures in his predecessor’s last 
annual report.50 
According to the colonial and later figures, the population nearly doubled 
from 107,861 to 200,253 people between 1933 and 1951, and subsequently 
tripled to 618,669 between 1951 and 1991.51 Interestingly, the figures suggest a 
relative decline in population growth after 1951: had the population been cal-
culated to have increased at the same rate between 1951 and 1991 (a forty-year 
period) as it had in the less than two decades leading up to 1951, the figure in 
1991 would have been 800,000 people. 
Although fertility figures (the number of live-born children per woman) are 
rare, data for the Oukwanyama district for the 1930s provide some clues to 
understanding the area’s population dynamics. The 1938 census recorded 4,600 
infants (defined in the census as children of two years of age and under), 
suggesting that on average approximately 2,300 children were born in 1936 and 
in 1937. The population of Oukwanyama increased by 11,000 persons between 
1933 and 1938, and 2,300 births per year would account for the increase, al-
though these figures do not reflect mortality. Infant mortality was high, and 
actual natural increase was much lower than the above figures at first glance 
seem to suggest. The 1934 figures for Oukwanyama, for example, recorded 663 
births, 245 infant deaths and 295 other deaths. Natural increase of the popu-
lation thus was only 123 people, i.e., three per thousand based on the population 
figures for 1933.52 In 1933-1934, Ovamboland was still in the aftermath of a 
severe drought, which must have depressed the number of births and increased 
mortality, so the figure may be on the low side. It nevertheless suggests that the 
population increase of 11,000 people in Oukwanyama district between 1933 and 
1938 principally was due to immigration rather than to natural increase. Figures 
for Ombalantu, Ongandjera and Onkolonkathi underscore that in-migration may 
                                                 
50  See NAO 24, 1933 Census and 1938 Census; NAO 19, NCO to Sec. SWA, 
Ondangwa, 15 Feb. 1934; NAO 20, Annual Report Ovamboland 1938; NAO 23, 
NCO to Sec. [SWA], Population Census 1946, Windhoek, 8 March 1946, and Final 
Return Census 1946, Province of South West Africa, Ovamboland, 15 May 1946; 
NAO 61, Annual Reports Ovamboland 1948, 1950 and 1951. 
51  NAN, NAO 24, 1933 Census and 1938 Census; NAO 61, Annual Report Ovambo-
land 1951; Republic of Namibia, 1991 Census. 
52  NAN, NAO 23, O/C Oshikango to NCO, 30 March 1938, and NAO 24, O/C 
Oshikango to NCO, Oshikango, 14 May 1935. 
 TREE CASTLES AND POPULATION BOMBS  39
have been an important source of population growth between 1933 and 1938. 
No comparable figures are available for Ondonga, but even if Oukwanyama was 
the only colonial district where migration determined population dynamics, its 
overall impact was critical: in 1933, the district accounted for nearly 40% of the 
total population of Ovamboland.53 
Figures from the 1991 census suggest that natural population increase was 
significant in the 1940s and 1950s. Only 8% of the survivors born between 
1947 and 1976 were foreign born, a percentage that is lower than that for the 
older age groups. “Foreign born” refers to refugees from the northern floodplain 
in modern Angola.54 Ovamboland had a young population in 1991: over one-
third of the population had been born after 1976 and the survivors from the 15-
24 age category were twice as numerous as survivors from the 25-34 age cate-
gory.55 The data from the 1991 Namibian census also indicate that the fertility 
of women born between 1932 and 1946 was notably higher than that of the 
older age groups. In turn, the average number of live-born children for women 
born between 1927 and 1931 – although lower than the 1932-1946 age group – 
was substantially higher than that of the 65+ group that had been born in 1926 
or earlier. The women with the higher number of live-born children are likely to 
have begun to give birth in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and they subse-
quently would have produced a baby boom until well into the 1960s.56 
Malthusian population bomb mechanics caused by a natural population 
growth only became a factor after World War II. Prewar population increase in 
north-central Namibia was the result of massive in-migration of refugees from 
the northern floodplain in modern Angola. The resulting population pressure on 
woody and other environmental resources in north-central Namibia was thus not 
the result of natural causes, but was a consequence of political insecurity in the 
Portuguese colony of Angola. It was also not a mechanical and linear process; 
rather the decision to flee to the Namibian side or remain on the Angolan side 
was made by individuals and households. Instead of an explosive population 
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growth it was the displacement and reconcentration of the existing population of 
the floodplain within the larger region that transformed how, where and to what 
extent woody vegetation resources in north-central Namibia were utilized.  
Woody vegetation resources by the close of the twentieth century 
Poles and firewood were scarce in Ombalantu district by the early 1970s. By the 
early 1990s, the same applied to much of the central floodplain in the peri-urban 
area around Ondangwa and Oshakati. Households in villages close to the border 
had access to abundant wood resources in Angola’s northern floodplain. In 
villages further south and closer to Ondangwa and Oshakati, including, for ex-
ample, Oshomukwiyu, Omupanda and Eko, however, firewood was in such 
short supply that people dug out and used old tree stumps and tree roots. In 
Oshomukwiyu, the only nonfruit trees left in the landscape consisted of sparse, 
heavily coppiced mopane stumps and some mopane bush.57 While a bundle of 
firewood from Angola fetched two rand in border villages in 1993, it fetched 
five rand in the Namibian border town of Oshikango; a bundle of firewood was 
sufficient to meet a household’s cooking fuel requirements for two or three 
days.58 By the early 1990s, a variety of woody species, including mopane 
(Colophospermum mopane), red bushwillow (Combretum apiculatum) and wild 
seringa (Burkea africana) were used as firewood.59 Southwest of Oshakati, one 
of Ovamboland’s two largest towns, only fruit trees remained and people used 
palm fronds and dried dung as fuel. A 2001 study, however, claimed that wood 
use in Ovamboland as a whole was sustainable, irrespective of the population 
growth.60 Despite an undeniable shortage of wood resources in parts of Ovam-
boland, the dire predictions that Ovamboland would degenerate into a desert 
had not materialized by the close of the twentieth century. Why not? First, such 
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predictions often were overstated. For example, a warning by the forester Dr. 
Lueckhoff that Ovamboland was transforming into an inhospitable desert was 
based on a tour through Ovamboland in late 1969 – during the height of the dry 
season! He pointed to ‘treeless plains’ northeast of Oponono Lake as evidence 
and considered the area’s sparse trees as relic vegetation of a previously more 
abundant tree cover.61 Yet, earlier descriptions of the area depict it as grass 
plains with little woody vegetation. Colonial officials also presumed that ‘Afri-
cans’ had a negative attitude towards trees and they explicitly attempted to re-
educate African subjects on the value of trees, for example, in 1972, when the 
administration embraced reforestation under the South African ‘Our Green 
Heritage’ environmental awareness campaign.62 
Second, woody vegetation became less exclusively a source of construction 
materials (and protection). The fate of the baobab may in fact suggest a trend 
for other woody species that served ‘protective’ functions. Although the baobab 
castle represented the starkest example of the critical safety functions of woody 
vegetation early in the twentieth century, by the end of the century its use as a 
stronghold was a distant memory. Overall, the importance of woody vegetation 
as an almost exclusive source for construction materials had been declining 
since the 1950s, when wood began to be replaced by alternative materials. Of a 
sample of surveyed households that retained a palisade in 1993, in 13% of the 
cases (50 out of 313) the materials were of nonwood origin.63 Almost 10% of 
the households used millet stalks and 7% used palm fronds, wire or bricks.64 
Clay bricks and bricks made from a mixture of clay and cement became in-
creasingly common in even the most remote rural areas of north-central Nami-
bia. In 1966, of the 49 homesteads that were razed to make room for Ogongo 
Agricultural College, 10% contained brick buildings.65 In 1967, 231 households 
received compensation for losses in connection with widening the Ruacana-
Ondangwa and Oshivelo-Ondangwa-Oshikango roads. The homesteads of al-
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Director of Agriculture Ovamboland Government, Pretoria, 6 Nov. 1972. 
63  OMITI 4.3.1. 
64  OMITI 4.3.1. 
65  NAN, AHE (BAC) 1/346, Bantu Affairs Commissioner to Chief Bantu Commis-
sioner, Ondangwa, 30 Dec. 1965, and Chief Bantu Commissioner SWA to Secretary 
Bantu Administration and Development, Windhoek, 11 Jan. 1966. On bricks, see 
also WAT ww17, S. Davis, Tour of Northern Territories – Some Random Com-
ments and Thoughts, and Kaulikalelwa Oshitina Muhonghwo, interview by author, 
Ondaanya, 2 Feb. 1993. 
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most half (110) of the households contained one or more brick constructions 
and 24 (10%) used corrugated iron as a construction material, mainly for the 
roofs.66 In 1993, wood was still a critical material, and two out of every three 
Ovamboland Multi-Purpose Investigation for Tree-Use Improvement (OMITI) 
survey households had at least one hut made with a wall of wooden poles. But 
two out of every three households also had at least one additional hut made with 
brick walls. The walls consisted predominantly of mud bricks; only one out of 
every ten households had one or more cement brick huts. Wood- and mud-
walled huts were mentioned by one of every three respondents in the 1993 
OMITI survey, and corrugated iron by one of every six.67 Indeed, late in the 
1993 rainy season, in the villages of Eko and Omupanda, where construction 
wood was in very short supply, young boys could be observed making bricks 
during the school holidays, typically using earth taken from termite mounds, but 
also using cement.68 The shortage of construction material was especially ob-
vious in the Ondangwa-Oshakati area, which was sparsely forested earlier in the 
twentieth century. In 1993, millet and sorghum stalks were used as construction 
material for huts (mentioned by 4% of the OMITI sample) and for palisades.69 
Although wood was in short supply in the central areas in the late twentieth 
century, therefore, environmental change in north-central Namibia cannot be 
reduced to a unilinear, progressive and irreversible process of deforestation 
based on the hypothesis of population explosion. 
The role of population movements and their impact on the making and 
unmaking of human-settled areas and uninhabited ‘forest,’ ‘bush’ or ‘wilder-
ness’ areas was critical. Colonial violence and the demarcation of colonial 
boundaries led to massive flight from the Portuguese-occupied northern flood-
plain into the South African-occupied middle floodplain, an area that was over-
whelmingly wilderness. The subsequent settlement of the middle floodplain 
wilderness by the refugees from the northern floodplain, and the settlement of 
the wilderness zones that had separated the precolonial polities from one 
another by refugees from the northern floodplain and migrants from the old 
                                                 
66  NAN, OVA 53, Sec. SWA to Sec. Agriculture Owambo, Windhoek, 24 June 1974, 
appendices A-C. 
67  OMITI 4.3.11. The 1991 census underrepresented the use of nonwood construction 
materials for huts. The census identifies 598 homesteads in the category “Kraal/Hut” 
with cement block constructions but it has no category for clay brick constructs. See 
Republic of Namibia, 1991 Census, Report A, Statistical Tables, vol. 5, table H04.  
68  Author’s personal observations, Eko, 25 May 1993. 
69  On the use of millet stalks, see OMITI 4.3.11. Millet stalks are not included as a 
category of building materials in the 1991 census. See Republic of Namibia, 1991 
Census, Report A, Statistical Tables, vol. 5, table H04. 
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southern floodplain heartlands, dramatically changed Ovamboland’s environ-
ment. 
The impact of population density on the forest environment therefore is am-
biguous and beyond being a quantitative and biological factor. Until the 1940s, 
the ‘population’ factor in Ovamboland exerted its most important influence 
through migrations and flight, and not through the mechanics of any ‘population 
bomb’. Thus, security and insecurity concerns contributed critically to how 
much woody vegetation was consumed, and why. That population as a qualita-
tive factor is as important as population as a quantitative factor also suggests 
that population may play a critical role in environmental change even under 
conditions where overall population-to-land ratios appear to be low. 
 
 
  
3 
Conquest of Nature:  
Imperial political ecologies 
The ideas, policies and practices regarding the conquest, occupation and admi-
nistration of colonial empires are major factors in understanding environmental 
change. Perceptions of non-Western environments which involve a set of issues 
that Grove labeled ‘green imperialism’ can be distinguished from Crosby’s 
‘biological imperialism’ because Grove highlights human agency (i.e., Culture) 
and ideas while Crosby emphasizes biological agency with humans as the 
unintentional vectors (i.e., Nature’s agency).1 
Colonial conservation and development priorities and projects shaped the 
non-Western environment physically and conceptually – often in very dramatic 
ways. Hunting and gathering forest products, for example, were redefined as 
poaching when colonial administrators created game and forest reserves.2 
Moreover, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the insecurity that marked 
colonial conquest and the draconian punishment meted out to maintain colonial 
law and order caused population redistributions through flight or migration, 
which in turn had dramatic environmental consequences. In north-central Na-
mibia, colonial officials increasingly enforced external and internal colonial 
                                                 
1  Crosby, The Columbian Exchange and Ecological Imperialism; Grove, Green Impe-
rialism. 
2  See, for example, Grove, Green Imperialism; Anderson and Grove, Conservation in 
Africa; MacKenzie, Imperialism and the Natural World and The Empire of Nature. 
See also Guha, The Unquiet Woods, and Peluso, Rich Forests. 
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borders to limit the movement of subjects, animals and goods between different 
territories and within territories. A policy that had an even greater impact than 
proclaiming game reserves in the area, however, was the move to limit the 
mobility of cattle into and outside of Ovamboland in the name of disease con-
trol.3 
A political ecology focus builds on the premise that actions relating to the 
environment ultimately are dominated or inspired by political and power con-
siderations. Alternatively, political ecology highlights power as a means to at-
tain an environmental objective. In practice, political ecology often highlights 
politics and power struggles and relegates environmental dynamics to the back-
ground. The green imperialism theory emphasizes that environmentalism was 
created overseas, in the process of empire building, and in interaction with and 
often dependency on non-Western environmental ideas and practices, rather 
than being an exclusive product created in the halls of power, offices or labs in 
the West. 
The political ecology framework not only sheds light on power struggles be-
tween the colonizer and the colonized, but also on the policies and measures 
that in turn resulted from power struggles within the ‘colonial’ and ‘colonized’ 
categories. Officials at different levels and in different departments, admini-
strators, scientists, missionaries, settlers, local headmen, Christians of various 
denominations and non-Christians were often at odds, sometimes motivated by 
personal rivalries between individuals. This chapter focuses on power struggles 
that either indirectly affected the environment or were fought over particular 
environmental resources. 
The idea of a post-World War II second colonial conquest of Africa is useful 
here.4 The first colonial conquest was the turn of the nineteenth century military 
and political conquest that established control over the peoples of empire in 
order to harness their labor. But effective exploitation and development required 
harnessing Nature’s resources as well, especially when officials became con-
cerned about rapid population growth and a limited natural resource base. 
Diseases and droughts were a further limitation on the efficient use of natural 
resources. The second, post-World War II conquest of Africa (and Asia) was in 
effect a scientific conquest of Nature (i.e., Nature as the physical environment). 
After the first conquest the colonial rulers established new borders affecting 
environmental use and management (intercolonial borders, Native Reserves, 
conservation areas) and introduced conservation measures to limit hunting 
immediately upon conquest. In many areas, the violence of the initial conquest 
                                                 
3  See chapter 6. 
4  The term “second colonial conquest” was coined by Lonsdale, see Lonsdale, “East 
Africa”, p. 540. 
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displaced populations and livestock was lost to the conquerors as spoils of war. 
Because Africans were regarded as part of Nature, conquering African peoples 
would provide colonial administrations with the means to subjugate Wild 
Africa. 
But in general, before World War II the main colonial policy that shaped 
environmental dynamics was indirect, that is, territorial control was exercised 
by instituting political and conservation boundaries and disease cordons, and by 
confining people and animals to reserves. In pre-1940s Ovamboland, the 
colonial administration also sometimes directly and purposely interfered in how 
its inhabitants used the environment, although with limited impact. Conserva-
tion measures prohibited hunting in the newly established game reserves 
(resulting in the Etosha Park) and proscribed the hunting of ‘royal game’ such 
as elephants and lions. Overall, in pre-World War II Ovamboland, colonial 
governance not only was marked by indirect political rule but also by an 
indirect colonial stewardship of Ovamboland’s Nature. 
Indirect environmental rule frustrated colonial officials because Africans 
persisted in what officials regarded as their inefficient and wasteful use of 
Nature’s bounty. After World War II, colonial states directly tackled the African 
environment, causing a second round of struggles that had as its main objective 
to conquer Africa’s Nature, harnessing its wild resources to subsidize colonial 
rule and economic development. 
In Ovamboland, the two conquests left clear imprints on the landscape. 
Military and political conquest was enormously destructive. The high levels of 
sustained violence in the northern floodplain left entire areas depopulated, while 
thousands fled into the middle floodplain wilderness where within a generation, 
refugees created a new humanized environment, Ovamboland’s Oukwanyama 
district. The history of the delimitation of the border between the Portuguese 
colony of Angola (including the northern floodplain and the old Oukwanyama) 
and the South African colony Namibia (then known as South West Africa and 
legally a mandate from the League of Nations) demonstrates the extent to which 
grand political strategy made in the imperial capitals was written onto the land. 
The border was disputed and moved over time, leading to further displacements, 
and causing the creation of yet new village environments deeper in the wilder-
ness. 
Science offered both a tool and legitimization to conquer Nature in Ovambo-
land directly and to domesticate its environment. Especially during World War 
II, the state demonstrated its strength in carrying out planned and top-down 
resource allocation. Extending political control over Ovamboland’s environ-
mental resources led not only to struggles between colonizers and colonized, but 
also to competition within the ranks of both groups. Rifts and alliances were 
fluid. To appreciate the full complexity of how power struggles shaped the 
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environmental dynamics and the other way around, it is necessary to different-
iate the processes of change. Various struggles acted upon one another at 
different times but without being fully integrated, leading to multiple, fleeting 
outcomes as the relationships and roles of subjects and objects of the power 
struggles shifted. When Harold Eedes took over as the Native Commissioner for 
Ovamboland in 1947, he spearheaded the second colonial conquest: the con-
quest of Ovamboland’s Nature. His predecessor C.H.L. Hahn had earned his 
laurels in the first, military and political conquest of Ovamboland, which, unlike 
the rest of Namibia, had never been occupied by the Germans. Eedes, seeking to 
distinguish himself from his personal rival Hahn, presented himself as the con-
summate modernizer by deploying science, scientific knowledge and scientists 
to conquer Ovamboland’s natural (cattle) disease environment. In the 1920s, 
Eedes had been Hahn’s second-in-command and the Assistant Native Commis-
sioner for Ovamboland stationed at the border with Angola in Oshikango, Oukwa-
nyama district. The two clashed openly in 1929 and 1930 about the severity of the 
famine conditions in Oukwanyama. Eedes argued that Oukwanyama required 
immediate famine aid. Hahn had Eedes removed from Ovamboland as a result of 
this dispute, but to Hahn’s chagrin, Eedes was promoted to the rank of Native 
Commissioner of the smaller Okavango Native Territory east of Ovamboland.5 
Eedes was also the last of a generation of colonial officials whose qualifica-
tions were based on personal and empirical inductive knowledge – i.e. based on 
his experience with the Ovambo (like Hahn) – whereas post-World War II 
experts claimed expertise derived from a scientific deductive knowledge base. 
Yet until his retirement in 1953, Eedes quite successfully harnessed the scienti-
fically trained veterinary and agricultural experts that were seconded to his staff 
to serve his own agenda.  
The political ecology of insecurity 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the Ovambo floodplain and the surrounding 
areas were subject to raiding and warfare linked to the slave trade and imperial 
expansion, and simultaneously to being plagued by periodic droughts and pesti-
lence. Insecurity in the Ovambo floodplain, as elsewhere in the continent-wide era 
of troubles, caused populations to concentrate in fortified defensible sites under the 
protection of strong military leaders. Ovamboland’s elite used ivory and cattle to 
acquire guns and horses that provided an effective means of defense against raids, 
by, for example, the gun-wielding and horse-mounted Nama from central Namibia 
and the Portuguese from the right bank of the Kunene River. The guns and horses 
were not only for defense, but also provided the means to raid others, which led to 
                                                 
5  NAN, AGR 25, Senior Veterinary Surgeon to Sec. SWA., Windhoek, Nov. 13, 1941. 
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retaliatory raids, further escalating the violence. As a result, in the course of the 
1800s through 1914, not only outlying farms, fields and villages but also entire 
districts and an entire kingdom were abandoned and transformed into wilderness. 
In addition, from the 1880s to the mid 1910s, the decline in animal populations 
that resulted from commercial hunting and the rinderpest epizootic spurred 
environmental change. Ivory hunting led to a sharp decline in elephant numbers 
and the rinderpest killed wild and domestic browsers and grazers. As a result, bush 
vegetation may have outstripped the capacity of browsing animals to check it, 
resulting in bush encroachment as undesirable bush species invaded park- and 
grasslands.6 
At the same time, the combined threats of Portuguese and German conquest 
created an ever-increasing demand for firearms, horses and other war materials. 
Ovambo elites not only raided neighboring polities and communities but also 
raided their own subjects, causing further internal insecurity and population dis-
placement. After a series of disastrous defeats, in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, the Portuguese occupied most of the northern floodplain, with the 
exception of the powerful Oukwanyama kingdom. When a military force from 
German South West Africa attacked a Portuguese border post in the northern 
Ovambo floodplain in 1914, a massive revolt routed the Portuguese. A large 
expeditionary army sent from Portugal in 1915 reoccupied the lost territories and 
conquered Oukwanyama, leaving the entire northern floodplain in Portuguese 
hands. The Portuguese success caused a massive population flight into the middle 
and southern floodplain, where South African forces had arrived after defeating the 
German forces in South West Africa/Namibia.7 
King Mandume of Oukwanyama and many other northern floodplain leaders 
and a large number of their followers fled to the South African-controlled side, set 
off from the Portuguese-occupied northern floodplain by a seven-mile band of 
disputed territory that until 1927 was co-administered by the South African and 
Portuguese colonial administrations. King Mandume continued to challenge the 
Portuguese and was defeated in 1917 at Oihole, where he met his death. Although 
the Oihole battle was the last major armed encounter, neither colonial admini-
stration managed to gain full military control of the floodplain until the early 
1930s, when King Iipumbu of Uukwambi was bombed into submission and the 
southern Ovambo floodplain communities were disarmed.8  
 
 
                                                 
6  See Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chaps. 1-4. 
7  Ibid., pp. 35-55. 
8  Ibid., pp. 57-80. For details about the refugee movements, see chapter 2. On the dis-
armament, see chapter 5. 
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Indirect environmental rule 
In 1920, C.H.L. Hahn, a military officer who had participated in the 1916-1917 
campaign against King Mandume, became the Native Commissioner of the South 
African-controlled parts of the Ovambo floodplain, a position he retained until his 
retirement in 1947. During his tenure, he very much ruled the ‘Native Territory’ of 
Ovamboland as his personal fiefdom, submitting regular reports only after he was 
forced to do so following an investigation into alleged abuses in 1924. Hahn and 
his successor H.L.P. Eedes (who ruled Ovamboland from 1947 until 1953) 
considered themselves the paramount chiefs of the territory, which they ruled with 
a combination of (the threat of) violence and patronage. Hahn prided himself on 
ruling through the traditional chiefs and headmen of Ovamboland. In 1924, in his 
first annual report, he explained: “The policy since our establishment has been to 
allow natives to rule themselves according to ordinary native law, and no at-
tempt has been made to change this or in any way to interfere with native 
custom”.9 In his 1938 Annual Report, he stated: 
The policy of the Administration in Ovamboland is that of indirect rule in a modi-
fied form. It is not nearly so far advanced as a similar policy exercised by the British 
Government in its East African possessions, but the principal of control is identical, 
namely to build on the institutions of the people themselves, tribal institutions which 
have been handed down to them through the centuries (…). The great essential in 
carrying out a policy based on the foregoing is the education of the native Chiefs 
and Headmen so that they may administer justly and efficiently under our guidance 
and supervision.10  
The latter, he emphasized, required a persistent “personal touch”, which he 
complained he had not been able to focus on optimally due to a shortage of staff 
and transport. The “personal touch”, however, was a euphemism for unadulte-
rated personal rule, and what Mahmood Mamdani has called ‘decentralized des-
potism’, a highly authoritarian system of rule.11 
Hahn did not simply rule through Ovambo traditional chiefs and headmen 
and traditional law. He usurped what he believed to be the absolute powers of 
the Ovambo kings/chiefs over their subjects, their material possessions and the 
environmental resources they relied on, including land. Hahn did not hesitate to 
use violence or the threat of violence when necessary, resorting to what was 
then the ultimate new destructive weapon: bombers. Kings Martin of Ondonga 
and Iipumbu of Uukwambi were too independent-minded for Hahn’s liking, es-
pecially since their followers were very well armed. King Iipumbu also was not 
afraid to use his armed retainers to enforce his policies: in 1921, his men 
                                                 
9  NAN, NAO 18, Annual Report Ovamboland 1924. 
10  NAN, NAO 20, Annual Report Ovamboland 1938. 
11  Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, pp. 35-179. 
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destroyed a homestead in the Oukwanyama district that the king felt was 
intruding on his territory.12 
In 1925, to intimidate Kings Iipumbu and Martin, Hahn arranged for a visit 
of two South African military planes to demonstrate the power of aerial bomb-
ing which in 1922 had been successfully used to suppress the Bondelswart 
rebellion in colonial Namibia. One of the two planes sent to Ovamboland was 
piloted by Colonel Sir Pierre van Ryneveld, an icon in the history of South 
African military aviation. Hahn arrived in Ondangwa as a passenger on one of 
the planes and on April 17, King Martin of Ondonga met the pilots and was 
given a demonstration of the firepower of one of the planes’ Lewis machine 
guns. The next day the planes demonstrated a bombing run, dropping ten 
bombs. King Martin did not attend the event, but he was sure to have felt the 
impact of the explosions which reverberated beyond Ondonga district through 
Uukwambi and Oukwanyama districts. King Iipumbu of Uukwambi mobilized 
his warriors when he heard about the arrival of the planes; in the evening of 
April 18, the two war planes circled around King Iipumbu’s homestead and 
airdropped a message from the Administrator of South West Africa (colonial 
Namibia), which Assistant Native Commissioner Eedes read to the king.13 In 
Hahn’s perception, the demonstration was successful. He noted in his 1925 
Annual Report: “The visit of the aeroplanes had a very marked effect on the 
natives and the matter is still discussed by them”.14 The effect on King Iipumbu, 
however, was not permanent. In 1932, Hahn called in warplanes and armored 
cars, exploiting the available firepower to the fullest. Not only was King 
Iipumbu exiled and his followers disarmed following the bombing of his palace, 
but Hahn also used the occasion to persuade King Martin of Ondonga and the 
leaders of the other southern Ovambo districts to promise to hand in their 
modern firearms. Hahn thereafter kept the Ondonga airfield well maintained 
and also established airfields at Engela (near the border) and Omboloka, in the 
far east of Ovamboland.15 In December 1939, Hahn once more resorted to war-
planes, this time to impose his will on King Martin of Ondonga, who had re-
fused to relinquish jurisdiction over capital cases to the colonial administration. 
The arrival of three planes and a strong police unit proved sufficient to allow 
Hahn to fully disarm the king and his subjects, thus completing the disarmament 
                                                 
12  NAN, A450, 7, RCO to Sec. SWA, Ondangwa, 15 Nov. 1921. 
13  NAN, NAO 18, Monthly Report Ovamboland, April 1925. On the Bondelswart re-
bellion, see Emmett, Popular Resistance, pp. 122-124. 
14  NAN, NAO 18, Annual Report Ovamboland 1925. 
15  NAN, NAO 25, NCO to CNC, Ondangwa, 16 Feb. 1943; NAO 20, Annual Report 
Ovamboland 1937 and Monthly Report Ovamboland, Aug. 1937. 
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of Ovamboland almost a quarter century after it first had been occupied by 
South Africa.16 
During the 1930s, in the name of defending traditional order and law in 
Ovamboland, Hahn also crusaded to limit the influence of the missions and its 
adherents, notably the Finnish Mission Society (FMS) and its new elite of 
Ovambo pastors and teachers, who openly rejected the authority of the tra-
ditional leaders and rules. Hahn had warned that as a result “from an admini-
strative point of view the control over the natives, which at present is exercised 
through their own chiefs or other ruling natives, will in future become more and 
more difficult, complex and costly”.17 In 1935, Hahn’s superior, the Admini-
strator of South West Africa, advised his subordinate about how to prepare for 
the upcoming visit of a commission of inquiry, the South West Africa Com-
mission, and what to stress in his testimony: 
You should dilate on the point of the economic completeness of the Ovambo people and 
the dangers of breaking up their tribal system through a wrong system of education and 
misapplied christianity. Between ourselves, Judge van Zyl [a member of the commis-
sion] asked me what we had accomplished in the way of education after 21 years, and 
why we had left this matter entirely in the hands of German missionaries. I told him this 
was a very pertinent question from the political point of view but I should prefer to 
answer the question after he had been round the country when he would be in a better 
position to appreciate our arguments. For instance I told him that we might argue that as 
far as Ovamboland went education as at present understood by our Union [of South 
Africa] Education authorities was unnecessary and in fact dangerous. What we had 
done in Ovamboland so far was to enforce peace, law and order which the native popu-
lation had never known up till now and to assist them to improve their country so as to 
carry a larger population which naturally followed with the cessation of tribal wars and 
the influx from Portuguese territories (…) as the result of improved conditions here. We 
had even gone so far as to transport to Windhoek an Ovambo kraal to show the Euro-
peans and natives here how the Ovambos could maintain themselves without having to 
rely on European support in a country far less fertile than the Territory proper. The 
christianising of Ovambos, if it resulted in their detribalization would probably result in 
a few years in our having to feed the population (…). Curiously enough Dr. Holloway 
[another member of the commission] said the Economic Commission on which he 
served in the Union had found that a great deal of harm had been done in the Union by 
misapplied education. I told him he would find interesting scope for study in 
Ovamboland (…). So you see you have ample scope for your pet views.18  
The Administrator also supplied Hahn with a list of people who should be 
asked to testify.19 Encouraged by this advice, Hahn went before the commission to 
                                                 
16  NAN, NAO 20, Monthly Report Ovamboland, Dec. 1939. See also Emmett, Popu-
lar Resistance, pp. 203-205. 
17  NAN, NAO 18, Annual Report Ovamboland 1927. 
18  NAN, NAO 104, Administrator SWA to NCO, Windhoek, 24 July 1935, 
19  NAN, NAO 104, Administrator SWA to NCO, Windhoek, 24 July 1935, 
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reject the missionaries’ credentials as a source of knowledge about Ovambo so-
ciety and culture and stressed that he was the sole uncontested authority because of 
his deep knowledge of the local culture and its traditions. Hahn stated: “they [the 
missionaries] do not go about. I do not think that there is any Missionary here 
today who knows the country better than I do”. Responding to the concerns of the 
commission about the contradictions between his evidence and that of the mis-
sionaries, Hahn attributed it to the latter’s highly localized knowledge. He argued 
that their experience with Ovamboland’s society was limited to the main mission 
stations and a few outstations and that they had a road bias: “They just go along 
the main road and they travel from the mission station to the store or the hostel”.20 
Moreover, in his testimony, Hahn warned that the missions – especially the 
FMS, which was the largest – undermined traditional authority in Ovamboland 
through their “native teachers” who “catch hold of the children and hold them”, 
and undermined the “tribal order” because they no longer listened to their elders. 
Experimenting with giving the inhabitants of Ovamboland more administrative 
powers, he continued, was also dangerous because of the situation just across the 
border in the Angolan Lower Kunene “where after all you have the same native. 
He is being detribalised at present. The Portuguese Government does not believe 
in allowing the natives to go ahead according to their own customs. They have a 
number of headmen who control areas only in so far as the tax collection goes. 
Further they have no right to try cases or disputes”.21 
With the blessing of the Administrator and having impressed the commission 
of inquiry, Hahn could implement his pet views. Employing bullying and black-
mail, by the end of the decade Hahn had forced the FMS Christians into submitting 
to the authority of the “traditional” leaders, his chosen headmen. Hahn’s notes of 
his meeting with the leading FMS missionary Alho about the payment of cattle as 
bridewealth are illustrative: 
Alho accepts the enforcement of custom as long as it is not a bargain!! i.e. Father-in-
Law should not pick & chose the ox bought by prospective son-in-law, but should 
accept the ox as an ox tendered as a token of impending uniting of two groups. He adds 
that a calfox or old and decrepit animal would not be acceptable (…). I pointed out that 
the ox has never been tendered as payment since no Ovambo would sell his child for 
one ox and a few hoes (…). After an argument lasting for about 3 hrs Mr. Alho sub-
mitted to my suggestion & 'threat' that I would get the Adm. [Administrator] to support 
the headmen.22  
                                                 
20  NAN, A450, 12, SWA Commission: Minutes of Evidence (1935), vol. 12, session at 
Ukualuthi, 13 Aug. 1935, pp. 659-660. 
21  NAN, A450, 12, SWA Commission: Minutes of Evidence (1935), vol. 12, session at 
Ukualuthi, 13 Aug. 1935, pp. 666-667. 
22  NAN, NAO 9, notes of a meeting of Hahn with FMS missionaries regarding position of 
V. Alho, 17 May 1938, Attached to O/C NAO to NCO, Oshikango, 22 Feb. 1938. 
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An additional threat Hahn used was that the headmen – who allocated plots of 
land to newly married couples – would withhold land from recently married 
Christian couples.23 
In addition to eliminating challenges to the authority of the headmen, Hahn 
promoted his own favorites to key positions. He personally chose the members of 
the new Councils of (Senior) Headmen that he introduced, first in the Oukwany-
ama district, and subsequently in all of the districts. He placed the Senior Headmen 
(also called Councilor Headmen or Tribal Councilors) over the remainder of the 
headmen in matters of administration, justice and the allocation and management 
of land and other environmental resources in each district. After the violent dis-
posal of King Iipumbu of Uukwambi, Hahn reorganized the district, elevating 
fourteen of its headmen to Councilor Headmen and allocating between six and 
nineteen of the remaining headmen as “subheadmen” to each of his chosen Coun-
cilors.24 
In the Oukwanyama district, where his subordinate Eedes pioneered the insti-
tution of the Tribal Council, Hahn initially had favored mainly former opponents 
of the last Oukwanyama King Mandume. But in the mid-1940s and early 1950s, 
the most powerful Senior Headman of Oukwanyama (the most populous of all the 
districts of Ovamboland) was Nehemia Shovaleka, who began his career in the 
1920s as one of Eedes’ ‘police boys’. The administration’s ‘boys’ served as 
messengers, interpreters and, most importantly, as thuggish enforcers of colonial 
rule.25 Hahn ruthlessly neutralized traditional leaders whom he considered to be a 
threat, including Kings Iipumbu and Martin. In 1944, when a man turned up 
claiming to be Nanjungu Sapetama, the uncle of the late King Mandume, Hahn 
allowed the man to live with Nanjungu Sapetama’s mother, Nawanga. But he 
warned the seventy-year-old Nanjungu “that any move on his part which is 
contrary to the established authority will result in his immediate expulsion from 
Ovamboland and finally that it be made generally known that he is an imposter 
and not of royal descent”.26 The fact that Nawanga took the old man in as her own 
son suggests that he was probably not an imposter, but, as the maternal uncle of the 
former King Mandume, Nanjungu Sapetama would have been the legitimate 
successor to the last king of Oukwanyama, throwing a wrench into Hahn’s system 
of personal and indirect rule through the Tribal Councilor headmen. 
                                                 
23  NAN, NAO 20, Annual Report Ovamboland 1938; Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 
117-121. 
24  NAN, NAO 19, Monthly Report Ovamboland, June 1933; Kreike, Re-creating 
Eden, pp. 69-70. 
25  NAN, NAO 49, Farewell Address H.L.P. Eedes to the Ukuanyama Council of Head-
men and People Assembled at the Tribal Office at Ohanguena on 12 June 1954; NAO 
18, Monthly Report Ovamboland, Jan. 1929; Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 69-70. 
26  NAN, NAO 10, ANC to NCO, 13 May 1944. 
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Hahn also invented and re-invented traditional laws and customs. As Native 
Commissioner for Ovamboland for three decades he was not only the major source 
for his superiors on Ovamboland and its culture, but also one of the foremost 
ethnographers of the Ovambo, in addition to being considered an authority on the 
botany of the region.27 Hahn carefully guarded access to knowledge about Ovam-
boland which he thought held the key to control over the territory’s people. In 
1928 he made an urgent plea to his superiors: 
I would respectfully like to point out that it is not advisable to allow persons, 
whether Professors, Scientists etc. or not, to travel about alone in Ovamboland, to 
take photographs of chiefs, headmen and natives, and to question them about their 
customs. Their actions, however innocent, will tend to eventually undermine the 
authority of the Officials here, who, alone, administer thousands of armed natives.28  
Hahn’s main sources in turn were his favorite headmen, as were his subordi-
nates and the missionaries.29 In 1935, Hahn noted in his diary: “All the Ukuambi 
headmen visited Ondangwa & were interviewed by Mr. Hahn re. tribal affairs, 
witchcraft and demarcation of borders of areas”.30 
Comparing Hahn’s rich private and public papers demonstrates the extent to 
which he edited, streamlined and at times manipulated or even misrepresented data 
he had collected. In one manuscript, he added a note to himself: 
State:- 37. That they [the Ovambo laws] may be modified from time to time by the will 
of the chief or by the new council now controlling some of the tribes. 38. That the laws 
are traditional (…), 42. [that] [l]aws are seldom changed. Ovambos like other Bantus 
are very conservative in regard to their laws and customs. If any alterations should be 
necessary then these are affected [sic] by the chief & his councillors (or by the council 
of headmen where there are no chiefs).31  
During a speech at a meeting in Windhoek in 1936, Hahn let slip the extent 
to which he had in effect changed ‘traditional’ units of administration: 
The boundaries of the Omukundas [villages] are well-known by the natives. They are 
seldom changed. Any school opened in an Omukunda would of course take the name of 
that particular Omukunda. In certain places we have already knitted three or four Omu-
kundas together, since they have been too small for individual headmen to control.32  
In addition to promoting his favorites in the formal administrative hierarchy 
of headmen, Hahn also gave them a key role to play in recruiting migrant labor 
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to supply the farms and mines of colonial Namibia south of Ovamboland, and in 
collecting taxes when these measures were introduced in the early 1930s; 
Ovamboland was the principal source of African labor for South Africa’s 
Namibian colony.33 Hahn also provided his Senior Headmen and the regular 
headmen with a new source of income by granting them a monopoly over land 
allocation and allowing them to charge a one-time ‘transfer-fee’ for existing 
farm plots when a new owner took over the farm after the death of the previous 
owner. To be granted the lifetime use of a farm, the applicant had to pay a fee to 
the village headman and/or the Senior Headman. In the 1930s, the fee for a farm 
could be as high as three pounds sterling and one head of cattle. During the 
1930s and 1940s, this custom spread across Ovamboland.34 
Decentralized despotism corrupted colonial officials and their subordinates 
alike. In 1935, George Tobias, the leading Anglican missionary in Ovamboland, 
sharply criticized Hahn’s administration in a mission pamphlet and alleged that 
serious abuses of power were taking place in the Oukwanyama district: 
The present policy seems to be simply to preserve law and order by indirect rule 
through Chiefs and Headmen, without doing anything to improve the conditions of the 
people (…). The main argument against the work of the Missionary is that it 
undermines the authority of the Headmen. There may be something in this, though we 
do all we can to instill into our converts the duty of loyalty and obedience to the 
Government and to the Chiefs and Headmen. What undermines the authority of the 
Headmen more than anything else is Police-Boy Government. They are feared and 
resented by both headmen and people as an upstart bullying class, who have the ear of 
the white ruler as his interpreters and servants.35  
W.E. Cawthorne, Tobias’ colleague, stressed that the headman of the Onan-
munamu district of Oukwanyama in eastern Ovamboland, where Cawthorne 
was stationed, arbitrarily ejected people – including adherents of the Anglican 
church – from their farm plots, causing at least twenty-eight families to flee the 
area. In addition, the ‘police boys’ of the Oshikango office had run rampant, 
extorting ‘fines’ from the hapless owners of any donkeys they found wandering 
without a herder. Because the accusations had become public, Hahn demoted 
the Senior Headman (but left him in charge of the area) and forced the ‘police 
boys’ to return the extorted money. Hahn’s superior, the Administrator of South 
West Africa (Namibia) concluded that the accusations of a lawless ‘police-boy 
government’ were entirely unwarranted. Tobias’ accusations were dismissed as 
the product of a mind on the verge of a nervous breakdown. Hahn – obviously 
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relieved that he had got off the hook – wrote in the margins of the letter he 
received from the Administrator about the decision: “File & look pleasant!”36 
For the second time in his career, Hahn emerged unscathed from what could have 
become a major scandal. These were not isolated incidents. After Hahn’s retire-
ment in 1947, the Senior Headmen of Oukwanyama complained that they faced 
increasing resistance against the forced labor that they habitually had imposed to 
work on such projects as road building within the reserve, suggesting that forced 
unpaid labor had been key to Hahn’s administration. Two years later, an anony-
mous letter accused the Senior Headmen of the Oukwanyama district of abusing 
their powers to make subjects work in their fields without compensation, demon-
strating that forced labor did not end with the departure of Hahn.37 
Hahn’s personal rule and the regime of decentralized despotism over which he 
presided indirectly but deeply shaped environmental use and management in 
Ovamboland. Hahn made the majority of the headmen subservient (“sub-head-
men” in his words) to a small coterie of Senior Headmen. The headmen controlled 
arable land, labor and wage labor opportunities (through their role in migrant labor 
recruitment), water reservoirs and modern firearms (for hunting and for defense 
against predators). Senior Headmen and Ovamboland’s remaining kings received 
their main income from ‘selling’ villages to headmen. Since they allocated villages 
for the lifetime of the buyer, the founding of new villages was a lucrative under-
taking. 
The simplest way to earn additional income was to subdivide existing villages, 
which was possible because the colonial administration had placed a cap of 100 on 
the number of farms per village in order to prevent overpopulation and deforesta-
tion. The practice of subdividing villages mushroomed in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Often, the colonial administration was unaware that the villages had been 
subdivided. In 1952, only 456 of Ondonga district’s 603 villages were recorded 
in the administration’s books.38 
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Hahn’s enhancement of his chosen headmen’s personal powers at the local 
level also meant that village forest conservation was largely up to the village 
headman. The colonial government’s policy of the 1940s and 1950s, of pre-
serving existing forest and bush vegetation in formal village forest reserves, met 
with little success. A 1941 letter by Hahn directed to his superior in Windhoek 
stated: “It has always been the policy of this office to encourage the protection 
of indigenous trees and in every ‘umkunda’ (area) [village] a portion is, as far as 
possible, always kept as bush and forest reserve. The difficulty, however, is one 
of control”.39 As an example, in the 1950s, Gabriel Kautwima, who had been 
personally selected by Hahn’s successor Eedes as a Senior Headman in the 
Oukwanyama district, nevertheless permitted farm plots to be cleared in his 
Omhedi village’s designated forest reserve.40 The action might be construed as 
merely ironic: Hahn’s and Eedes’ chosen headmen using the despotic powers 
bestowed upon them to undermine their patrons’ conservation policies. But, in 
fact, there was much more to it. From 1920 to 1954, Hahn and Eedes them-
selves not only failed to implement but actively campaigned against the intro-
duction of South Africa’s conservation regulations into Ovamboland. 
Hahn conceded that environmental degradation had become an issue in 
Ovamboland since at least the early 1930s. The massive influx of refugees from 
Angola and the subsequent deforestation and a severe 1929-1932 famine were 
testimony to the soft environmental underbelly of Hahn’s Ovamboland project. 
In public, however, Hahn denied that conservation was an immediate priority.41 
Although Hahn and his subordinates raised conservation concerns regularly at 
meetings with Ovambo kings and headmen, the meetings were more about 
political control than about the environment. In 1934, for example, Hahn met 
with the Senior Headmen and village headmen of the Oukwanyama district 
about suppressing wildfires, preserving trees and opening up eastern Ovambo-
land as a settlement area.42 
In a 1941 report to his superior, Hahn conceded that the construction of 
heavily palisaded homesteads was “responsible for the cutting of many trees, 
poles, saplings and brushwood, and this cannot be stopped unless the whole 
system of kraal building is altered”. Yet, Hahn advised strongly against the ap-
plication of the regulations to control timber cutting, as issued under the Native 
Trust and Land Act No. 18 of 1936 in Ovamboland, for three reasons. First, he 
emphasized that the inhabitants of Ovamboland traditionally were allowed to 
                                                                                                                       
[received Ondangwa, 13 June 1934]. See also NAO 99, statement of Mingana 
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39  NAN, SWAA 3, NCO to CNC, Ondangwa, 2 June 1941. 
40  Joshua Mutilifa, interview by author, Omhedi, 8 March 1993. 
41  NAN, A450, 10, “Agriculture”. 
42  NAN, NAO 19, Monthly Report Ovamboland, Sep. 1934. 
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cut trees freely for “domestic uses” and that “[a]ny interference with such a 
right would definitely, at their present state of development not be understood 
and lead to discontent and disturbances”. Second, he argued that introducing 
timber fees for cutting wood to construct homesteads as occurred in South 
Africa was impossible because Ovamboland’s economy was not sufficiently 
monetized. Third, he emphasized that the situation in Ovamboland differed 
from that in South Africa.43 Indeed, he openly stated that he did not enforce South 
Africa’s conservation regulations in Ovamboland because he believed that ‘tradi-
tional’ Ovambo conservation practices made such regulations superfluous. Eedes, 
in turn, considered Ovamboland to be unique, so that enforcing the regulations 
was inappropriate.44 
The only notable tree conservation measure that was implemented was to 
require the missions to obtain permits from the administration in order to cut down 
trees.45 Missions and the colonial administration itself were significant wood 
consumers and they competed with villagers for the same species, although they 
preferred the larger trees that could be cut into timber. A 1931 report by the 
Assistant Native Commissioner noted that in the preceding decade, four large 
missions and 100 outstations and schools had been constructed in Oukwanyama 
alone, consuming at least 2,800 timber-quality trees. A single 1955 request for 
seven Finnish Mission stations required cutting down 1,260 mopane, 140 tam-
boti (Spirotachys africana) and 60 Lowveld cluster leaf (Terminalia prunioides) 
trees.46 Missions supposedly used dead trees to construct churches and schools, 
but in reality, dead trees of the preferred species were increasingly scarce in 
many places by the 1950s. In the Oniipa area of Ondonga district, for example, 
dry tamboti was rare by the late 1950s, although in 1955 it could still be 
obtained in the Uukwambi district, and the FMS requested permission to cut 
down green Lowveld cluster leaf and mopane.47 
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Hahn’s unpublished private papers contain evidence that suggests he was 
more concerned about the state of the environment than he publicly acknow-
ledged. He listed overpopulation as a result of immigration from Angola, 
exhausted soils, deforestation and overstocking as major problems. In a 
manuscript that may have dated to the late 1930s or early 1940s, he appeared 
confident that exploring and exploiting water resources in eastern Ovamboland 
would make new lands available for settlement and thereby relieve population 
pressure. In his draft Annual Report for 1942, he emphasized that overpopu-
lation had become a “priority issue” and he proposed to end any further immi-
gration from Angola.48 
Yet in response to inquiries from the Chief Native Commissioner in Wind-
hoek regarding Portuguese complaints that Ovamboland subjects illegally cut 
the precious Transvaal teak (Pterocarpus angolensis) timber trees in Portuguese 
territory, Hahn allowed his assistant in Oukwanyama to defend the Ovambo 
‘tribal’ record of tree conservation. The latter claimed that 
[u]nder existing tribal customs in Ovamboland the ordinary Natives require special 
permission from their Chief or Councillor Headman to cut down green trees. In 
Ukuanyama [Oukwanyama district] a Native is only allowed to cut down trees when 
clearing new lands and no land may be cleared without the prior authority of the 
Councillor Headman of the Area. Even then the cutting of large trees for clearing 
new fields is discouraged.49  
Hahn conceded, however, that “[t]his law is easily enforceable in the in-
habited tribal area but it becomes altogether a different question in the unin-
habited Eastern Ukuanyama bush where it is impossible to have effective 
control over thousands of square miles”, and he advised against enforcing the 
Portuguese law because it would lead to the exploitation of Transvaal teak trees 
on the Ovamboland side of the Angolan-Namibian border.50 
The Anglican missionary W.E. Cawthorne, however, warned about the threat 
of environmental disaster. Cawthorne considered Ovamboland to be essentially 
a desert environment that could yet be saved through careful conservation 
efforts: 
For the present the native resources should be carefully examined. Large areas, at 
present too dry for settlement, could bear timber giving excellent plank wood. Some 
afforestation might be stimulated to aid rainfall as the country seems to be drying up 
(…). There remains the major problem that the present boundary between South West 
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Africa and Angola cuts off a native people from their natural home and drives them to 
live in what is really a desert. In the nature of things, despite all palliatives, the pressure 
of the circumstances will become more and more severe and native development practi-
cally impossible until the unity of the people and their country is restored.51  
Nonetheless, Hahn continued to oppose the introduction of any substantial 
conservation measures in Ovamboland beyond game conservation. In part based 
on his decades-long experience in Ovamboland, he genuinely may have felt that 
the purported threats of deforestation and desertification in Ovamboland were 
exaggerated and alarmist. But his hesitation about introducing conservation 
regulations was also politically motivated, since such measures threatened the 
special status that Ovamboland had gained under his personal administration, and 
therefore also the idiosyncratic way in which he ruled his ‘fiefdom’. Hahn used the 
threat of disturbances as a trump card to deflect calls to bring the administration of 
Ovamboland in line with that of other South African reserves; implied throughout 
his reports is the notion that Ovamboland was stable under his “personal touch”, 
but that it could “explode” if any radical new policies were introduced from the 
outside. The implementation of a comprehensive conservation policy would re-
quire abandoning his personal and indirect style of rule for a more direct inter-
ference in how the environment was managed in which scientific expertise would 
count more than the ethnographic and experiential knowledge that was the found-
ation of his authority. On a sheet in his personal files that probably dates from the 
1940s, Hahn wrote: “It [development without overpopulation and environmental 
stress] can only be done scientifically under proper European supervision & this 
means a [sic] increased native affairs staff”.52  
The colonial conquest of Nature: Direct environmental rule 
The 1947-1950 foot and mouth affair highlighted the transition from indirect 
environmental rule to direct interference in Nature through a second colonial 
conquest. The affair illustrates how the political ecology framework may serve 
to identify multiple struggles that affected one another without leading to a 
single and unambiguous environmental outcome; in fact, different measures and 
actions had contradictory consequences. Professional rivalries that had nothing 
to do with environmental concerns were important factors given the extent to 
which the Ovamboland administration relied on personal rule and decentralized 
despotism. Native Commissioner Harold Eedes deliberately used the foot and 
mouth scare to introduce draconian measures in an attempt to change funda-
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mentally cattle use and management in Ovamboland. Like Hahn, he saw 
himself as the king or paramount chief of the area. The 1926 monthly report for 
Ovamboland noted that Eedes “played” the role of chief of Oukwanyama, and 
after he succeeded Hahn, subjects often addressed him as ohamba (king) in their 
correspondence.53 Much of his motivation arose from his attempt to best his 
predecessor Hahn and to confirm his own reputation as a can-do modernizer. 
The whole affair could have backfired on Eedes: first, his extreme measures 
(including shooting cattle) proved entirely ineffective; and second, alarm about 
an outbreak of foot and mouth proved unfounded not just once, but twice. Yet, 
Eedes turned each fiasco around and was able to strengthen his own position 
vis-à-vis a new generation of scientifically trained colonial experts as well as 
versus the headmen and population of Ovamboland. He implicitly prevented 
science from becoming the dominant discourse of knowledge (and power) 
during his tenure even as he used science to shore up his rule and status. He did 
not need to spell out the limitations of science: scientific knowledge clearly 
demonstrated its limitations outside of the laboratory. During each of the two 
disease outbreaks, the veterinarians concurred with the diagnosis of foot and 
mouth, only to discover months later when they investigated infected animals 
that their initial diagnosis had been wrong. Eedes explicitly blamed Ovambo-
land’s headmen and the population at large for the outbreaks because they not 
only had ignored his advice to quarantine their cattle, but also had broken their 
promise to cooperate. Moreover, the veterinarians had made their initial diag-
nosis based on descriptions of the symptoms of the infected animals by Ovam-
boland’s headmen and cattle holders. Thus in one fell swoop, Eedes discredited 
Ovamboland’s headmen and population as minor partners in an indirect system 
of political and environmental governance. They had disobeyed orders and lied 
and proved themselves to be incapable of effectively managing their own natu-
ral resources: their indigenous knowledge base fell short not only in identifying, 
but also in describing the disease. 
During Hahn’s long tenure in Ovamboland, the local population’s ‘primitive’ 
but natural acceptance of Nature’s plagues had justified the radical measure of 
cattle containment which cut off the region’s livestock from outside markets.54 
Containment imposed new limits on the practice of cattle transhumance. But 
Hahn had refrained from any radical interventions in cattle use and management 
within the reserve and had come to terms with the continued movement of 
cattle, beef and hides across the border with Angola. Hahn successfully fought 
off challenges to his hands-off cattle policy in the 1920s and 1930s when he 
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canceled cattle vaccination projects, and again in 1946, when foot and mouth 
surfaced across the border in Angola. His motivation in the 1920s might have 
been simply to keep any potential competing colonial source of authority out of 
‘his’ reserve. An outbreak of anthrax and blackquarter evil on the border 
brought the colonial Chief Veterinary Officer to Ovamboland in September 
1926 to inspect livestock and consult with his Portuguese counterparts. But 
Hahn reported in November 1926 that the presence of the officer in Ovambo-
land was no longer required since “[t]he question of inoculating Zone cattle 
which was his main duty has now ceased owing to the lack of keenness and 
disinclination on the part of the natives to have their stock treated”.55 
Foot and mouth made its first appearance in southern Angola in the 1930s, 
but it did not cross the colonial border into Ovamboland.56 The 1946 outbreak in 
the Portuguese-ruled northern Ovambo floodplain, however, jolted South 
Africa’s administration into action. The administration sent veterinarian Dr. 
Zschokke, accompanied by a police major, to southern Angola to investigate, 
and hastily seconded a veterinary officer to Hahn’s staff. After his visit to 
Angola, Dr. Zschokke self-confidently stated: “Everything possible is being 
done here [in Angola] to check the spread of the disease into Ovamboland and 
the natives have all been instructed to report immediately any causes (…). Foot 
and Mouth disease is unknown to them but the symptoms have been well des-
cribed.57 The veterinary officer seconded to Hahn’ s staff recommended the 
immediate implementation of a five-mile-wide stock-free zone along the Ango-
lan border. Any trespassing cattle would be shot on sight, and any cattle pro-
ducts would be impounded. Hahn overruled the veterinarian, arguing to his 
superiors that such measures to close the border “are out of the question in the 
near future in that part of the country, not only because the natives would not 
understand them and would not carry out our instructions” but also because the 
Portuguese would have to fully cooperate. Instead, a veterinary cordon with a 
patrolled stock-free zone was located in the far south of Ovamboland, near the 
Etosha Pan, to prevent the infection of animals further south.58 
Reports that the disease had spread into northwestern Ovamboland in February 
1946 could only be investigated in August because heavy flooding during and after 
the rainy season made the area inaccessible. Careful inspection of the affected 
animals revealed that the lesions to the hooves and mouths that the inhabitants in 
the border region had described, and that veterinarians and officials had interpreted 
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as a sure sign of foot and mouth, had different causes. The mouth lesions had been 
caused by the rather innocuous lumpy skin disease virus and those on the hoofs 
were the result of Crotolaria plant poisoning. Further investigation revealed iso-
lated signs of recent lumpy skin infection along the entire border with Angola as 
well as on the other side, leading the officials to conclude that the disease had 
originated in Angola.59 
When Eedes formally took over from Hahn in January 1947, he immediately 
set the stage for a more interventionist administration. In his first quarterly report 
he stated that Ovamboland was overpopulated and overstocked and that it was 
critical to develop water resources in the large unused areas outside of the flood-
plain. One of his first actions was to fence the administration’s compound at 
Ondangwa, a measure that can be seen as symbolic of his new policy of direct 
environmental rule. In June 1947, he hosted the Assistant Director of Native 
Agriculture of the Union of South Africa on a visit to Ovamboland “for the 
purpose of investigating the necessity of the establishment of a local Agricul-
tural Section”. Eedes also moved the 1946 foot and mouth cordon in the far south 
of Ovamboland even further south to Namutoni, effectively establishing what later 
came to be known as the Red Line.60 Although the veterinary cordon in its new 
position no longer interfered with cross-border cattle movements, it now cut across 
the routes from Ovamboland to the salt pans on the edge of Etosha Pan. Under 
pressure from King Ushona Shimi of the Ongandjera district, Eedes requested 
special permission from his superior in Windhoek to allow salt gathering across 
the veterinary cordon. The Native Commissioner’s telegram read: 
Natives of North Western tribes, particularly the Ongandjeras, complain bitterly against 
Foot and Mouth Disease restriction which prevents them crossing line to obtain salt 
from pans which strictly speaking are in tribal areas (…), Natives cannot exist without 
sufficient supplies of salt (…), recommend Natives be allowed proceed salt pans with 
donkeys only (…), No pack oxen will be taken.61  
Despite the complications it caused, Eedes maintained the veterinary cordon 
even though almost a year had gone by without any new reports of foot and mouth 
by the headmen. But Eedes had little confidence in the chiefs and headmen that 
Hahn had relied on for his information, and, moreover, his veterinary officer 
claimed that the disease was unknown in Ovamboland, suggesting to Eedes that 
the local population would be incapable of recognizing the disease even if they 
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saw it.62 As a matter of fact, early in his tenure as Native Commissioner, Eedes 
distanced himself from the headmen who had been the closest allies to Hahn. 
Immediately upon succeeding Hahn in 1947, Eedes publicly humiliated Nehe-
mia Shovaleka, one of the most powerful headmen of Ovamboland, by empha-
sizing that the Senior Headman of the Oukwanyama district was a mere “native 
interpreter” (and “police boy”) who owed his high position solely to the Native 
Commissioner. In a statement to the Oukwanyama Council of Headmen, Eedes 
exhorted: 
I wish to record further that the mover of the resolution [Nehemia Shovaleka], although 
a Headman, is actually a Native interpreter. As such he has access to information, and 
is, on occasion, able to overhear conversations between officials, and other Europeans. 
He has had a lot of attention paid to him by a certain class of visitor, with the result that 
he has now rather an inflated opinion of himself. Although he is not respected by all the 
Ukuanyama Natives, he is feared because of his official position as Interpreter. He is 
very well known to me, as he commenced his service with me at Namakunde many 
years ago.63  
Two years later, Eedes limited Nehemia Shovaleka’s power over the Oukwany-
ama district by approving moving its Tribal Council seat (and the office of the 
tribal secretary to the council) from Nehemia’s Omhedi homestead to a location at 
Omafo in a neighboring subdistrict: “The [Oukwanyama] Headmen intimated that 
Nehemia’s occupation of the Tribal kraal had given cause for a certain amount of 
ill-feeling and a suspicion of favouritism and their resolution is therefore sup-
ported”.64 
Eedes returned to Ovamboland with a dream: to eradicate stock diseases in 
Ovamboland as he had done in Okavango in the late 1930s, and he was willing to 
use all means necessary to accomplish his goal. Upset that Ovamboland had been 
abandoned to livestock diseases, Eedes believed that Ovamboland could be made 
disease-free fairly easily if a ‘free zone’ was created along the entire border with 
Angola. His plan entailed transforming a five-to-ten-mile-wide zone along the 
Angolan-Namibian border into a stock- and settlement-free buffer to prevent re-
infection across the border. The plan required the forced removal of up to 20,000 
people from the border districts of Oukwanyama and Ombalantu, but Eedes rea-
soned that the displaced could easily be accommodated in eastern Ovamboland 
once a water infrastructure had been put into place. He shared his brainchild 
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confidentially with a Mr. Randall of the Church of England Mission “and told him 
that it was quite likely that I [Eedes] would not be supported by the Admini-
stration. He unfortunately reported my conversation to Mr. Allen [the Admini-
strator for South West Africa], who asked me to submit a report”. Eedes wrote the 
Chief Native Commissioner that “[t]he matter has not been discussed with the 
Natives, or with the Portuguese Authorities, and for reasons of which you are 
aware, it is suggested that it be kept strictly confidential for the present”.65 But 
Eedes’ request for secrecy came too late, because several weeks earlier, in June 
1947, his boss had already informed George Tobias, by now Bishop in Windhoek, 
that the administration was studying a plan to create a ten-mile buffer zone along 
the border and to relocate the local residents.66 
The missionaries’ reaction was blistering. Early in 1948, Tobias wrote to the 
Additional Native Commissioner in Windhoek that removing the Oukwanyama 
population would be “a disastrous mistake” and expressed his belief that “the 
Administration will never sanction such an arbitrary and despotic act”.67 The 
Anglican missionary in Oukwanyama, the Reverend Dymond, urged caution: 
There is a vast amount of disquiet and of threats of resistance to evacuation going on 
among the ova Kuanjama (…). The general theme is, ‘I will die – I will be shot in my 
kraal – before I will consent to leave it’ (…). There is general scepticism about the 
existence of ‘cattle-disease’; and, if cattle-disease can be demonstrably proved to exist, 
there is no sympathy whatever with the proposed method of its cure – the evacuation of 
fertile territory, the best in Ovamboland (…). A lack of confidence in the European 
Administration is growing and will certainly increase as long as the people have reason 
to believe that plans are afoot to remove them from their homes for purposes of which 
they are ignorant.68  
The senior FMS missionary in Oukwanyama, the Reverend Bjorklund, was 
even blunter: 
The man in whose brain such an idea has matured must be either an abnormal man or 
else an enemy of the Ovambos and of the Missions (…). If it [the buffer zone] is to be 
isolated only for pure nonsense like cattle-disease, there will be so great disturbances 
that the Administration will lose all Ovamboland; and all Ovambos from the mines, the 
farms and the towns will leave their work and run back to Ovamboland their home-
country (…). Disturbances may perhaps happen as a result of the cutting of the 
Oukuanjama. Further the Reds whose eyes are everywhere – know what is going on in 
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this country as well as other countries, and they perhaps will come on the pretext of 
liberating the Ovambos from a tyrannical Administration.69  
The missionaries’ warnings echoed those of Hahn against interfering directly in 
how the inhabitants of Ovamboland raised their cattle: that to do so would trigger 
resistance. Eedes’ worried superiors in Windhoek asked him to investigate, but, 
not surprisingly, the Native Commissioner and his staff found no evidence of any 
unrest. On the pretext of collecting the data for a census, Assistant Native Com-
missioner C.S. Holdt, who was stationed in Oshikango, Oukwanyama, had been 
quietly assessing how many people would be affected by a forced removal since 
early December 1947. Holdt believed it to be likely that most of the district’s 
inhabitants had heard rumors about the removals and that there was a great deal of 
distrust of the administration. Holdt advised Eedes that “[i]t is doubtful whether 
the people would voluntarily accept such a scheme. There are many reasons for 
this. But it could nevertheless be put to them. There appears to be no reason for not 
doing so, especially now. If they do not accept it, then the Administration will have 
to consider whether they are prepared to put through the scheme even in the face 
of opposition”.70 
Eedes disagreed with his subordinate about the need to consult the Oukwany-
ama leaders; he felt that it was too soon. Fearing that the administration might 
prematurely vote down the plan because the missionaries “may have sabotaged the 
efforts of the Administration to develop Ovamboland”, Eedes suggested that 
Dymond and Bjorklund be warned to stay out of politics or face expulsion from 
the reserve. Ultimately, in a letter marked confidential, Eedes proposed to shelve 
the plan for future consideration and added: “I suggested the present scheme, 
which the Administration told Bishop Tobias was a good one, and which has the 
support of the Veterinary and Police Authorities. I am quite prepared, however 
(…) [to] tell the Natives that the scheme has been abandoned. It must be borne in 
mind that the Portuguese Authorities may adopt a similar scheme on their side of 
the border, and that they would not consider the wishes of the Natives (…). There 
is also always the possibility that the Portuguese Authorities will suddenly one day 
prohibit the continual movement of Ukuaanyama cattle in and out of Angola”.71 
Windhoek accepted the recommendation. Eedes reported that on 6 March 1948, 
he addressed the Oukwanyama district Tribal Council meeting as follows: 
Reports have been made to the Government in Windhoek that there is a very unpleasant 
atmosphere of suspicion everywhere, and that there is a lack of confidence in the 
European Administration. The Government has instructed me to give you the following 
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message: – There was never any proposal on the part of the Administration to evacuate 
the Ukuanyama (…). He [the Administrator] hopes that the reports that you are dis-
turbed by these rumors are not true. As you know we have talked for many years about 
the possibility of eradicating stock disease in Ovamboland (…). If Ovamboland was 
free from stock disease, the possibility was foreseen of Ovamboland being reinfected 
from Angola in the absence of a proper “line” between the countries. I wish to tell you 
now that there is no intention of evacuating the Ukuanyama tribe, and that even a 
suggestion, made by somebody, of a small evacuated strip along the border line was 
never entertained by the Chief native Commissioner, or by the Administrator.72  
The incredulous Eedes could hardly believe his ears when the Oukwanyama 
headmen responded to his hypocrisy in kind. Their spokesperson said: “We have 
never heard about this matter until now. After having heard your words we are 
now afraid (…). Who gave the reports to the Government in Windhoek? (…) How 
does ‘Nakale’ (Mr. Eedes) know about any unrest if we do not”. Eedes advised his 
superior against publicly identifying Dymond as one of the culpable, because “he 
is quite likely to show his Converts and Native Priest, your letters (…) addressed 
to Bishop Tobias” about the removal plans and embarrass the administration.73 
Eedes’ ally, the veterinarian Dr. Zschokke, did his part to keep Eedes’ plan 
alive. In October 1948, seven months after Eedes’ ruse of publicly denying his 
own plan, Dr. Zschokke confidentially urged his departmental superior in Wind-
hoek, Director of Agriculture Dr. J.S. Watt, to close the Angolan-Namibian border 
to cattle movements with a fence. Zschokke’s letter was critical of what he 
portrayed as the old unenlightened Ovamboland establishment (Hahn and the 
missionaries) and praised Eedes as an ally of rational and energetic scientist-
experts (like himself and Watt) who could and should shake up the dozing 
bureaucrats in Windhoek: 
I am writing this letter to you, because I feel that the mere fact that the Administration 
has sort of shelved a problem, of utmost important [sic] in my opinion, does not justify 
any closing of eyes on our part. Mr. Eedes closed the northern boundary [with Angola] 
for to and fro movements of stock in the Okavango Territory after the first lungsickness 
campaign in 1938. We both know only too well, what was benefitted by this action 
(…). The border-line of Ovamboland was never closed, except for a short period in 
1946, when we had to take over control, on account of F&M [foot and mouth]. We both 
know of the numerous outbreaks of various notifiable stock-diseases occurring in this 
part of the country (…). Mr. Eedes, then in the Okavango, was for clear territorial 
segregation, because he believed it to be beneficial for both countries, Major Hahn was 
against it for a number of reasons, not all known to me and declared the establishing of 
such boundary conditions (…) an impossibility, as far as Ovamboland was concerned 
(…). During the 1946-F&M-Campaign the closing of the border between Angola and 
Ovamboland, was an essentiality. Against all belief of the Ovambolanders (Missiona-
ries and Officials) we had a stretch of 120 miles of border-line under control within a 
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few weeks and all animal and human traffic was efficiently stopped (…). And I am 
more than ever before convinced that the most important factor in our endeavours to 
free the N[orthern] N[ative] T[erritorie]s from certain important notifiable diseases is a 
frontier towards north [sic], which can be efficiently controlled. Owing to various un-
fortunate circumstances Mr. Eedes proposal viz. to create an empty buffer-zone, met 
with disapproval on the part of the Administration. (I have made similar proposals in 
1946, see my reports) (…) I should feel very happy indeed if through this letter and 
your subsequent action this whole complex of problems could be re-considered by the 
Administration in order that we are not coming out second best with our “noble allies” 
[the Portuguese].74  
Zschokke and Eedes continued preparations for their project to eradicate 
livestock diseases in Ovamboland. In the same month that Zschokke made his plea 
to his boss, he successfully trained 122 volunteers from the eastern Ovamboland 
districts of Oukwanyama, Ondonga and Uukwambi as cattle inoculators. The 
veterinarian noted with satisfaction that the volunteers “know how to operate a 
syringe in a professional manner”.75 In September 1949, Eedes’ assistant at Oshi-
kango triumphantly reported that the 
[Oukwanyama] Headmen unanimously agree to any type of inoculation (…) and ask 
the Administration be requested to make as early a start as possible and that cattle 
diseases be tackled in the following order of priority: (1) lungsickness, (2) Anthrax and 
(3) Blackquarter. Headman Nehemia points out that the best months for an inoculation 
campaign are April to July as, during that period, most of the cattle are back from the 
cattle posts.76  
In early November of the same year, the chiefs and headmen of western Ovam-
boland also agreed to cooperate with the vaccination program, which included the 
use of branding to mark vaccinated cattle. The Ovamboland veterinarian wrote to 
his superior in Windhoek: 
Obviously there was and still is a certain amount of antagonism amongst the older 
people against such novelties (…). But the fact that the younger generations agreed to 
come together (…) and discuss all questions and proposals (…) resulting eventually in a 
clear decision to brand and inoculate in future, seems to indicate that a step towards 
betterment of conditions was achieved.77  
During the same month, the Oukwanyama headmen reiterated their com-
mitment to the vaccination project and agreed that vaccinated cattle would be 
branded, and the veterinarian services trained another sixty-four inoculators from 
the districts of western Ovamboland. Eedes’ prediction that the Portuguese one day 
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would simply close the border became a reality at the end of 1949 as the Angolan 
veterinary services prepared for a grand effort to eradicate the principal cattle 
diseases on their side. No doubt also to put pressure on his superiors, Eedes in-
formed Windhoek that until all Ovamboland’s cattle had been certified as vaccin-
ated, the Portuguese would no longer allow any livestock from south of the border 
to enter Angola beginning on 2 January 1950.78 Thus, three years after Eedes took 
over from Hahn, and despite setbacks, the stage seemed finally set for Eedes to 
eradicate cattle diseases in Ovamboland. 
Eedes must have felt as if Providence was on his side because a renewed foot 
and mouth outbreak – this time in the Okavango Native Territory due east of 
Ovamboland – added a sense of urgency, justifying radical and rapid action. 
Claiming that he suspected that Angola was the source of the infection, Eedes 
immediately prohibited any movement of cattle and cattle products across the 
Angolan border east of Oshikango in either direction, effectively preventing the 
return of large numbers of cattle from Ovamboland that had been at cattle posts in 
Angola – locations beyond the floodplain where the cattle were kept during the dry 
season only. Eedes personally attended a Tribal Council meeting in Ovamboland’s 
Oukwanyama border district and warned the headmen that their herdsmen should 
not cross back from Angola into Ovamboland with their cattle until at least March. 
Eedes promised to send twenty-eight police officers with vehicles to patrol the 
border after the leading Senior Headman, Vilho Weyulu, expressed fears that the 
herdsmen might not obey him and his colleagues. The Native Commissioner 
threatened that any cattle found crossing the border could be shot, and added: 
The Government has also decided to put a fence of wire (…) along the border line (…) 
there will be only one gate and this will be at Oshikango. No stock will be able to get 
through this fence. Any person climbing through this fence or cutting it or damaging it 
in any way may be punished. These measures are being taken by the Government to 
protect Ovamboland from stock disease. They are necessary as I am sure you will 
realise. I hope, therefore, you will co-operate with the Government.79  
Eedes reported that the headmen of Oukwanyama agreed with his proposals: 
“After discussion the Principal headmen, the sub-Headmen and people present 
agreed to co-operate with the Government. They asked that the question of the 
return of the cattle from Angola be decided by the end of March next”.80 In a 
generous mood because of the ready cooperation he received from the headmen, 
the Native Commissioner – after initially refusing to intervene – subsequently 
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successfully negotiated with his Portuguese colleagues for the release of a herd of 
180 cattle that was owned by the village headman Panguashimi Nehadi from 
Namibia’s Oukwanyama district. Eedes supplied the headman with a pass to cross 
into Angola and collect his cattle from Portuguese custody. Handing him the pass, 
Eedes went out of his way to remind the headman not to bring his cattle across the 
border but to temporarily “place the cattle with relatives and friends in Angola” 
instead. Totally disregarding Eedes’ advice, Panguashimi Nehadi smuggled his 
cattle back into Ovamboland. The Secretary for South West Africa, determined to 
set an example, ordered Panguashimi’s cattle to be shot, and instructed Eedes in 
future to shoot one or two head from each herd stopped at the border.81 Eedes 
noted in his diary that he traveled to the Oshikango border post on 13 February to 
shoot cattle suspected of being infected with foot and mouth; the cattle probably 
belonged to Panguashimi.82 
But the very next day Eedes had a change of heart. He sent an urgent tele-
gram to Windhoek proposing to cease the cattle killings because he found that 
foot and mouth already had spread deep into Ovamboland.83 Reluctantly, since it 
meant that he had to shelve his plan for a border barrier once more, Eedes re-
commended that the foot and mouth cordon be withdrawn from the Angolan 
border to the far south of Ovamboland, where it had been situated during the 1946-
1947 outbreak. A disillusioned Eedes ended his telegram by placing the blame for 
the failure to contain foot and mouth – and of his plan to eradicate stock diseases – 
squarely on “the Ovambo” in general: 
The Ovambos have definitely shown that they are not prepared to co-operate and that 
they will defy instructions given to them for their own good and for the protection of 
South West Africa as a whole Stop It is clear that other natives not yet detected in addi-
tion to Panguashimi introducing infected herds from time to time.84  
The policemen withdrew to what became the Red Line and the southern 
border of Ovamboland.85 Several months later, the veterinarian inspected a herd 
in Oukwanyama that had been suspected to be infected with foot and mouth. His 
conclusion was startling: “Dr. Zschokke (…) came to an immediate conclusion 
that there was no Foot and Mouth disease in Ovamboland – in fact he said that 
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there never was!”86 In July, without sharing Dr. Zschokke’s revelation, Eedes 
issued a stern warning to Ovamboland’s chiefs and headmen: 
it is the duty of all men to report immediately any sickness in his cattle to his Headman. 
It is then the duty of the Headmen to report it to me (…). I wish to warn you that failure 
to obey these instructions will necessitate strong action being taken by me against the 
persons who fail to make reports to me.87  
Only in November 1950 did Eedes inform the headmen of the border dis-
tricts of Ombalantu and Oukwanyama and the interior Ondonga district that 
cattle could be brought back to Ovamboland from Angola, a full four months 
after he had alerted his superiors in Windhoek that the foot and mouth alarm – 
the rationale for the prohibition – had been erroneous.88 
Eedes may have manipulated the foot and mouth scare in part to get even with 
Hahn, his long-time rival who also claimed to be the leading expert on Ovambo-
land. While serving as Native Commissioner in 1938 in Okavango after he had 
been removed from Ovamboland by Hahn, Eedes had eradicated lungsickness 
through a successful vaccination campaign.89 Native Commissioner Hahn was 
unwilling and unable to repeat his disgraced subordinate’s accomplishment in 
Ovamboland. Hahn canceled two planned vaccination campaigns in Ovamboland 
at the last moment and openly expressed doubts about both the political and eco-
nomic benefits of lungsickness vaccination there. The feud was far from over in 
1947, when Eedes succeeded Hahn while foot and mouth threatened Ovamboland. 
In his first report as Native Commissioner there, Eedes quoted from a letter he had 
received from the headmen of the western Uukwaluthi district expressing 
gratitude to the government for sending “a Master whom we know” in order to 
dispel as “untruthful (…) the statement made by a certain Ovamboland official 
to the effect that my previous experience in Ovamboland was limited to the 
Ukuanayama [Oukwanyama] and Ombalantu tribal areas”.90 The official Eedes 
referred to was his predecessor Hahn. 
Using foot and mouth as an opportunity to best Hahn on his own Ovamboland 
turf and to prove his own prowess, Eedes gambled not only with his own re-
putation, but also that of the colonial veterinary service, which had not had a 
permanent presence in Ovamboland before the foot and mouth affair. Even more 
tragic and longer-lasting in its effects, Eedes’ actions put the livelihoods of 
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floodplain’s cattle holders at stake. Veterinary science in Ovamboland, Native 
Commissioner Eedes and Ovamboland cattle holders all suffered, but they paid 
very different prices. The institutional introduction of veterinary science in Ovam-
boland was tarnished and the territory’s first veterinary officer, Dr. Zschokke, was 
left with little professional integrity because he had allowed Eedes to run rough-
shod over him. Dr. Zschokke was clearly not a scientist who subverted coloni-
alism, to the contrary. Eedes’ reputation was dented, but he remained the Native 
Commissioner until his retirement in 1954, re-emerging from the foot and mouth 
controversies as the uncontested source of authority in Ovamboland in political 
and environmental matters. Along with the neighboring Kaokoland and Okavango 
Reserves, Ovamboland retained its unique status as a Prohibited Area under 
Proclamation No. 26 of 1928. Entry into Ovamboland required a special permit 
from the Secretary of South West Africa and the reserve remained under the 
control of the Chief Native Commissioner in Windhoek and the Native Commis-
sioner in Ondangwa. Except in ‘technical matters’, members of other departments, 
including scientifically trained experts in the environmental realm, namely veteri-
narians and agricultural officers, were wholly subordinate to the Native Commis-
sioner.91 
Ovamboland’s inhabitants, however, paid the heaviest price, because the foot 
and mouth veterinary barrier remained in place as the Red Line long after Eedes 
had retired. Moreover, the foot and mouth affair contributed greatly to a colonial 
re-evaluation of Ovamboland’s cattle from a subsistence resource into a health, 
and, subsequently, an environmental threat.92 The affair also entrenched the per-
ception that cattle holders and indeed ‘the Ovambos’ as a group were not the noble 
and self-sufficient savages that Hahn sometimes had described them as, but rather 
obstinate primitives who needed to be dragged into the modern world kicking and 
screaming, if necessary. Achieving modernity therefore would require full colonial 
control over Ovamboland’s population, resources and environment and the firm 
exercise of power. 
The foot and mouth affair also highlights a particular environmental twist to 
Mamdani’s point about the autocratic nature of colonial rule. Highly authoritarian 
and fairly independent Native Commissioners made policy choices and imple-
mented policies affecting environmental resources that were strongly motivated in 
part by personal rivalries. The affair also speaks to the concept of the second 
colonial conquest as a conquest of Nature. Hahn implemented the indirect policy 
of containing cattle diseases by confining the animals to the reserve. His successor 
Eedes attempted to intervene directly in cattle management and use and to 
eradicate cattle disease, even though the goal remained elusive. The impact of the 
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political ecology of insecurity and the repercussions of successive regimes of 
indirect and direct environmental rule had dramatic consequences in north-central 
Namibia and elsewhere in the colonized world. 
 
  
4 
Fierce species:  
Biological imperialism 
The concepts of biological or ecological imperialism and biological exchanges 
highlight the role of biological invaders in environmental change. The European 
conquest of the Americas, for example, was as much a product of the (unin-
tentional) introduction of Old World biological species as of military might. 
Biological invaders from the Old World, including smallpox germs, sheep, 
cattle, horses and a host of plants, accompanied European conquerors, deci-
mating New World indigenous human, animal and plant populations, destroying 
the local natural environment, and transforming the Americas into a Neo-
Europe.1 
As part of the Old World, Africa has long been regarded as immune from 
biological imperialism from Europe. In addition, Africa was seen – implicitly or 
explicitly – as being complicit in the Old World’s biological imperialism in the 
New World because several of the invading species were carried on the ships 
that brought African slaves to the New World – for example, malaria, yellow 
fever and trypanosomiasis.2 Not only was Africa considered immune to Euro-
pean biological imperialism, but tropical Africa’s own particular disease envir-
onment was portrayed as a formidable obstacle to European intrusions, as il-
lustrated by its reputation as the ‘White Man’s Grave’. A range of diseases, 
                                                 
1  Crosby, The Columbian Exchange and Ecological Imperialism. 
2  Kiple, The Caribbean Slave. 
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including malaria, sleeping sickness, schistosomiasis, bilharzia and river blind-
ness, mired European military, political, economic and ecological conquest.3 
Various Eurasian and American species introduced in Africa, however, be-
haved much like invasive species. Like smallpox in the Americas, bovine pleu-
ronomia (lungsickness or cattle TB) and rinderpest (cattle plague), spread like 
wildfire when they were introduced in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
decimating domestic cattle and other susceptible domestic and wild animal 
species in Africa. The impact of lungsickness utterly destroyed South Africa’s 
Xhosa society in the 1850s.4 Moreover, European biological and nonbiological 
imperialism also unleashed indigenous species from their ‘natural’ niches in 
Africa and transformed them into plagues and pests, vermin and weeds as well 
as unintended collaborators with the colonial invaders because they disturbed 
precontact ecosystems. One example is sleeping sickness in Africa, an endemic 
disease that turned into a deadly epidemic during the era of colonial conquest.5 
Thus, the notion of biological imperialism appears to be more appropriate to 
Africa than sometimes has been acknowledged. In north-central Namibia, the 
biological invaders included microbes that introduced at least three major 
human diseases (influenza, measles and the plague) and three animal diseases 
(lungsickness, rinderpest and foot and mouth), as well as two new animal 
species (the horse and the donkey). In addition, during the colonial era, several 
species of animals were (re)classified as vermin. Indigenous species that under 
the new circumstances had opportunistically infested the environment were re-
cast as both the cause and the effect of new ecological and biological imbal-
ances that were associated with imperialism and colonialism, including such 
wild animals as lions, leopards, cheetahs, wild dogs and elephants, as well as 
domestic cattle and goats. 
Invading microbes and virgin soil epizootics 
The era of European imperialism witnessed the introduction of a variety of new 
diseases in Ovamboland. Three of the diseases affected animals, especially do-
mestic cattle: lungsickness entered the region in the 1860s, rinderpest followed 
in the 1890s, and foot and mouth reached southern Africa in the mid-twentieth 
century. 
                                                 
3  Curtin, Disease and Empire. 
4  Van Onselen, “Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africa”; Peires, The Dead Will 
Arise. 
5  Lyons, The Colonial Disease; Headrick, Colonialism, Health and Illness in French 
Equatorial Africa; Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, pp. 164-165; Kjekhus, 
Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History; Suret-Canale, 
Afrique Noire, pp. 51, 498-499; Hartwig and Patterson, Disease in African History. 
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The increased movements of people and animals through trade, hunting, 
exploration, missionary work and raiding throughout late nineteenth-century 
southern Africa facilitated the introduction of new animal diseases in the 
Ovambo floodplain. After killing hundreds of thousands of cattle in Europe, 
lungsickness reached South Africa in 1853 with a shipment of imported Frisian 
bulls. Transport oxen spread the disease across the region and by 1876 it had 
infected cattle in Ongandjera in the southern Ovambo floodplain.6 Lungsickness 
remained endemic thereafter and had a significant long-term impact on land use 
in the region. 
Far more destructive in the short term was the 1896 introduction of rinder-
pest in southern Africa. Rinderpest reached the Ovambo floodplain via South 
Africa in 1897, and decimated alike domestic livestock herds (cattle and goats) 
and wildlife (all single-thumb hoofed animals including antelopes were af-
fected). Migratory herds of antelopes spread the disease from Ondonga in the 
southern floodplain to Oukwanyama in the north and next to southwestern 
Angola via the Kunene River fords. One observer claimed that only 1% or 2% 
of the African-owned cattle in the area survived. Southwestern Angola’s cattle 
herds in Humbe and Gambos were estimated at half a million head before the 
rinderpest. Less than a decade later, Humbe contained a mere 50,000 head of 
cattle. The price of oxen more than quadrupled and all trade with ox wagons 
ceased. Carnivores preyed on humans for want of game. Rinderpest not only 
triggered a crisis in hunting, but also changed the nature of the cattle trade in the 
years immediately following the introduction of the disease because Africans 
refused to sell any breeding stock. Local diets and dress (leather had been the 
primary material used for clothing) also changed radically.7 
Cattle losses due to rinderpest in the Ovambo floodplain were probably 
much lower than the 90%-plus losses that European observers claimed. Mi-
grating wildlife and cattle must have spread the disease across the Kunene River 
during the dry season, the only time when its fords were passable. During the 
dry season, however, cattle were dispersed over a large number of isolated cattle 
                                                 
6  NAN, A233, J. Chapman collection, 1903-1916, pp. 61-62; and Peires, The Dead 
Will Arise, pp. 70-73. 
7  NAN, A233, J. Chapman collection, 1903-1916, pp. 45-47, 159-160, 167-169; “Ain-
da o Desastre do Humbe”, and “A Peste Bovina em Angola”, Portugal em Africa 5 
(March 1898): 51, 128-136; Marquardsen, Angola, pp. 99-101; CNDIH, Avulsos, 
Caixa 4121 “Humbe”, 32-4.6 Humbe, Cicumscricão Civil: Agricultura 1891-1913, 
relatorios 1906; Schachtzabel, Angola, pp. 89-99; AVEM, RMG 2630 C/k 7, Wulf-
horst, Referat: “Giebt es in unserer Ovambomission eine Frauenfrage?” Omupanda, 
Oct. 1903 (leather clothes); see also NAN, SWAA, Native Affairs Vol. 456, Secre-
tary for South West Africa, “Native Cattle”, Replies to Questionnaire by Dr. G. 
Schmid, GVO, n.p. [1932], to Secretary for External Affairs, Pretoria. 
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posts, which might have offered protection against rinderpest, since although it 
is highly contagious, transmission is dependent upon direct contact with dis-
eased animals. In the Oukwanyama kingdom, for example, cattle losses due to 
rinderpest reportedly were in the hundreds or thousands rather than the tens of 
thousands which a mortality of 90% plus would have required. By all accounts, 
rinderpest affected critical animal resources with dire consequences. Cattle were 
the principal means to purchase war supplies (guns, lead, gunpowder, cartridges 
and horses) in an era of increased insecurity, especially since local sources of 
ivory and feathers had been depleted by the early 1900s. As competition for the 
remaining cattle increased, insecurity further mounted, triggering an arms race.8 
Despite attempts to make up for lost animal proteins by increasing crop pro-
duction or fishing, insecurity negatively affected cultivation.9 Depleted live-
stock herds made manure scarcer. Significantly, during the early 1900s, the in-
habitants of the northern floodplain suffered from a series of famines.10 
The steep decline of grazing and browsing wildlife in conjunction with the 
virtual absence of elephants due to hunting caused bush to encroach upon grass-
lands throughout the region, as noted in descriptions of the vegetation in the 
northern and central floodplain from the early 1900s. In 1881, the only dense 
forest described in Ombadja was alongside the Kunene River, where a path had 
to be cut to allow the passage of ox wagons. In 1907, the expanse of open plains 
in Ombadja was surrounded by dense and predominantly thorny species; the 
Portuguese invasion forces were forced to cut their way through the impreg-
nable vegetation.11 
The recovery of rinderpest-affected animal populations took two decades, 
and at least as much time passed before the region again was referred to as a 
“hunter’s paradise”.12 And only another decade later, cattle raising in the 
southern floodplain once more was considered to be as important as crop 
cultivation.13 
During the dry season, herdsmen took the cattle to the distant cattle posts be-
yond the Ovambo floodplain. After the first good rains, the herdsmen accompanied 
the cattle back to the villages. Concentrating the cattle in the villages had a 
                                                 
8  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, p. 46; Schachtzabel, Angola, p. 99. 
9  Marquardsen, Angola, pp. 99-101. 
10  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chaps. 2-3. 
11  NAN, NAO 104, C.L. Anderson to Hahn, 13/4/44 Johannesburg 1882, extract diary 
W.W Jordan; “Campanha do Cuamato”, Portugal em Africa 14 (Sep. 1907): 165, 
446-447. Cf. CNDIH, Avulsos, Caixa 3703 “Huila”, Processo Missão de Estudos no 
Sul de Angola, 1914-15, Relatorio do Mez de Outubro [1914]. 
12  Quadros Flores, Recordações do Sul de Angola, p. 200. 
13  NAN, NAO 18, Hahn, Notes on Ovamboland for the Administrator, Windhoek, 15 
May 1924. 
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negative side: contagious diseases could spread more easily. Lungsickness, for 
example, struck early during the rainy season, when open water was abundant 
throughout the floodplain and cattle were concentrated in the villages. Although 
lungsickness did not have the apocalyptic impact in Ovamboland that it had had 
in the Xhosa territory, it did become an increasingly severe problem. Or at least, 
the South African colonial administration perceived it as such, and consequently 
introduced measures to limit the export and movement of cattle. Prior to 1930, 
reports about lungsickness in Ovamboland were rare, but they became increas-
ingly more common and more urgent.14 
 A third virgin soil cattle disease which appeared in Ovamboland in the 
second half of the 1940s, foot and mouth, jolted the colonial administration into 
taking radical actions and led to the consolidation of the Red Line, the 
veterinary barrier between Ovamboland and the rest of Namibia. The disease 
itself, however, did not cause any significant livestock losses at all: foot and 
mouth symptoms mirrored another innocent local disease that was well-known 
to Ovamboland’s cattle holders.15  
Invading microbes and virgin soil epidemics 
Several diseases also struck the human inhabitants of Ovamboland early in the 
colonial era in the 1920s. Three of them were triggered by invading microbes: 
influenza, measles and plague. In addition, TB and smallpox appeared. The TB 
incidence in Ovamboland increased as migrant laborers from the area were 
exposed to the disease and to unhealthy working and living conditions in 
southern Africa’s mines. 
Colonial reports are dismissive or vague about any virgin soil epidemics in 
1920s and 1930s Ovamboland, and influenza and measles epidemics received 
little attention in colonial reports. In June of 1924, an influenza outbreak in 
central and southern Namibia virtually halted recruitment because, as an ob-
viously annoyed official wrote, returning migrant laborers “brought back exagge-
rated reports of sickness on the diamond fields”. The disease spread to Ovambo-
land, but according to the annual report for 1924, the death toll was not heavy. 
However, the very first colonial monthly report for Ovamboland, which covered 
December 1924, stated that influenza had afflicted “thousands” in the month of 
November alone, although no additional information was available about the 
disease for December. The following year, influenza caused “a great number” of 
deaths in Ovamboland. By October, the epidemic had killed at least two hun-
dred people in the border district of Oukwanyama and fifty in the Ondonga 
                                                 
14  NAN, NAO 18, Monthly Report Ovamboland, March 1925. 
15  See chapters 3 and 6. 
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district; it continued to rage in Ondonga in December 1925, where its victims 
included several headmen. Another influenza epidemic in October 1928 led to 
high but unspecified mortality, especially amongst children and the elderly. In 
1931 and 1932, influenza struck again, in the latter year killing the prominent 
headman of Eenhana in eastern Oukwanyama. In 1935, influenza once more 
surfaced in the Oukwanyama and Uukwambi districts but again no details were 
provided.16 
A 1927 outbreak of smallpox in Angola led to a vaccination campaign in 
Ovamboland that progressed smoothly in Ondonga and the northwestern 
districts and prevented the disease from becoming an epidemic south of the 
border. In 1942, the Oukwanyama district experienced an outbreak of ‘Kaffir-
pox’, and the response of the administration was to vaccinate people in the 
affected areas, although with a delay of three years, possibly related to the war 
conditions. Almost 54,000 people were vaccinated against smallpox in 1945.17 
Two epidemics of measles, in 1929 and in 1938, are only mentioned in 
passing in the colonial records, although local memories associate an outbreak 
of measles on the Angolan side with heavy mortality amongst recently initiated 
girls. The annual report for Ovamboland for 1929 mentions no deaths, stating 
“[no epidemics to report] with the exception of a few cases of measles”. But the 
small colonial staff of Ovamboland had not only been distracted by routine 
tasks, but also had been overwhelmed by a famine and the introduction of a tax 
system. In addition, its medical staff was shorthanded because one of the admi-
nistration’s two medical officers had been temporarily re-assigned to the 
Caprivi region to attend to a smallpox outbreak. As a result, the impact of the 
1929 measles epidemic may have been underreported. In July-August 1938, the 
Anglican mission reported that an outbreak of measles at its Holy Cross 
Mission had spread rapidly throughout the Oukwanyama district, causing 
several deaths. The outbreak was serious enough for the administration to halt 
migrant labor recruitment for a few weeks. No female initiation ceremonies 
were reported in that year. Women’s initiation ceremonies took place in 
Ovamboland in October 1928, despite a threatening drought: “In spite of the 
depressing conditions wedding feasts are being celebrated with much beer and 
noise, this being the season of marrying and taking in marriage”.18 It is possible 
                                                 
16  NAN, NAO 18-19, Annual Reports Ovamboland 1924 and 1925, and Monthly 
Reports Ovamboland, Dec. 1924, Sep.-Dec. 1925, Oct. 1928, May-June 1931, Sep. 
1932 and June-July 1935. 
17  NAN, NAO 18, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Aug.-Sep. 1927; A450, 7, Annual 
Report Ovamboland 1945; NAO 60, Quarterly Report Ovamboland, July-Sep. 1952. 
18  NAN, NAO 18, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Oct. 1928. 
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that the measles epidemic that is known as the killer of ‘brides’ (as recently 
initiated girls were referred to) took place in 1929.19 
A third disease introduced alongside colonialism was cause for concern to 
the administration. Tuberculosis patients had been treated within the (govern-
ment-subsidized) mission hospitals in Ovamboland since at least 1927. Ques-
tioned about health issues in Ovamboland by a commission of inquiry, the 
District Surgeon for Ovamboland stated that he had treated 79 cases of TB in 
Ovamboland in 1934 and that 17 patients had died. He added that “according to 
histories given by patients, it appears as if many of them contract the disease while 
at work in the South [i.e. as migrant laborers on the farms and in the mines of 
Namibia]”.20 Tuberculosis remained endemic in Ovamboland: in 1951, the hospi-
tals in Ovamboland treated 257 cases, and 35 patients died.21 
A fourth invasive microbe that made its way into Ovamboland during the 
1930s, however, jolted the South African colonial administration into a frenzy 
of action. In January 1932, the Finnish Mission Society, which ran several 
hospitals and clinics in Ovamboland, reported the outbreak of what appeared to 
be plague. A high-ranking medical official from the South African Health 
Department was immediately flown in and hastened to Ovamboland to in-
vestigate the cases with the District Surgeon. The two doctors collected blood 
smears, sending the samples to a lab for analysis while the death toll rose to 
twelve. The blood samples confirmed the worst fears: it was bubonic plague. 
The plague continued to spread as the administration brought in plague serum 
and vaccines. The administration also dispatched a special rodent inspector to 
Ovamboland to combat the disease’s main vector. The inspector received his 
own motor vehicle, a rare luxury especially in this era of economic depression, 
and indicative of the extent of the administration’s concern about the outbreak. 
The Portuguese authorities stationed two of their precious medical officers on 
the border to monitor the disease in Ovamboland and the officers remained in 
close touch with their South African counterparts. The Portuguese also closed 
the Angolan border “to all travelers and placed a chain of military outposts 
along the line” that served as a base for regular border patrols. Sealing the 
border triggered a series of incidents. In one instance, Ovamboland residents 
returning to Namibia from Angola with their cattle disarmed a Portuguese 
                                                 
19  NAN, NAO 18, Monthly Report Ovamboland, Oct. 1928 and Ovamboland Annual 
Report 1929; NAO 20, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, July-Aug. 1938. Maria Wey-
ulu, interview by author, Eenhana Refugee Camp (Namibia), 16 July 1993. 
20  NAN, A450, 12, SWA Commission: Minutes of Evidence (1935), vol. 12, Session at 
Ukualuthi, 13 Aug. 1935, evidence by Dr. Michiel van Niekerk (District Surgeon 
Ovamboland and Kaokoveld); and NAO 18, Native Affairs Ovamboland Annual 
Report 1927. 
21  NAN, NAO 65, Annual Health Report Ovamboland and Kaokoveld 1951. 
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indigenous soldier guarding the border. Fearful of an escalation of the violence, 
the Portuguese withdrew their patrols soon thereafter. 
The number of plague cases declined rapidly after February 1932 but in-
creased again by the end of the year. By mid-1933, the total cumulative death 
toll of bubonic plague had risen to 61, representing one of every five people 
diagnosed with the disease. Ondonga was the most severely affected district, 
with more than half of the confirmed cases and half of the fatalities.22 Plague 
returned in 1934, but it was no longer confined to remote villages, causing 
resident colonial officials to fear for their own lives: “[Flea vectors] are now a 
constant source of danger to the Europeans”.23 Migrant laborers recruited in 
Ovamboland during 1934, 1935 and 1936 received “prophylactic injections” 
against plague before they were allowed to leave the reserve to engage in wage 
labor in the ‘white’ regions of colonial Namibia.24 In 1935, plague struck again, 
killing 27 of 175 infected people.25 Cases of plague occurred again in 1937 and 
a “severe outbreak” of what is identified as “pneumonic plague” was reported in 
1943, but without details about any fatalities.26 It is unclear whether the 1943 
outbreak was indeed the less deadly pneumonic plague, or whether it was 
reported in error, because the lab analysis of the blood smears collected during 
the initial outbreak in 1932 had identified bubonic plague. Plague and its rodent 
carriers continued to worry the Ovamboland administration. In 1948, the 
colonial staff still included a Rodent Inspector and in the mid-1950s, officials 
issued what appears to have been a routine request to Ovamboland’s Tribal 
Councils to monitor rodent populations closely and to report any renewed out-
breaks of plague.27 
Although colonial reports argued that the epidemic was due to the local 
practice of consuming rodents, which they described as disgusting and unhygi-
enic, the actual source was food aid shipments of maize from South Africa with 
                                                 
22  NAO 19, Annual Report Ovamboland 1932 and Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Jan., 
Feb., April, July-Dec. 1932, June-Oct. 1933. 
23  NAN, NAO 19, Monthly Report Ovamboland, March 1934. 
24  NAN, NAO 19-20, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Sep.-Oct. 1931, Jan.-Feb. 1932, 
March-Aug. 1932, June and Oct. 1933, March and Oct. 1934, March and June-July 
1935, Jan.-March and June-July 1936, and Quarterly Report Ovamboland, Jan.-June 
1943; NAO 36, District Surgeon Ondangwa, Annual Report 1933. 
25  NAN, NAO 19, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Jan.-March and June-July 1935. 
26  NAN, NAO 36, Annual Health Report Ovamboland 1937 [or 1936?], and NAO 21, 
Quarterly Report Ovamboland, Jan.-March and April-June 1943. 
27  NAN, NAO 66, Rodent Inspector Ovamboland to District Surgeon Ovamboland, 
Ondangwa, 18 June 1948; and Tribal Secretary Ondonga to NCO, Okaloko, 20 July 
1954. 
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infected rats during the early 1930s Famine of the Dams.28 The plague became 
endemic in the region because Ovamboland’s abundant indigenous rodent popu-
lation rapidly became infected with the disease: fleas carried by the rodents 
were the vector that transmitted the disease to humans. More recent outbreaks 
of plague in the Ovambo floodplain occurred in 1992 and 1993.  
A plague of donkeys: Fierce invading equines 
Horses played an important role in the story of the military and biological 
conquest of the Americas. Hernando Cortés had approximately two dozen war 
horses that inspired great terror amongst his Aztec opponents. When adopted by 
the North American Indians, horses revolutionized the local economy and 
society, initiating the era of the dominance of the Plains Indians.29 But the 
horse, ridden by cowboys and the U.S. Cavalry, was also powerfully helpful in 
the conquest of the Indians and the establishment of a Neo-Europe. 
Horses were also an important tool of empire and biological conquest in 
Africa. The great savanna empires of medieval West Africa – including Ghana, 
Mali and Songhay – relied on cavalry. Cavalry played a role in the destruction 
of Songhay by Moroccan invaders. Horses were imported from North Africa 
and Europe, commanding high prices, and they also were bred locally. Cavalry 
remained important in warfare well into the nineteenth century, facilitating 
(slave) raids and conquest. In his resistance to the French advance in the latter 
nineteenth century, the West African resistance leader Samory relied heavily on 
cavalry, and cavalry also played an important role in the French conquest of the 
savannas of West Africa. 30 
The Portuguese not only supplied West African rulers and merchants with 
horses, but also introduced horses in southern Africa. The numbers of horses 
remained small in both modern Mozambique and Angola and their impact was 
more akin to a Cortés-style weapon of terror.31 In South Africa, horses (and 
guns) afforded the Boers, the Griqua, the Bastards and the Oorlam great mo-
bility and power.32 In fact, the Boers probably only survived in the interior of 
South Africa because of the combination of horses and firearms. 
                                                 
28  South African National Archives Pretoria, NTS Ovamboland, PM 1/2/176, 
PM49/91. These materials have since been transferred to the National Archives of 
Namibia in Windhoek. 
29  See Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison. 
30  Law, The Horse in West African History, and Goody, Technology, Tradition, and 
the State in Africa. On Samory, see Person, Une révolution Dyula. 
31  See, for example, Amaral Ferreira, “Transforming Atlantic Slaving”. 
32  See Ross, Adam Kok’s Griquas; Lau, Southern and Central Namibia in Jonker Afri-
kaner’s Time; Swart, “‘Horses! Give Me More Horses!’”. 
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In the 1860s and 1870s, the Ovambo floodplain and the wider region were 
subjected to horse-mounted and gun-armed raiders from central Namibia. 
Terrorized and impressed, in the following years the floodplain’s elite invested 
heavily in purchasing guns and horses, even though both commanded very high 
prices. Before the 1897 rinderpest, a horse’s value ranged from 70 to 190 head 
of cattle. Both high prices and the prevalence of horsesickness limited their 
numbers to several hundred at the most from 1850 to 1930.33 The Portuguese 
and South African invading armies made heavy use of cavalry in the floodplain 
but they limited their operations to the dry season.34 
Horsesickness was mentioned frequently in regular reports from the colonial 
administration in Ovamboland, from their inception in 1924 onward. The re-
ports record that horsesickness occurred during the rainy season and that when 
there was an abundance of standing water, losses were especially severe. During 
the rainy season of 1924-1925, the outbreak of horsesickness was first reported 
in December 1924, and losses steadily mounted until into the month of May. By 
the end of April, when standing water still abounded, losses to horsesickness 
reached 93 animals. By February 1927, horsesickness had returned, killing 
“several” horses. Because of their scarcity, horses continued to be highly 
coveted, but because they no longer were valued in warfare, the cost was a 
fraction of the pre-1890s rinderpest price. In 1932, a horse cost 6-7 head of 
cattle, as against the 70-190 head of cattle before the advent of rinderpest.35 In 
1951, the headmen of the Oukwanyama district purchased 285 doses of horse-
sickness vaccine and it was reported that “many of the horses have been inocu-
lated”. 36 
Mules and donkeys were also introduced in Ovamboland early during the 
colonial period, and they too remained few in numbers until the 1930s.37 Like 
horses, mules were vulnerable to horsesickness, but, the extent to which the 
disease affected donkeys is unclear.38 After World War II, however, the number 
of donkeys quickly expanded and colonial observers began to describe donkeys 
                                                 
33  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, p. 38, table 2.1. On horsesickness, see NAN, NAO 18, 
Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Jan.-Feb. and April 1925, Feb. 1927. Cf. NAO 104, 
Anderson to Hahn, Jordan diary. 
34  Kreike, Re-Creating Eden, pp. 35-80. 
35  NAN, NAO 18, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Dec. 1924, Jan.-May 1925, Feb. 
1927, and NAO 16, statement of Tiolene, appendix to O/C Oshikango to NCO, Oshi-
kango, 22 June 1932. 
36  NAN, NAO 18, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Dec. 1924, Jan.-May 1925, Feb. 
1927, and NAO 16, statement of Tiolene, appendix to O/C Oshikango to NCO, Oshi-
kango, 22 June 1932; NAO 60, Quarterly Report Ovamboland, Oct.-Dec. 1951. 
37  NAN, NAO 18, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Feb. 1925, Aug. 1926 and Aug. 
1927. 
38  NAN, NAO 18, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Dec. 1924, Jan.-Feb. 1925. 
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as a veritable plague. In the South African Bophuthatswana homeland, donkeys 
were culled in the 1980s ‘donkey massacre’.39 Today, donkeys are identified as 
one of the most dangerous and prevalent invading species in Ovamboland, and a 
severe environmental threat. 
The history of donkeys defies conventional narratives of invasive species, 
including that of Latin America’s plague of sheep.40 Whereas the number of 
sheep in Mexico quickly increased following their introduction, donkeys in 
Ovamboland initially did not fare much better than their equine cousins. Until 
the late 1930s, the floodplain environment did not seem to favor donkeys. A 
September 1937 colonial report noted that donkeys 
do not seem to thrive, at all well, in Ovamboland. In former years it was not so 
noticeable but whether there is a difference in the grazing or watering conditions, is 
not known, but the fact remains that all donkeys, as soon as the grass discolours and 
becomes dry, rapidly fall off in condition. They all appear to be suffering from intes-
tinal trouble. This according to the Veterinary Officers with whom I have discussed 
this matter must be due to bad water. It may be that the successive flood seasons, 
experienced since 1934, brought with them some parasite, from the North, which is 
injurious to donkeys.41  
Donkeys and mules were used as transport animals. Donkey carts were much 
more versatile than ox wagons because the prevalence of lungsickness in Ovam-
boland meant that oxen could not be used to transport goods between Ovambo-
land and the rest of Namibia. In the 1930s, the Anglican mission at Odibo near 
Oshikango used donkey wagons to haul supplies into Ovamboland from the 
railhead at Outjo. The colonial administration and the local population used 
donkeys to carry supplies and water. 42 
Increased opportunities for paid labor during World War II – including 
military service – allowed more people to invest in donkeys and carts. In 1942 
and 1943, increased military service wage returns brought over 8,000 pounds 
sterling per month into Ovamboland at the same time that the availability of 
imported manufactures in the local stores declined. Many returning migrant 
laborers bought donkeys in the white farming regions south of Ovamboland “at 
ridiculously low cost” to carry food and other products home. In 1943, the 
Senior Headmen of Ovamboland allegedly asked the Native Commissioner to 
limit the import of donkeys because “[t]hey feel that they may easily become a 
menace to grazing in the same way as has happened in certain areas in SWA”. 
                                                 
39  Jacobs, Environment, Power and Injustice. 
40  Melville, A Plague of Sheep. 
41  NAN, NAO 20, Monthly Report Ovamboland, Sep. 1938. 
42  MacDonald Diary, 1932-1944 (Private Collection Nancy MacDonald, courtesy Nancy 
MacDonald), Odibo; NAN, NAO 20, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Aug. 1937, 
Aug.-Sep. 1939. 
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A 1944 census revealed that the Oukwanyama district alone had 3,410 donkeys 
while the total number of donkeys in Ovamboland in 1943 was estimated at 
over 8,000 animals. Native Commissioner Hahn claimed to have met Africans 
who brought in 500 donkeys at the time, and he discussed the matter with the 
headmen: 
All have expressed concern at the position, particularly on account of the shortage of 
grazing for cattle and other stock. In the vast majority of cases the natives acquire 
donkeys for the purpose of carrying their goods from the railhead and on reaching 
Ovamboland they are allowed to run wild and are seldom used again.  
Hahn wanted to prohibit the passage of donkeys via Ovamboland to Angola. In 
March 1945, with the agreement of at least the Oukwanyama Council of Head-
men, a ban on the import of donkeys into Ovamboland came into effect. Excep-
tions would only be made for draft animals that had been purchased in the Police 
Zone.43 In 1945-1946, the number of donkey carts in Ovamboland was estimated 
at 200 and the number of donkeys was estimated at 6,000.44 The 1950 census 
report only listed 50 donkey carts, but an actual count in 1952 produced a total 
of 576 single-axle donkey carts, including 136 in Oukwanyama, 100 in Ondon-
ga, 76 in Ombalantu, 152 in Uukwambi, 108 in Ongandjera and 4 in Onkolon-
kathi.45 
During the 1950s, donkeys continued to be used as pack animals, for ex-
ample, by hunters to carry meat and by female petty grain traders.46 Using the 
donkey as a plowing animal seems to have been a fairly recent 1950s inno-
vation.47 Low prices in the Police Zone and the general usefulness of donkeys 
(despite colonial perceptions to the contrary) encouraged migrant laborers to use 
them to transport their goods back to the Ovambo floodplain. The number of 
                                                 
43  NAN, NAO 43, NCO to Graig, Ondangua, 22 June 1943; NAO 15, ANC to NCO, 
Oshikango, 14 Nov. 1944, NCO to CNC, Ondangwa, 22 Nov. 1944 and NCO to 
Secretary SWANLA, 3 Jan. 1945; A450, 7, Annual Reports Ovamboland 1942 and 
1943. On the use of donkey carts, see BAC 44 f. 1/15/4/17, Minutes Annual Meeting 
Ondonga, 1 Dec. 1958 and BAC 45, Minutes Tribal Meetings Oukwanyama, 9-29 
May 1958. 
44  NAN, NAO 103, Census of Agriculture, Ovamboland 1945-1946. 
45  NAN, NAO 103, Census of Agriculture Ovamboland, 1949-1950, and ANC to NCO, 
Oshikango, 30 Dec. 1952; Chief Kambonde to NCO, Okaroko, 18 Dec. 1953; Council 
of Headmen of Ombalantu to NCO, 25 July 1952; Council of Headman of Ukuambi to 
NCO, Ukuambi, 16 July 1952; Chief Ushona Shimi to NCO, Okakua, 7 July 1952; 
Ikasha Nkandi and Ashimbanga Mupole to NCO, Onkolonkathi, 26 June 1952. 
46  NAN, NAO 90, Statements by Johannes Shekudja before NCO, Ondangwa, 18 and 
19 March 1952; NAO 62, ANC to NCO, [Oshikango], 22 Oct. 1952, and Pastor 
Risto Ushona to NCO, Okaku, 8 Sep. 1952. 
47  NAN, NAO 100, Ruusa Amtenya vs. Nikodemus Amtenya, statements by Ruusa Am-
tenya and Nikodemus Amtenya, Ondangwa, 17 Sep. 1954. 
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donkeys in Ovamboland consequently increased sharply in the 1950s and 
1960s. In 1966, the Namutoni Farmers Association of the Tsumeb district (an 
organization of white farmers) complained that migrant laborers who traveled 
through their district on their way home were accompanied by donkeys loaded 
up with furniture and other goods. The Police Commander at Oshivelo, the 
main entry point into Ovamboland for returning migrant laborers, estimated that 
since the new Oshivelo road had opened six months ago, 1,500 donkeys and 
1,500 horses had passed his post.48 An increase in the donkey population was 
also facilitated by what appears to have been a decreased vulnerability of the 
animals to the floodplain disease environment. By the late 1950s, they re-
portedly rarely succumbed to disease, although horses continued to suffer from 
a high death rate.49 
Overgrazing came to be seen as an increasingly serious threat to north-
central Namibia’s environment during the 1940s. Such radical measures as 
livestock culling, which had been attempted elsewhere in southern Africa (and 
Kenya), however, were not introduced in Ovamboland. In 1954, the Admini-
strator of colonial Namibia visited Ovamboland and in public meetings criti-
cized the environmental abuses of Ovambo farmers. He singled out donkeys 
explicitly: 
I also want to warn you against another thing. You should not keep donkeys. The 
donkey does not only eat the grass but he also uses his hoofs to scratch out the roots. 
We also had many donkeys initially, but we realized how bad they were and we then 
sent them to the factories/plants to be slaughtered.50  
Donkeys remained a target of the colonial administration throughout the 
1950s and 1960s. In 1958, the Chief Native Commissioner compared donkeys 
(and horses) with locusts and imposed a temporary ban on importing donkeys 
that lasted throughout the dry season.51 
The warnings and measures, however, had little or no effect. Donkey num-
bers rose to 25,000 in 1956-1957, and 31,382 in 1959. In the 1960s, the sta-
tistics suggest a decline in the number of donkeys to 25,500 animals in 1966 
and 18,000 in 1967. The number was still 18,000 in 1968, although another 
report from 1968 set the number of donkeys, horses and mules at 35,000. The 
                                                 
48  NAN, AHE (BAC) 332, Report of Meeting of Namutoni Farmers Association, Tsu-
meb District, 25 June 1966. 
49  NAN, BAC 133, Agricultural Report Ovamboland 1956-1957. 
50  NAN, NAO 64, Minutes Ukwanyama Tribal Meeting attended by the Administrator 
[12 July 1954]. 
51  NAN, BAC 44, Minutes Annual Meeting Ondonga, 1 Dec. 1958. Cf. BAC 45, 
Minutes Tribal Meetings Oukwanyama, 9-29 May 1958. In 1961 the import of don-
keys was again prohibited, BAC 131, Quarterly Report of Meeting held at Outanga, 
Oundonga [Ondonga], 27 Dec. 1961. 
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late 1960s show an increase to 35,000 in 1969, and 55,000 in 1970, followed by 
a decrease in the early 1970s (50,611 in 1971, 52,540 in 1972, 56,236 in 1973), 
increases in 1974 (to 60,958) and 1975-1976 (to 86,227) and a dip in 1981 (to 
81,000). Although the figures – all estimates – suggest years of rapid increase 
followed by decreases between individual years, the overall multi-year trend is a 
rapid increase from 6,000 in 1945-1946 to 81,000 in 1981, a growth by a factor 
of 13.52 
Not only did donkeys continue to serve as versatile transport animals, but 
during the 1950s and 1960s, north-central Namibian farmers discovered the 
donkey’s potential as a cheap plowing animal in an era when plow technology 
was rapidly spreading. Colonial officials continued to rail against donkeys and 
again threatened to prohibit their import at meetings in Oukwanyama and 
Ondonga in 1958, but at both of the meetings, people in the audience stressed 
the importance of donkeys as plow animals. At the meeting in the Ondonga 
district, Johannes Kuandambi said: “it hurts to hear these words about donkies 
because they are our assistents that we use to plough and they transport our 
goods and the meat of cattle that is dying at the moment”. At the meeting in the 
Oukwanyama district, the Native Commissioner retorted that oxen should be 
used to plow and “if any man has not enough oxen of his own he should pool 
his with those of his neighbour or neighbours. Such communal ploughing works 
very well in the Union [of South Africa]”.53 In 1968, the Director of Agriculture 
worked out an agreement with the Tribal Councils of Ovamboland whereby no 
further donkeys could be imported without a purchase and import permit issued 
                                                 
52  NAN, BAC 133, Agricultural Report Ovamboland 1956-1957; WAT 1, “Equines, 
goats, pigs, and poultry in Northern Native Territories outside Police Zone, 30 June 
1959”; Ovamboland; AHE (BAC) 1/352 [1/357], Annual Report Agriculture 
Oukwanyama for 1964 and Annual Reports Agriculture Ovamboland for 1966 and 
1968; OVA 49, Agricultural Statistics 1967, appendix to Chief Director Department 
of Economic Affairs to Director Agriculture, Ondangwa, 25 March 1967; OVA 9, 
Chief Agricultural Official to Director Agriculture, Ondangwa, 25 June 1969, 
“Regarding Questionnaire”, and OVE 10, table 6.1.3. The 1970, 1971 and 1975-
1976 figures included horses and mules which from 1972-1974 numbered 1,200-
1,500, see OVA 40, questionnaire appended to Secretary Economic Affairs to Secre-
tary of Agriculture, Ondangwa, 10 Nov. 1973 and OVE 10, table 6.1.3, Veegetalle 
in Owambo, 1968-1972; OVA 6, Annual Report Veterinary Service Owambo 1975-
1976; OVA 9, Director Agriculture and Forestry to Director-General Department of 
Cooperation and Development Pretoria, [Ondangwa], 5 May 1981. 
53  NAN, BAC 44, Minutes Annual Meeting Ondonga, 1 Dec. 1958, and BAC 45, 
Minutes Tribal Meetings Oukwanyama, 9-29 May 1958. See also BAC 133, Agri-
cultural Report Ovamboland 1956-1957, and O/C Native Affairs Kaokoveld to 
CNC, Ohopoho, 4 Oct. 1950; Census of Agriculture, 1949-1950, Ovamboland and 
NAO 61, [ANC] to NCO, n.p., 9 April 1949. 
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by the councils. But migrant laborers continued to illegally purchase donkeys 
and smuggle them into Ovamboland.54 
In practice, the import of donkeys and horses was only effectively interfered 
with during drought years.55 In May 1971, the state veterinarian based at Otavi 
to the south of Ovamboland complained that every year Africans bought 
“uncountable” numbers of horses and donkeys in South West Africa – the latter 
from as far south as Mariental – and drove them in herds on sometimes months-
long drives to Ovamboland.56 Extension officers castrated small numbers of 
donkeys in the early 1970s, but the practice appears to have been confined 
mainly to animals owned by headmen. For example, one of the two extension 
officers in Oukwanyama district castrated 41 donkeys in 1973 and 56 in the 
following year, while in May-June 1976, another extension officer castrated 151 
donkeys. But the district counted over 11,000 donkeys in 1971 so the impact of 
the extension officers’ efforts was minimal.57 Donkeys, mules and horses did 
suffer from intestinal parasites and in early 1970s Oukwanyama, an extension 
officer reported that people had requested the distribution of such deworming 
medicines as Askaritox and Equizole.58 
In 1974, in western Oukwanyama three village headmen had some of their 
livestock castrated: one of them brought in 7 bulls and one donkey, a second, 5 
bulls, 2 billy goats and 9 donkeys, and a third, 7 bulls and 2 donkeys.59 In 1975, 
only one of a sample of four wealthy livestock owners in the far eastern Oukwa-
nyama had a pair of donkeys.60 Out of a 1993 sample of 101 households sur-
veyed by OMITI, 10 owned one donkey, 19 owned 2 donkeys, 14 owned 3, 11 
owned 4, 7 owned 5, 6 owned 6 and one each owned respectively, 17, 28 and 60 
                                                 
54  NAN, AHE (BAC) 332, Director Agriculture to Chief Bantu Commissioner, Wind-
hoek, 20 Aug. 1968. 
55  NAN, AHE (BAC) 332, Director Agriculture to Chief Bantu Commissioner, Wind-
hoek, 20 Aug. 1968 and AHE (BAC) 332, Secretary Department of Agriculture to 
Chief Bantu Commissioner, Ondangwa, 25 March 1974 and Chief Bantu Commis-
sioner to Director Agriculture Ondangwa, Windhoek, 4 March 1974. 
56  NAN, OVA 56, State Veterinarian to Chief Director Owambo Government, Otavi, 5 
May 1971. 
57  NAN, OVA 61, Monthly Reports Supervisor Agriculture: Andreus Ndeitwa (Ohan-
gwena, Oukwanyama), 1971-1976; OVA 59, Monthly Reports 1974 and 1976 
[Agriculture], Leonard Haihambo, Oukwanyama. See also OVA 61, Monthly 
Reports Agricultural Officer: Moses Nandjebo [Ohangwena] (Oukwanyma), 1973-
1975. 
58  NAN, OVA 61, Monthly Report for August Supervisor Agriculture: Andreus Ndeit-
wa (Ohangwena, Oukwanyama), 1971-1976. 
59  NAN, OVA 61, Monthly Reports 1974 Supervisor Agriculture: Andreus Ndeitwa 
(Ohangwena, Oukwanyama). 
60  NAN, OVA 61, Monthly Report Feb. 1975, Agricultural Officer: Moses Nandjebo 
[Ohangwena] (Oukwanyma). 
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donkeys. Their owners mostly kept the donkeys near their farms; only 4 owners 
kept a total of 30 donkeys away from their homes, while 86 other owners kept 
their total of 176 donkeys close to home.61 Of the 69 households that answered a 
question in the survey about herding, 47 claimed to have herded their donkeys 
during the rainy season, but donkey owners did not herd their animals during 
the dry season. Unherded animals were sometimes tied (2 out of 70 mentioned 
this), which probably refers to the not uncommon practice of hobbling – tying 
the front legs of a donkey together with a short rope to prevent it from wan-
dering too far. The household’s children were usually the herders, or alterna-
tively the head of the household or his wife watched over their donkeys.62 
Almost all households (101) in a sample of 115 from the OMITI survey used 
donkeys for plowing; almost one-half also used the animals for carrying water 
(54) and pulling carts (51), and one third (36) used them to carry firewood. 
Thirteen respondents mentioned other transport functions, and only 10 respond-
ents mentioned breeding and meat production.63 The 1979-1980 agriculture 
report stated that the tribal authorities of Ovamboland owned one plow, that 
private farmers owned a total of 100 plows, and that 20,000 ha (of a total of 
190,000 ha) were plowed.64 The figures seem to be a gross underestimation of 
the number of animal-drawn plows in Ovamboland, which may partly be a 
reflection of the increased use of donkeys as opposed to oxen as draft animals: 
donkey plows may have been simply not included in the statistics. 
The principal feed of donkeys consisted of grass (mentioned by 100% of a 
113-household sample in the survey), woody vegetation (75%) and roots 
(19%).65 Donkey users were fully aware of the environmental costs of using the 
animals: 98 out of 120 households in the survey emphasized that donkeys fed 
differently than cattle; 64 observed that donkeys ate more than cattle; and 14 
respondents pointed out that donkeys simply ate too much. Respondents also 
explained that not only did donkeys eat larger quantities of grass than cattle, but 
unlike cattle, they were not at all selective in what they fed on and they ate 
continuously, even at night. Respondents also observed that donkeys cropped 
grass much closer than cattle, and that they dug out roots and scraped bark off 
trees, and in 12 cases, the surveyors understood from the respondents that the 
latter believed that donkeys caused overgrazing.66 
                                                 
61  OMITI survey, 2.51. 
62  OMITI survey, 2.5.2.0-1 and 2.5.3. For hobbling donkeys, personal observations, 
1991-1993. 
63  OMITI survey, 2.5.4. 
64  NAN, OVA 6, Department of Agriculture and Forestry Owambo, Annual Report 
1979-1980. 
65  OMITI survey, 2.5.5. 
66  OMITI survey, 2.5.6. 
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The large majority (127) of a 158-household OMITI sample believed that the 
number of donkeys had increased since their youth.67 Most respondents attri-
buted the increase to the donkeys’ many uses, especially as plowing animals 
(plowing was mentioned by 42 out of 113 respondents). In addition, in contrast 
to cattle, donkeys were not killed for meat (mentioned by 19 respondents) 
which in turn facilitated their increase, and, moreover, they were imported in 
large numbers from south of Ovamboland (mentioned by 31 respondents), 
where they continued to be cheap. One respondent even said that “donkeys 
produce more than cattle”, i.e. donkeys are more productive than cattle, which 
was a very strong statement in a society where cattle have an enormous econo-
mic and symbolic value.68  
Fierce indigenous creatures on the rampage 
While many of Ovamboland’s inhabitants embraced the donkey even as it was 
condemned as an invasive plague by colonial officials, the reverse was true for 
African indigenous ‘royal game’. Colonial officials actively sought to protect 
elephants and lions, whereas most of their colonial subjects considered these 
animals dangerous predators, imperiling their lives, livestock and crops. But the 
South African colonial administration – despised for its apartheid policies but at 
times celebrated for its ‘progressive’ conservation record – considered other 
indigenous predators to be vermin that should be eradicated, including the 
cheetah and the wild dog. Today, both species are amongst the rarest predators 
alive, and the object of extensive conservation projects. Moreover, from World 
War II onwards the administration also characterized Ovamboland’s indigenous 
domestic goats as despicable environmental vermin, although, like the donkey, 
the local population considered goats to be a critical resource. Thus, 
interpretations of which animals were a blessing or a curse differed radically 
between the colonial authorities on the one hand and the local population on the 
other. 
Three factors brought humans, their domestic animals and their villages in 
closer contact with wildlife from the 1920s to the 1960s. First, humans en-
croached on wildlife habitat in and around the middle and southern floodplain. 
In the 1910s, 1920s and 1930s, thousands of refugees poured into the middle 
floodplain, an area that had been a wildlife paradise in the 1870s and 1880s. 
Secondly, as security improved in Ovamboland from the 1920s onward, in-
habitants from the core areas of the precolonial polities fanned out into the  
 
                                                 
67  OMITI survey, 2.5.7. 
68  OMITI survey, 2.5.8. 
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borderlands that had separated the polities, and to the edges of the floodplain 
and beyond. The influx of refugees and migrants from the Angolan side of the 
border and the rebuilding of cattle herds also led to the creation of more cattle 
posts further away from the floodplain. 69 
Thirdly, the border region’s game populations, especially predators and 
elephants, recovered in the early colonial era because the local population was 
disarmed and colonial conservation measures were introduced. The sequence 
complicates progressive linear Nature-to-Culture narratives because the turn-of-
the-century wildlife populations probably were at a low due to heavy hunting 
and the rinderpest, and they increased in the early colonial era. As refugees and 
migrants and their cattle permeated beyond the densely settled heartlands that 
had marked the precolonial Ovambo polities, predators, elephants and other 
wildlife simultaneously repopulated the very same areas. The competition be-
tween humans and their livestock on the one hand and wildlife on the other was 
especially keen whenever and wherever the settlement frontier intersected with 
wildlife migration routes. 
Colonial conservation of ‘royal game’ intensified the conflict: colonial offi-
cials insisted in preserving lions and elephants at almost all costs, even if they 
caused tragic losses of lives or undermined livelihoods. Only in exceptional 
cases did colonial officials permit the killing of selected ‘problem’ animals, 
although the predators caused severe livestock losses, and elephant raids on 
fields, fruit trees and food stores on the edges of the expanding settlement 
frontier increased.70 
Most of the big game in the Angolan-Namibian border region migrated be-
tween or around three major nuclei: Etosha Pan and the Ombuga Flats in the far 
southern floodplain, the Kunene River valley west of the floodplain, and the 
Oshimolo swamps and the Kavango/Cubango River valley east of the flood-
plain. The creation in 1928 of what was to become the Etosha Game Park 
(Game Reserve No. 5) made any game hunting within its vaguely defined 
boundaries illegal, although ‘poaching’ remained a problem in Etosha until the 
1950s.71 
The western game corridor connected Etosha Pan to the Kunene River which 
the animals crossed through numerous fords. Wildebeest, zebra, springbok, 
gemsbok, duiker and hartebeest were the most abundant animals during the 
1930s and 1940s. They calved with the onset of the rainy season in their dry 
                                                 
69  See chapter 2 and Kreike, Re-creating Eden. 
70  Timotheus Nakale, interview by author, Ekoka laKula, 21 Feb. 1993; NAN, NAO 
19-21, Monthly and Quarterly Reports Ovamboland, 1931, 1935, 1939-1941, 1946; 
NAO 60-61, Quarterly Reports Ovamboland, 1947-1949, 1952-1954. 
71  NAN, NAO 20, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Jan.-Feb. 1937, and NAO 60, 
Quarterly Report Ovamboland, April-Sep. 1947. 
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season haunts around Etosha Pan. Early in the rainy season, they moved to the 
open grass savanna of the Ombuga Flats to the north of Etosha Pan. When the 
Ombuga Flats with their poorly drained soils were too soggy, the large herds 
dispersed over a wide area to the west and northwest of Etosha, close to the 
inhabited areas of western Ovamboland, and as far west as the Kunene River 
valley. If standing water in western Ovamboland hampered movement and 
grazing, animals also fanned out to the sandy (and better-drained) Okamatere, 
directly west of Etosha Pan, and the Sandveld to the east. Towards the end of 
the rainy season, around April, wildebeest and zebra once more concentrated on 
the Ombuga Flats, followed by springbok, gemsbok and ostrich. The timing of 
this movement depended entirely on the availability of standing water in the 
Flats. In 1943, for example, surface water remained so abundant throughout the 
southern floodplain that in August the herds had not even begun to concentrate 
on the Flats. By contrast, early in 1946, rainfall was scarce and the big game 
herds already commenced returning to Etosha Pan. In June-July, the herds 
usually left the Flats for the permanent water holes south of Etosha Pan between 
Okakueyo and Namutoni. In general, gemsbok, hartebeest and kudu traveled 
along the southern edge of the western game corridor and along the edge of the 
Ombuga Flats because they preferred to browse on bush vegetation that was 
more easily found away from the Flats. Impala ventured from their dry season 
habitat in the Kunene River valley as far southeast as Etosha Pan during a good 
rainy season. Elephant, giraffe and eland shared the western corridor as they 
migrated between Kaokoland, the Kunene River and Etosha Pan.72 
Elephants used the northern side of the western game corridor, closest to the 
inhabited areas of the southern floodplain. Traveling in larger and smaller 
groups, they skirted and, if forage and water was scarce, invaded the villages on 
the edge of western Ovamboland. As elephant populations rebounded and hu-
man settlement pushed into the fringes of the southern floodplain, competition 
over water and forages mounted. Mopane bush – a favorite of elephants and a 
dry season forage of cattle – was abundant in these areas. Elephant populations 
on the western corridor also increased because of hunting pressure across the 
Kunene River in southwestern Angola. During 1939 and 1940, elephants ex-
tended their range north of Etosha Pan.73 During the 1940s and 1950s, western 
                                                 
72  NAN, NAO 18, 20-21, Monthly and Quarterly Reports Ovamboland, July 1929, 
1931, 1937, 1939-1946. 
73  Boer hunters from Angola smuggled ivory into Ovamboland via African ‘runners’, 
NAN, NAO 21, NCO to Sec. SWA, Ondangwa, July 5, 1939; NAO 20, Monthly 
Reports Ovamboland, May and Aug.-Sep. 1940. For elephants and border markers 
in western Ovamboland, see NCO to Sec. SWA, Ondangwa, 26 Aug. 1940. In 1949 
ten elephant carcasses with the tusks removed were found in the uninhabited border 
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Ovamboland (Onkolonkathi, Eunda, Uukwaluthi and Ongandjera) and On-
donga, adjacent to the western game corridor from Etosha to the Kunene River, 
suffered from increased elephant raids on crop fields and attacks on cattle 
during the rainy season, and the destruction of water holes during the dry sea-
son.74 
Predators, including lions, followed the large herbivore herds on their mi-
grations. But when heavy rains turned the Ombuga Flats or the areas further 
west into swamps, prides of lions that regularly attacked the herds of wildebeest 
and zebra were cut off from the migrating herds when they moved south, and 
the lions found livestock on the edge of the inhabited zone to be an easier prey. 
Significantly, the lions that preyed on livestock near the villages during the 
1940s and 1950s usually consisted of entire prides and not weakened old 
individuals.75 
The eastern game migration corridor linked the Kavango/Cubango River 
Valley and Oshimolo with the Sandveld and ran as far south as Etosha Pan. 
Game that migrated from Etosha along the western game corridor also moved 
into the Sandveld.76 Elephants moved along the entire length of the eastern 
game corridor, from Etosha to the Kavango River and between the eastern 
Sandveld north and northeast into Oshimolo. The elephants remained south of 
the border during the rainy season, but moved north and northeast and 
northwest (to Okafima and perhaps from there to the wilderness north of Evale 
and to the Kunene River) as the dry season progressed and surface water in pans 
in eastern Ovamboland dried out.77 In eastern Ovamboland, the cattle post and 
settlement frontiers moved outward from the floodplain eastwards, while the 
eastern game migration routes ran on a north-south axis between Etosha and 
Oshimolo and the Kavango River. Contact and conflict between people and 
their livestock and elephants over water, food and space in eastern Ovamboland 
greatly increased when the settlement frontier met the eastern game migration 
                                                                                                                       
area between Ovamboland and Kaokoveld, NAO 60, Quarterly Report Ovamboland, 
Oct.-Dec. 1949. 
74  NAN, NAO 20-21, Monthly and Quarterly Reports Ovamboland, Aug.-Sep. 1939, 
March-May 1940, Jan.-July 1941 and Jan.-June 1946. 
75  NAN, NAO 19-20, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, April 1931, June-Aug. 1939, 
Jan.-Sep. 1940 and NAO 60-61, Quarterly Reports Ovamboland, April-June 1949 
and 1953-1954. 
76  NAN, NAO 19-21, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, 1931, 1939-1940, 1943, and 
NAO 60-61, Quarterly Reports Ovamboland, 1949 and 1953-1954. 
77  NAN, NAO 20, Monthly Report Ovamboland, May 1940; NAO 67, ANC to NCO, 
Oshikango, 11 July 1947; NAO 16, E.V. Martins [Veterinary Surgeon Lower Kunene] 
to Hahn [NCO], Lubango, 28 April 1945. 
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corridor between Omboloka and Okongo during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s.78 
Most of the elephant damage to crops, water holes and dams as well as colonial 
border markers occurred in what was notorious as ‘elephant country’, between 
border markers 29 and 35.79 
Animal attacks could be expected at remote cattle posts and pioneer 
settlements in the wilderness. Wild dog attacks on cattle posts occurred in 1928 
and lion raids on cattle posts were reported in 1928, 1931, 1935 and 1940. At 
night, herdsmen at the cattle posts and along the trails leading to them drove the 
cattle into enclosures constructed of dense barricades of thorn bush that were 
taller than a man, and they kept fires burning throughout the night and remained 
vigilant by day and by night.80 In April 1931, at least three serious lion attacks 
occurred. A heavy rainy season provided abundant browse and grazing, scatter-
ing wildlife over large areas.81 
Evidence suggests that the incidence of predator attack on livestock in and 
near the villages increased during the late 1930s and 1940s after the colonial ad-
ministration had disarmed the inhabitants of Ovamboland. The handing over of 
all modern firearms deprived Ovamboland’s inhabitants of their most effective 
defense against wild animals, leaving them with a few antiquated muzzle 
loaders at best. Hahn became aware of the impact of disarmament because of a 
rapid increase in predator attacks in 1940. In Ondonga district, lions and wild 
dogs killed 52 cattle, 11 donkeys and a horse during a single week in September 
1940 alone. At one location, Ondonga livestock owners lost 13 cattle and 6 
donkeys. In the same year, lions killed several head of cattle and 4 precious 
horses in eastern Oukwanyama. The total livestock losses due to predator 
                                                 
78  NAN, NAO 20, Monthly Report Ovamboland, May 1940; NAO 67, ANC to NCO, 
Oshikango, 11 July 1947; NAO 16, Martins to Hahn, Lubango, 28 April 1945; NAO 
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1952. Cf. KAB 1, Volkmann, 30 Oct. 1928, “Report on the Agricultural and Politi-
cal Conditions at The Angola Boundary”, and NAO 18, Monthly Report Ovambo-
land, February 1927. On border markers and elephants, NAO 17, NCO to Sec. 
SWA, Ondangwa 27 April 1933 and NCO to Sec. SWA, Ondangwa, 20 April 1935. 
On competition for water, see NAO 17, O/C NAO Oshikango to NCO, Oshikango, 
30 July 1934. 
80  See NAN, NAO 19-20, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Sep.-Oct. 1935, Aug.-Nov. 
1940, and NAO 105, Diaries kept by the NCO, Diary 1928 (stamped 1 Jan. 1928), 
entries 12 and 22 Nov. 1928. See also Timotheus Nakale, interview by author, Ekoka 
laKula, 21 Feb. 1993. 
81  NAN, NAO 19, Monthly Report Ovamboland, April 1931. 
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attacks in Ovamboland for the year were at least 100 head of cattle, 80 goats, 30 
donkeys and 6 horses, although the Native Commissioner acknowledged that it 
was impossible to give accurate numbers because the number of losses was 
underreported. The next year livestock losses to predators included 55 head of 
cattle, 60 goats, 20 donkeys and 4 horses. The losses were lower in 1942 but 
“[s]everal instances were reported where lions came right into the tribal area 
and in two cases natives were badly mauled”. In 1943, reported livestock losses 
due to predator attacks were 12 head of cattle, 20 donkeys and 4 horses (mainly 
the prey of lions) and an unspecified number of small stock killed by smaller 
carnivores. The decline in the livestock attacks seemingly coincided with a col-
lapse of the numbers of hyenas. 
Many of the attacks took place in or very close to villages. In 1939, a hyena 
attacked two people in Ongandjera, killing one, and in the Oukwanyama district 
“what is presumed to be a rabid leopard attacked and badly mauled ten natives one 
of which has since died”. Predators returned to haunt Ovamboland’s villages 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Early in 1946, lions killed a village 
headman and severely wounded two or three other people in different villages 
on the edge of the districts’ inhabited zones. Late in 1948, a leopard mauled a 
man right near the colonial administration’s headquarters at Ondangwa in the 
densely settled heartland of the Ondonga district, and lions attacked cattle in 
various areas in April-June 1949. Early in 1953, “[a] wild dog which ran amok 
in the Ongandjera area attacked and bit twelve people, two of whom died of 
their wounds. The wild dog was killed”.82 The villagers defended themselves 
and their livestock by using poison, traps, bows and arrows and muzzle loaders, 
but these weapons were often ineffective when entire prides of lions were 
involved, and the colonial administration rarely made modern rifles available.83 
Hahn refused to come to the aid of villages threatened by elephants and his 
successor Eedes only allowed a minimum number of rogue elephants to be shot. 
Hahn knew that elephants could cause severe damage. In May 1939 Hahn 
observed elephants very close to the Uukwaluthi tribal area “but up to the time 
of writing they do not appear to have done any damage to crops or native food 
[storage] baskets”. In August of the same year elephants moved into the tribal 
areas Uukwaluthi and Onkolonkathi, but as the crops had already been har-
vested, according to the report “very little damage was done”. In March-April 
                                                 
82  NAN, NAO 36, District Surgeon Ovamboland, Monthly Report June 1939; NAO 
19-21, Monthly and Quarterly Reports Ovamboland, April 1931, June-Sep. 1939, 
Jan.-May and Aug.-Nov. 1940, Jan.-June 1946. See also NAO 60-61, Quarterly 
Reports Ovamboland, Oct.-Dec. 1948, April-June 1949, Jan.-Sep. 1953 and Jan.-
Sep. 1954; A450, 7, Annual Reports Ovamboland 1940-1943. 
83  NAN, NAO 20, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Feb. 1940, March-April 1940 (poi-
son); NAO 61, Quarterly Reports Ovamboland, Oct.-Dec. 1953 and 1954. 
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1941, elephants damaged a water hole in Ongandjera and destroyed crops in 
Uukwaluthi and Ondonga as water and food shortages increased. Hahn dryly 
remarked that without the aid of firearms people could not deal with the prob-
lem and that he lacked the staff and other resources to act. In 1942, elephants in 
the northwestern part of Ovamboland at various occasions entered homesteads, 
chased the inhabitants and ripped open the grain storage baskets to eat the millet 
reserves. Early in 1946, in Onkolonkathi district, a bull elephant “which was 
molested by the dogs of native cattle herds became infuriated and charged cattle 
which were grazing nearby. The bull struck a cow with its trunk and broke her 
back. An ox was picked up bodily and bashed into a mopani tree. Both the cow 
and the ox were killed on the spot”. Towards the end of the rainy season in the 
same year, at least three elephants fell into water holes in Eunda and Uukwa-
mbi. In 1947, elephants wiped out the crops of sixteen households in six Eastern 
Oukwanyama villages; one elephant was shot. In Ondonga another two ele-
phants “which were destroying water holes (…) were shot”. 84 
The reluctance of colonial officials to act against the elephant incursions 
caused disbelief, fear and mounting anger. In 1949, the Ondonga King Kam-
bonde reported that “I saw just 400 yards from my kraal a [sic] elephant getting in 
an old woman's kraal and pulling down one grain basket”. Four elephants that 
entered the villages of Ondonga district damaged crops and water holes and 
were shot on orders of King Kambonde. Eedes with some reluctance allowed 
the headmen of Uukwambi and Ongandjera to shoot a few young elephants who 
had fallen into water holes. There were also reports of elephant poaching: at 
Ombombo deep into the wilderness south of Uukwaluthi, ten elephant carcasses 
with their tusks removed were found. In 1952, elephants caused problems in 
several districts and three were shot in eastern Oukwanyama. The Uukwaluthi 
king sent off a furious letter to Native Commissioner Eedes: 
You say that we the Ukualuthi people merely wish to kill the elephants (…) the 
elephants came to the Ukualuthi inhabited area at the edge of the Ukualuthi tribal area. 
There they met with cattle which were going to the bush. They killed four head of cattle 
out there. Our strength lies in the cattle (…). We will kill the elephants because they are 
killing our cattle. Now we have reported this matter to you on two occasions and you 
said the elephants do no harm in here.  
In September 1953, elephants killed a blind woman, a child and an old man in 
Ongandjera district. In addition, elephants killed cattle, destroyed fruit trees and 
water holes, emptied out other water holes and water reservoirs and caused people 
                                                 
84  NAN, NAO 20, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, May, Aug.-Sep. 1939 and March-
April 1941; NAO 21, Quarterly Report Ovamboland, Jan.-June 1946; NAO 60, 
Quarterly Report Ovamboland, April-Sep. 1947; A450, 7, Annual Report Ovambo-
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to flee their homes. Only then did the Native Commissioner authorize shooting 
four elephant calves. At the same time, a large number of elephants roamed freely 
through Ongandjera. A herd of sixty elephants passed the Finnish Mission station. 
The official who wrote the quarterly report for the period merely commented that 
the elephant herd that terrorized the Ongandjera district “did not do any damage 
except to flog four goats to death”.85 At a 1958 annual tribal meeting in Ondan-
gwa, Johannes Kuandambi asked if the Native Commissioner would now finally 
give people the permission to eradicate such “vermin” as lions and elephants.86 
Government officials and local leaders continued to have very different 
interpretations of what constituted conservation. In 1971, the Director of 
Agriculture explained to the President of the South African Hunters and Game 
Conservation Association in Pretoria that the number of elephants in Ovambo-
land was at most about one thousand, and probably only a few hundred. For 
Ovambo farmers along the game corridors, however, elephants remained a 
plague especially during drought years. In the far east of Ovamboland, ele-
phants continued to migrate across the border. In 1963, only two years after 
completion of a new border fence, elephants had destroyed it between markers 
37 and 42 at 44 different places.87 In 1966, tensions about the conservation of 
predators and elephants in Ovamboland had escalated so much that the 
Commissioner General for South West Africa (South Africa’s colonial governor 
for Namibia) wrote to the Minister of Bantu Administration (formerly Native 
Affairs) in Pretoria to request blanket authorization to shoot predators and 
elephants on sight when they entered inhabited areas, before they caused any 
damage. He emphasized that it was impossible to run Ovamboland and the other 
Northern Homelands as Native Reserves and game reserves at the same time, 
and recommended keeping the Department of Nature Conservation out of 
Ovamboland and the other homelands because it was greatly despised.88 The 
Commissioner General’s recommendations went unheeded and elephants and 
lions continued their attacks. 
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During the early 1970s, elephants caused damage to farms and water sources 
in eastern Oukwanyama, as well as in Uukwambi, Ongandjera and Uukwaluthi 
in the west, compelling the Director of Agriculture to write to the Secretary for 
South West Africa for permission to shoot two elephants in each of four dif-
ferent locations.89 In May 1971, a rhino damaged a field in Oundhiya near 
Ukuangula.90 In December 1977, elephants caused serious problems in Ongan-
djera and in the Ongandjera/Uukwambi border area. One elephant in Ongan-
djera killed five calves and a horse after two elephant calves had drowned in a 
well. Five elephants trapped in wells were killed. A rather insensitive Nature 
Conservation official reported that he had advised the villagers who had lost 
cattle “not to be angry because elephants also need to drink water”.91 In 1979, 
elephants were active in Uukwaluthi, Ongandjera and Ondonga “and broken 
fences and windpumps are a common sight”.92 In 1981, elephants caused great 
damage in the newly developed Mangetti area in the southeast of Ovamboland 
when they destroyed dams, pumps and water sources.93 
Although Africa shared the Old World’s disease environment, the continent 
proved vulnerable to invader species around the turn of the twentieth century, 
highlighting that Crosby’s concept of ecological imperialism is as applicable in 
the case of Africa as it is to the Americas. But evidence in Africa also demon-
strates the limitations of depicting biological invasion as a unilinear, mechanical 
and progressive process of environmental change from Nature to Culture 
(indigenous-natural to invasive-Western cultural). The impact of biological 
invaders and opportunistic indigenous species in north-central Namibia suggests 
the need for differentiating the process and the outcome of biological imperi-
alism. Not all invaders had a significant impact, and the timing of their impact 
differed. The destructive impact of lungsickness and rinderpest in Africa mir-
rors that of smallpox in the Americas to the extent that the epizootics caused 
immediate and dramatic domestic and wildlife losses, weakening preconquest 
societies and the environments they depended upon, and in the process paving 
the way for colonial conquest. Lungsickness is a critical factor in explaining the 
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collapse of South Africa’s Xhosa livelihoods and society and its subsequent 
conquest. Rinderpest had an enormously destructive impact across southern 
Africa in 1896 and 1897, bringing many communities to the brink of collapse. 
Unwilling or unable to eradicate the diseases, colonial administrations cordoned 
off the infected domestic and wild animal herds. Thus, invasive germs that 
accompanied the Europeans in fact turned against them by impeding progress 
on the grand colonial development plans that were based on scientific livestock 
management and the commoditization of indigenous cattle.94 
Disease – caused by invasive and local microbes – may have been a much 
more critical factor in the conquest and colonization of Africa than has been 
generally accepted. It did not result in a demographic collapse of a magnitude 
comparable to that in the Americas. The most destructive impact of disease on 
human populations was indirect, as with lungsickness, rinderpest and foot and 
mouth. Yet their impact was catastrophic because of the extent to which peo-
ple’s lives and livelihoods depended on the (domestic) animals affected by the 
diseases. Lungsickness and rinderpest decimated cattle resources. But, again, 
the impact of diseases in Ovamboland defies linear and mechanical models of 
environmental change. Rinderpest and lungsickness caused severe animal loss-
es, but foot and mouth did not do so, even as the colonial administration used 
draconian measures to contain it. 
The history of donkeys in north-central Namibia also defies unilinear pro-
gressive models of biological invasion. Unlike sheep in northern Mexico, don-
keys initially did not thrive in the region at all and their introduction does not 
adhere to the invasion-explosive growth-implosion model. The case of biolo-
gical imperialism in Ovamboland thus raises the same questions about the 
unilinear Nature-to-Culture depiction of environmental change and the homo-
geneity of the process and its outcome that emerged in the previous chapter in 
regard to imperial political ecologies. 
 
                                                 
94 For a good example of an invasive plant species turning on its fellow invaders, see 
van Sittert, “‘The Seed Blows About in Every Breeze’”. 
  
5 
Guns, hoes and steel:  
Techno-environmental  
determinism 
Technology can serve as a catalyst for environmental change but again the 
process is usually cast in very linear and mechanical terms.1 Once the process is 
set in motion, further technological innovation follows, ultimately resulting in 
the substitution of the natural by the artificial and, ultimately, of Nature by 
Culture. Diamond has argued that because Europe benefited from certain geo-
environmental advantages, the continent led the way to acquiring guns and steel 
technology. According to Diamond, these advantages explain why the West 
colonized the non-West, rather than the other way around. Diamond thus offers 
an environmental explanation (the geographical realities of the European 
environment facilitated borrowing) for historical phenomena (European impe-
rialism and colonialism) that had transformative environmental impacts locally 
and globally. Western technology was instrumental not only in paving the way 
for military and political conquest. It also facilitated environmental conquest 
within a Nature-Culture dichotomous framework: technology first allowed the 
West to convert its own environment from Nature into Culture, and subse-
quently provided the tools with which to conquer non-Western environments. In 
this model, the main obstacle to Western dominance is not really non-Western 
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Culture, but rather non-Western Nature, because most non-Western societies 
were held to be both hostage to and part and parcel of their physical en-
vironments. The West thus could not conquer Africa militarily and politically 
until it had developed the necessary technology (i.e., Western medical science 
and quinine) to overcome the continent’s natural disease environment. Further 
advances during the post-World War II era made it possible to address the last 
remaining Natural obstacles to Western development in Africa by using techno-
science to eradicate animal and human diseases and to introduce Western tech-
nology (erosion control and irrigation, plows, improved cultivars) to harness 
Africa’s natural resources and effectively exploit them.2 
Whereas Diamond’s guns and steel argument appears at first glance persu-
asive for the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Americas, since Amerindians had 
neither steel nor guns with which to resist European conquest, the situation in 
Africa was radically different. Africans produced and used steel weapons and 
tools long before Europeans, and from the sixteenth century onwards, Africans 
rapidly acquired firearms that enabled them to resist European imperialism until 
the end of the nineteenth century. While Europeans conquered and colonized 
much of the Americas between the late fifteenth and the late nineteenth centu-
ries, at the end of the nineteenth century, Europeans still controlled precious 
little territory in Africa.  
Guns 
In Guns, Germs and Steel, Diamond identified guns as weapons that gave 
Europeans a critical military advantage. But how critical were guns, really? 
Cortés and Pizarro had few guns and the impact of guns may have been more in 
terms of morale because guns were not very effective as weapons. Moreover, 
Amerindians and Africans acquired guns during the wars of conquest in the 
Americas and in Africa. 
In many cases, guns not only facilitated Western conquest, but they also 
have delayed, prevented or reversed it.3 Modern small arms, notably the Ka-
lashnikov AK-47, are credited with liberating the colonized world during the 
anticolonial and anti-imperial struggle. Mozambique, which emerged as an in-
dependent nation after a protracted liberation war in the 1960s and 1970s, 
prominently bears the image of the Kalashnikov on its national flag.  
Although Europeans initiated and controlled the overseas trade in slaves as 
well as their use in the Americas, they did not control the raiding and the supply 
of slaves in Africa itself. One explanation for this is that through the gold, slave 
                                                 
2  See chapters 4 and 6. 
3  Headrick highlights how guns facilitated conquest, see The Tools of Empire, pp. 83-
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and ivory trade during the eighteenth century some West and West-Central 
African polities acquired enormous quantities, often of the latest technology of 
guns and ammunition. The same was true in the nineteenth century not only in 
West and West-Central Africa but also in southern and eastern Africa. In terms 
of small arms, Africans often were as well armed as the Europeans. Around the 
turn of the eighteenth century, the Asante purchased large quantities of guns and 
gunpowder from the Dutch West India Company. In 1706 alone, the Director-
General of the West India Company on the Gold Coast requested 6,000 guns 
and 100,000 pounds of gunpowder from the Netherlands to meet demand there. 
The guns were the latest flintlocks rather than the outdated matchlock guns that 
were still in use in Europe at the time.4 
Africans also acquired a not inconsiderable amount of the latest gun tech-
nology in the late nineteenth century: first percussion muzzle loaders and rifles, 
then single-shot breechloaders and magazine-fed repeaters, and finally bolt-
action rifles. Samory’s forces in West Africa had modern rifles and blacksmiths 
who could build rifles, although repair and manufacture of firearms was typi-
cally a handcraft activity rather than a mass-production one as in Europe. Still 
Samory’s several hundred blacksmiths produced twelve breechloaders per week 
as well as 200-300 cartridges. The Boers of South Africa also depended on im-
ported firearms, but often were equipped with better small arms than their 
British opponents in the South African War of 1899-1902. Breechloaders and 
repeaters flooded the international and African markets in the aftermath of the 
American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War.5 
Even though firearms had been unknown before the 1860s, by the late 
nineteenth century the northern Ovambo floodplain polities of the Ombadjas 
and Oukwanyama were well supplied with guns. King Moshipandeka Hepunda 
(1862-1882) of Oukwanyama had 1,500 firearms that were mostly muzzle 
loaders, but also included 50 breechloaders. His successor, King Namadi Mwe-
lihanyeka (1882-1884), had a guard 3,000 men strong, armed with Martini-
Henry and Westley-Richards breechloading rifles. By 1910, Oukwanyama alone 
had 15,000 firearms, of which 7,000 were breechloaders, including American 
                                                 
4  Kreike, “Early Asante and the Struggle for Economic and Political Control on the 
Gold Coast”. Kea argues that the gun replaced the bow as the main weapon of Gold 
Coast armies around 1700, in Settlements, Trade, and Polities in the Seventeenth-
Century Gold Coast, pp. 156-164. 
5  The Boers imported modern firearms from Europe on the eve of the South African 
War, see Thompson, A History of South Africa, p. 141. On Samory and modern fire-
arms, see Person, Une révolution Dyula, 3:1762; Kanya-Forstner, “The French 
Marines and the Conquest of Western Sudan”, p. 136. For the postconflict surplus of 
small arms and Samory’s manufacturing of firearms, see Headrick, The Tools of 
Empire, pp. 109-110 and 119-120. 
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magazine-fed Winchester repeating rifles and German Mauser bolt-action rifles. 
The Ombadja kingdoms west of Oukwanyama were also well supplied with 
modern firearms.6 
The southern Ovambo floodplain polities were less wealthy in ivory and 
cattle, and so less able to purchase the most advanced firearms, but when the 
South African colonial administration disarmed their inhabitants in the mid-
1930s, the number of rifles (i.e. breechloaders) that were confiscated totaled 
almost 3,500, including over 2,000 in Ondonga, close to 1,000 in Uukwambi, 
140 in Eunda and Onkolonkathi and 182 in Ongandjera. In 1933, after a series 
of firefights between different factions, the Onkolonkathi headman handed in 
127 modern rifles, most of which were magazine-fed, eliciting Native Com-
missioner Hahn’s comment: “This small tribe was much better armed than was 
thought”. Over 3,000 of the confiscated rifles were kept in storage at the 
administrative offices at Ondangwa until they finally were destroyed in 1947.7 
Thus, during the 1900s and 1910s era of colonial conquest, the Ovambo polities 
jointly could have assembled at least 10,000 men armed with breechloading 
rifles. The Portuguese army that invaded Oukwanyama in 1915 – the largest 
army that had been fielded until then by the Portuguese in Africa, consisted of 
10,000 men who were armed with breechloaders, machine guns, and cannon. 
Challenged by Oukwanyama, armed with approximately 7,000 breechloaders 
and a similar number of flintlock and percussion cap muzzle loaders, the Por-
tuguese army came close to defeat.8 For comparison, in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu 
war a British army of 18,000 and 9,000 African levies faced 29,000 warriors 
who may have been armed with up to 20,000 firearms, mostly old muzzle 
loaders, and only 1,000 modern breechloaders. The Ethiopian army that in 1896 
crushed the Italian army at Adowa had several thousand breechloaders while 
Samory’s army in 1898 had 4,000 repeaters.9 
The inhabitants of the Ombadjas and Oukwanyama captured large amounts 
of small arms and ammunition, as well as several machine guns and cannon, 
from their Portuguese opponents following a string of Portuguese defeats. An 
Oukwanyama blacksmith even repaired one of three captured cannons, a French 
75; the Portuguese had removed the breechblock locks from the cannons to pre-
vent them from being used against them, but the blacksmith forged a replace-
ment lock that rendered the gun operable. When the Portuguese recaptured the 
                                                 
6  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 27-23 and 41-42; Capello and Ivens, De Angola a 
Contra-Costa, p. 228. 
7  NAN, NAO 20, Annual Reports Ovamboland, 1937-1938, and Monthly Reports 
Ovamboland, June 1933 and Dec. 1939; NAO 60, Quarterly Report Ovamboland, 
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8  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 52-53. 
9  Taylor, Shaka’s Children, pp. 216-217; Headrick, The Tools of Empire, pp. 119-120. 
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cannon, “the Commanding Officer was so impressed with the native made part 
that he sent it to the leading museum in Lisbon”. An Anglican missionary iden-
tified the blacksmith as Twemuna but Native Commissioner Hahn claimed the 
feat had been accomplished by Hangush, a headman who died in 1940. 
A large majority of the firearms had been acquired from European traders 
and smugglers at high prices. In 1870, a flintlock muzzle loader in southern 
Angola cost 10-15 head of cattle. By 1879, availability of and demand for more 
advanced firearms dropped the price of flintlocks to one head of cattle, and the 
Angola-based trader Chapman reported that the inhabitants of the Ovambo 
floodplain refused to buy flintlocks, preferring more modern guns. At the time, 
the more reliable percussion cap muzzle loaders cost two head of cattle, while 
such advanced breechloaders as the Martini-Henry and the Snyder were traded 
for a staggering 48-54 head of cattle apiece. In the 1890s, the percussion cap 
muzzle loaders had been reduced in price by half, whereas advanced breech-
loaders cost 7-10 head of cattle apiece. In Central Sudan in 1895, a Martini-
Henry cost 13-33 slaves and in 1898 Somalia, a rifle cost 5-6 she-camels.10 The 
acquisition of guns, which in the context of rapid technological advances in 
firearms technology and the threat of colonial expansion and conquest reached 
the proportions of a veritable arms race, constituted a serious drain on Ovambo 
floodplain resources. Cattle were the main export commodity for purchasing 
firearms, ammunition and horses, and, particularly after the rinderpest deci-
mated cattle populations in the region, conflict over cattle increased, leading to 
escalating violence, population displacement and further investment in guns for 
defense against cattle raiders.11 In 1890s prices, the 10,000 breechloading rifles 
the Ovambo acquired in the early 1900s cost the equivalent of 70,000 to 
100,000 head of cattle, whereas colonial estimates for the total number of cattle 
for Ovamboland were 60,000 in 1925 and 123,000 in 1942.12 
Thus firearms had contradictory effects: not only did they facilitate the 
European conquest, but they also helped prevent (in the case of Ethiopia) or 
delay European conquest and colonization. The impact of guns as a technology 
was therefore neither linear nor homogenous. The resistance of Samory, the 
Ethiopians, the Boers and the northern Ovambo floodplain polities of Oukwa-
nyama and Ombadja would not have been as effective or as sustained without 
modern firearms. But being met with effective resistance also redoubled Portu-
guese determination to conquer the area at all costs to maintain legitimacy as a 
victorious imperial and colonial power. The incursions of well-armed Oukwa-
                                                 
10  Headrick, The Tools of Empire, p. 110. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
 
106 
nyama and Ombadja raiding parties also increased violence and insecurity 
throughout southern Angola, further challenging the Portuguese.  
The South Africans disarmed the refugees from Oukwanyama and the Om-
badjas on their side of the border in 1917 after they defeated Mandume Nde-
mufayo, the last king of Oukwanyama.13 The colonial administration allowed 
selected kings and headmen to keep a small number of modern firearms – 100 
in the case of Ondonga – but required all firearms to be registered. It appears 
that some leniency was extended to muzzle loaders. A couple of hundred barrels 
without stocks (probably muzzle loaders) were handed in in 1934, but at least 
some muzzle loaders appear to have continued in use. The administration 
distributed small numbers of cartridges for the modern guns to the kings and 
headmen who had kept them. Although gun smuggling had been rampant before 
colonial occupation during World War I, it seems to have continued at a much 
reduced scale during the 1920s, and it had become virtually nonexistent by the 
1930s. As late as 1928, three “runners” for a Portuguese dealer known as 
Mengeri from the Humbe area in Angola were arrested: they carried 40 
percussion caps, three tins of gunpowder and a Mauser pistol with 69 rounds. In 
addition, colonial records occasionally note that returning migrant laborers 
carried a few rounds of ammunition for the registered firearm of a particular 
headman.14 In 1930, the trader Hermann Burchard, a resident of the Angolan 
Lower Kunene and a former inhabitant of the German colony of South West 
Africa, was banned from re-entry into Ovamboland because he was suspected of 
having supplied rifles and ammunition to King Iipumbu of Uukwambi in 
1925.15 During World War II, the colonial administration issued 36 .303 rifles 
(probably war-issue Lee-Enfields) to a selection of Ovamboland’s headmen.16 
Combined with the prohibitions on Africans hunting big game – one of the 
reasons given for the violent removal of King Iipumbu in 1932 was that he had 
engaged in ‘poaching’ – the disarmament of the Ovambo in part explains the 
resurgence of big game populations in the 1930s. The introduction of breech-
loading cartridge-fed rifles (especially magazine-fed ones) had greatly enhanced 
the efficiency of big game hunting in the Ovambo floodplain during the close of 
the nineteenth century, leading, for example, to the near disappearance of ele-
phants from the region. The lack of firearms and cartridges also reduced the 
                                                 
13  See chapter 3. 
14  NAN, NAO 26, Acting UGR Neutral Zone, Namakunde, March 18, 192[7] to Portu-
guese Govt. Representative Neutral Zone, Namakunde (attached to letter Acting UGR 
Neutral Zone, Namakunde, Feb. 25, 1928 to O/C NAO, Ondonga). In general, see 
NAO 18, Annual Reports Ovamboland 1928, 1930, 1932. On precolonial gun smug-
gling, see Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 42-43. 
15  NAN, NAO 26, NCO to Secretary SWA, Ondangwa, 24 July 1929, and 5 Dec. 1930. 
16  NAN, NAO 60, Quarterly Report Ovamboland, Jan.-March 1947. 
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impact of hunting big game. The resulting recovery of wildlife populations 
caused increased conflict between predators and elephants on the one side and 
humans on the other. Colonial reports demonstrate that the local population 
often was armed with spears, bows and arrows and muzzle loaders, making 
hunting less effective and much more dangerous. The 1931 annual report, for 
example refers to a “miniature war” with a pride of lions that had killed two 
donkeys on the edge of the Ondonga inhabited area: some of the hunters were 
armed with muzzle loaders “and after discharging their weapons [they] were 
forced to beat a retreat in order to re-load”. The hunters killed two of the four 
tracked lions, but not until one of their own had been badly mauled. In Uukwa-
luthi lions attacked a herd of livestock but, added Hahn, “I have not heard yet 
whether any natives were shot,” demonstrating that he had not only little respect 
for the marksmanship of his subjects, but also no sympathy for their safety or 
their attempts to protect their precious livestock.17 
Moreover, it was difficult to obtain supplies of gunpowder, shot and percus-
sion caps or flints, or spare parts for these guns, which were at least forty to 
sixty years old. The disarmament of the Ondonga district was only completed in 
1939, but Native Commissioner Hahn noted the unexpected consequence al-
most immediately. In his 1940 annual report he wrote: “The Ondonga natives 
have suffered considerably since they were disarmed last year. This tribe is 
bordered by the [Etosha] Game Reserve on the East as well as on the South and 
as a consequence lions, hyenas and wild dogs affect them much more closely 
than any of the other tribes”. In the next annual report he also stressed that be-
cause the inhabitants of Ovamboland had few rifles left they could not effect-
ively keep the lions at bay. Yet, Hahn hesitated to respond to a request by the 
headmen to issue them rifles for defending themselves against the predators as 
the attacks mounted.18 
Forced disarmament in Ovamboland and the rebounding wildlife population 
may also have been important reasons that the local population continued to 
construct elaborate palisades around their homesteads and fences around their 
fields, even though levels of violence declined in the 1930s. The defenses 
provided effective protection for humans, their livestock and their crops and 
fruit trees against big and small game depredations. Disarmament may have 
contributed to big game conservation in north-central Namibia, but the policy 
simultaneously may have maintained or even increased the use of woody 
vegetation as an alternative protection against wildlife.  
                                                 
17  NAN, NAO 19, Monthly Report Ovamboland, April 1931. 
18  NAN, A450, 7, Annual Reports Ovamboland 1940 and 1941 
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Steel tools 
A second technological advantage that Diamond identifies as being critical for 
the success of European imperialism was iron technology and steel. In six-
teenth-century warfare in the Americas, Cortés’ and Pizarro’s opponents did not 
possess metal arms: at best they used obsidian for cutting edges while the 
Spaniards had iron swords, pikes, bolts and arrowheads, as well as protective 
iron helmets, shields and body armor. But Africans used the same metals as 
Europeans. The oldest sites of iron working in sub-Saharan Africa date from the 
ninth to eighth centuries B.C. Iron technology not only had an enormous impact 
on warfare (swords, knives, axes, spears, arrowheads) but also on agriculture 
because metal bush-knives/machetes, axes and hoes greatly facilitated agricul-
ture, by making it easier to clear bush and forest, and to till, weed and harvest 
arable fields. In addition, iron smelting and working consumed large amounts of 
(hard)woods as a fuel.19 
African blacksmiths produced steel weapons, tools and other artifacts long 
before the Europeans did. This explains why – despite the import of European 
raw iron and iron tools and arms since the seventeenth century, African indi-
genous iron smelting and working did not disappear until the first half of the 
twentieth century. Although sub-Saharan Africans may or may not have in-
vented iron working independently, there is no doubt that it was a large-scale 
activity throughout Africa.20 Late nineteenth-century travelers to the Ovambo 
floodplain marveled at the iron industry in the Kingdom of Oukwanyama. The 
ore was mined in the Mupa area, north of the floodplain in modern Angola, and 
it was collected during annual expeditions. 
A authoritative study on African iron working explains that by the early 
twentieth century, African blacksmiths chiefly used (European) scrap metal as a 
resource rather than smelting iron themselves, that blacksmithing was moribund 
by the 1920s, and that after World War II, blacksmithing was limited to a few 
                                                 
19  Iliffe, Africa, pp. 33-34. See also de Maret and Thiry, “How Old Is the Iron Techno-
logy in Africa?”, Coucher and Herbert, “The Blooms of Banjeli”, and Schmidt and 
Avery, “Complex Iron Smelting and Pre-Historic Culture in Tanzania”. Denevan 
argues that in the Americas forest clearance and shifting cultivation only really be-
came possible with the introduction of iron technology, see Denevan, Cultivated 
Landscapes of Native Amazonia and the Andes, pp. 27-49 and 116-123. 
20  Herbert, Iron, Gender, and Power, pp. 4-11. Coucher and Herbert note that many 
Africans believed that locally produced metal hoes and axes were stronger and more 
durable than imported tools. See Coucher and Herbert, “The Blooms of Banjeli”, p. 
50. Craddock emphasizes that the preference for tools produced by the unique iron-
working technologies of precolonial Africa was not surprising because it resulted in 
high-quality iron with a high carbon content, i.e., steel. See Craddock, Early Metal 
Mining and Production, pp. 241-253, 264-265. 
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remote areas of Africa.21 Still, while blacksmithing certainly declined rapidly in 
north-central Namibia after World War II, Oukwanyama blacksmiths on both 
sides of the Angolan-Namibian colonial boundary acquired raw iron from the 
Mupa region until the 1940s, and they remained an important source for hoes 
and other tools despite the availability of industrially produced hoes from Portu-
gal and South Africa. For example, when Kaulikalelwa Oshitina Muhonghwo 
married in the early 1940s, her husband, the son of the village headman of 
Ohamwaala (in the Namibian district of Oukwanyama), paid her family the set 
bride wealth of one ox and four hoes. The hoes were especially valuable be-
cause they had been crafted from iron ore obtained from the Mupa area manu-
factured by Oukwanyama blacksmiths. She explained that when European-
manufactured hoes were substituted for the local superior-quality variety, the 
equivalent for one ‘Ovambo’ hoe was two and a half imported hoes.22 The 
missionary-ethnographer Carlos Estermann noted in 1935 that the customary 
bride price amongst the Ovambo consisted of a head of cattle and four ‘indi-
genous’ hoes.23 In 1938, the official bride price in Ovamboland’s Oukwanyama 
district consisted of one head of cattle payable to the father of the bride and six 
hoes payable to her mother.24 
In 1935, a group of blacksmiths demonstrated iron smelting and the pro-
duction of metal artifacts at an agricultural and ethnographic show in Wind-
hoek. Native Commissioner Hahn had sponsored and organized the Ovambo-
land section of the show, and he had ordered a load of authentic iron ore from 
Mupa. He considered iron smelting to be an antiquated craft with no economic 
significance, and consequently offered a mere symbolic price of one shilling for 
the entire load that had been carried to Ovamboland by a caravan of thirty men. 
The convoy’s leader, the Angolan blacksmith Shiweda, however, demanded ten 
shillings. Consulted by Hahn, the old Oukwanyama blacksmith Mueshipakange 
Hamuandi, who performed at the Windhoek show, noted that the artifacts 
produced with such expensive ore would not fetch even half the requested price. 
Hahn refused to pay Shiweda’s price and may have procured iron ore in the 
Namibian Police Zone, south of Ovamboland, instead. When he informed his 
superior about the show, Hahn claimed that the ore had originated in the Mupa 
area: “Iron ore, specially brought from the iron mines at Oshimanya in Angola 
(…) was smelted and forged at their primitive blast furnaces, and the metal 
fashioned into hoes, knives, assegais, axes, etc. (…) In many instances the anvil 
                                                 
21  Herbert, Iron, Gender, and Power, pp. 11-12. 
22  Kaulikalelwa Oshitina Muhonghwo, interview by author, Ondaanya, 29 Jan. 1993. 
23  Estermann, “Notas Ethnográficas”, 55-56. 
24  NAN, NAO 9, O/C Native Affairs to NCO, Oshikango, 22 Feb. and 27 April 1938. 
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consisted of a big hard stone”. It is unclear whether Hahn coldly lied to his 
superior, or whether he ultimately paid Shiweda’s price for the Angolan ore.25 
Ovamboland’s pavilion at the Windhoek show featured six regular black-
smiths from (Namibian) Oukwanyama: Mueshipakange Hamuandi, Hikela Hidi-
nua, Mateus Nakalondo Hamnyela, Shiteni Kamati, Himuthe Valombola Kakende 
and Deumane Kaushola. In addition, seven “jeweler-blacksmiths” participated: 
Haupindi Katinda, Hikushi Amnyela (nicknamed ‘Bones’), Gepata Hamatundu, 
David Nafine or Hamaulu, Lieinge Kambode, Mu(a)etako Knghone and Ham-
nyela Haimbili. The regular blacksmiths made weapons and tools, while the 
jewelers produced anklets and iron- and copper-beaded jewelry.26 Sometimes, 
jeweler blacksmiths were San men who specialized in manufacturing iron 
beads.27 In 1936, Hahn organized a display of arts and crafts for the benefit of 
the visiting Administrator of South West Africa in Oukwanyama that “included 
blacksmiths, making hoes, axes, knives, assegais, etc., jewelers making beads, 
copper and iron bracelets, and brassware”.28 Hahn may have engaged the same 
blacksmiths that he had used for the Windhoek show in the previous year. An 
Anglican missionary stationed in the Namibian district of Oukwanyama during 
the 1930s and early 1940s witnessed five blacksmiths at work at the Native 
Commissioner’s office, transforming muzzle-loading gun barrels into hoes. The 
barrels had previously been used as pipes for distilling liquor. The missionary 
was quite impressed by the blacksmiths’ skill, and he recounted the story of the 
famous Oukwanyama blacksmith who had repaired a captured Portuguese 
cannon.29 
After World War II, however, blacksmiths in Ovamboland rapidly became 
rare. In 1948, the Native Commissioner reported that few blacksmiths remained 
and that their number was dwindling, especially in Oukwanyama, which had 
been the principal center for blacksmithing. The Commissioner explained: “they 
cannot compete with similar articles of European manufacture which now-
                                                 
25  NAN, NAO 27, O/C Oshikango to NCO, Ondangwa, 15 March 1935; NAO 27, 
NCO to Sec. SWA, Ondangwa, 15 July 1935. 
26  NAN, NAO 27, NCO to Whom it May Concern (Pass) & Attached List for Windhoek 
Exhibition 1935, Ondangwa. 4 April 1935, and NCO to Sec. SWA, Ondangwa, 15 July 
1935. The blacksmith Mateus Nakalondo Hamnyela may be the same as the village 
headman (of Oneleiua?) Matheus Hamnyela who in 1947 was a close associate of 
Senior Headman Vilho Weyulu and accused of employing forced labor, see NAO 
98, anonymous to Ohamba Nakale [Eedes], received at Ondangwa 17 Jan. 1949, and 
ANC to NCO, Oshikango, 20 Jan. 1949. If this is the same individual, blacksmithing 
was unlikely to be have been his main occupation any longer. 
27  Kaulikalelwa Oshitina Muhonghwo, interview by author, Ondaanya, 29 Jan. 1993. 
28  NAN, NAO 19, Annual Report Ovamboland 1936. 
29  MacDonald Diary, p. 9. 
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[a]days are more easily and cheaper acquired at the local shops”.30 During the 
early 1940s, Native Commissioner Hahn noted that the production of local 
knives decreased because of what he perceived to be a drop in demand rather 
than in supply: “the manufacture of the dangerous Ovambo sheathed knife is 
definitely on the decline. This is principally due to the fact that the territory has, 
as a whole, become much more peaceful”.31 Across the border in Angola, Car-
los Estermann noted that in 1935, the Lower Kunene had many blacksmiths 
who still obtained their ore from Mupa, but that the extraction of iron from local 
ore was becoming increasingly rare.32 
In Ovamboland, imported iron hoes and other European goods could only be 
obtained from a few shops, from the missionaries, from Portuguese traders 
across the border or from central or southern Namibia. From 1925 to 1939, the 
Ondonga Trading Company (OTC) enjoyed a monopoly over trading in Ovam-
boland as a private concession. The OTC maintained an outlet at Ondjondjo at 
Ondangwa from 1925 onwards, and soon thereafter opened a second store at 
Omafo in the Oukwanyama district close to the Angolan-Namibian border. 
During the early 1930s, the economic depression with the resulting decline in 
migrant labor wages in Ovamboland caused a slump in sales because people had 
“very little ready cash and are not inclined to spend (…). trade in Angola is as 
bad if not worse than in S.W.A.”. By the end of 1932, business declined so 
sharply that the OTC closed its shop in the Oukwanyama district. By the middle 
of 1933, business had deteriorated even further although the OTC shop at 
Omafo (Oukwanyama) had been re-opened by R.S. Cope, the effectively 
unemployed labor recruiter in Ovamboland, who was happy to earn at least 
some income through his small store, where the gross earnings amounted to 100 
pounds sterling per month. His brother-in-law, Native Commissioner Hahn, 
noted, “there is always more ready cash in Ukuanyama [Oukwanyama] than in 
any of the other tribes. Besides this many Portuguese natives from Angola come 
over to trade at Omafo”.33 In 1939, the Ovamboland administration issued a 
license to the private trader Erich Beersmann to open a store at Endola in the 
Oukwanyama district because of the “excessive” prices that were being charged 
by the monopoly OTC.34 
                                                 
30  NAN, NAO 71, NCO, Purchase and Sale of Native Curios and Handicraft, 20 Aug. 
1948. 
31  NAN, A450, 9, Annual Report Ovamboland 1941. 
32  Estermann, “Notas Ethnográficas”, pp. 51-52. 
33  NAN, NAO 19, Monthly Report Ovamboland, Jan. and Sep.-Oct. 1932, June 1933. 
34  NAN, NAO 25, Additional NC, Trading in Ovamboland: Ondonga Trading Company 
Limited, Windhoek, 23 Sep. 1938, Administrator SWA to NCO, Windhoek, 24 June 
1939 and CNC to NCO, 6 Oct. 1938. 
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The two OTC shops and Beersman’s shop offered a variety of metal goods. 
According to a 1940 report comparing the prices in Beersman’s Endola store 
and the OTC ones, all outlets charged one shilling for hoes. Beersmann also 
carried a second type of hoe which was more expensive, ranging in price from 
2s. to 2s. 6d. In the light of the above oral history account of the higher prices 
commanded by locally manufactured hoes the second type may have been an 
Ovambo hoe, although its larger size and its being listed as “Etema lombruru” 
(etema lombulu or Boer hoe?) suggest that it may have been a South African 
manufacture. Bush knives – imports since they were not produced by Ovambo 
blacksmiths – varied in price from 1 to 2s. at Beersman’s Endola shop to 2s. at 
the OTC shops. An ax varied from 2s. 3d. to 4s. at Endola and 2s. to 4s. at the 
OTC outlets. The OTC also carried large axes and spades, and both the OTC 
and Beersman carried knives, nails and wire but these items were all cheaper at 
Endola. Both the OTC and Beersman also sold ‘kaffir pots’ (locally manu-
factured clay pots) but only the OTC had ‘kitchen pots’, which probably were 
imported metal pots, in its inventory.35 
During World War II, prices at the shops increased while the availability of 
imported iron manufactures decreased. In 1941, the prices for regular hoes at 
the Endola store had increased to 1s. 6d., and the price of the second type of 
hoes sold by Beersmann had risen to 2s. 6d. No prices for bush knives were 
given and it is likely they no longer were available in the shops. ‘Kaffir’ pots 
ranged in price from 7s. to 12s. With the cash infusion resulting from the re-
mittances from military service wages in 1942, business at Ovamboland’s shops 
boomed, but the stores had so much difficulty in acquiring new supplies of 
goods that a new ‘native store’ at Ombalantu was forced to close down almost 
as soon as it had opened because its owner could not procure inventory. Al-
though the three remaining shops continued to do good business, many potential 
clients crossed the border to buy from the well-stocked Portuguese-owned 
shops in the Lower Kunene which were supplied especially with soft cotton 
goods from Brazil. In the final years of the war, metal goods were in short 
supply. The OTC, which in 1943 was taken over by the South West Africa 
Native Labour Association, the main migrant labor recruiting company, did not 
supply any hoes, axes, knives, wire, saws or (metal) kitchen pots. Only in 1947, 
two years after the end of World War II, did the stores once again carry a range 
of metal goods. But hoes cost 2s. (twice their prewar price) and bush knives and 
                                                 
35  NAN, NAO 25, Erich Beersmann to NCO, Endola, 2 Nov. 1939, and Pricelist Ondonga 
Trading Company Ltd. (OTC), Jan. 1, 1940. 
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metal cooking pots were unavailable. The only cooking pots in the inventories 
were ‘kaffir pots’.36 
Diamond’s ‘steel’ thesis, like his ‘guns’ thesis, explains why it was that be-
fore and during European-African contact, at the turn of the twentieth century, 
Europeans colonized Africans rather than the other way around. In contrast to 
the situation in the pre-Columbian Americas where iron working technology 
was non-existent, Africans had used steel tools long before Europeans, and their 
indigenous handcrafted iron and steel hoes (and axes) had greatly facilitated 
agriculture and the clearing and utilization of woodlands for up to three mil-
lennia before the European colonial invasion. In north-central Namibia, indi-
genous blacksmiths and their handcrafted steel hoes held their own against 
industrially manufactured imports until well into the 1940s, defying linear 
narratives of the automatic substitution of ‘inferior’ traditional and local techno-
logy by ‘superior’ modern Western global technology.  
Steel plows 
The history of the plow in the Ovambo floodplain and southern Africa shows a 
similarly asymmetrical and contradictory history. The use of the animal-drawn 
plow is ancient in highland Ethiopia.37 However, the plow did not readily dis-
seminate to other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. During the nineteenth century, 
the use of the animal-drawn metal plow spread in the eastern part of southern 
Africa (e.g., Lesotho, Swaziland). In Ovamboland, the plow led to more labor-
intensive preparation of the soil, but it also used more land to produce the same 
quantity of crops. 
The new South African colonial rulers in Namibia first introduced the plow 
soon after they occupied the southern Ovambo floodplain in 1915. Yet, plows 
were not adopted in Ovamboland until after World War II, more than three 
decades later. Why did it take more than a generation for the animal-powered 
steel plow to be adopted in an area that had a strong history of crop cultivation, 
that was entirely free of tsetse and that had an abundance of cattle? 
When the South African official based at Ondangwa first used a plow in 
1916, three of his local employees requested his assistance in acquiring plows 
for themselves. In 1918, with the blessing of his superior in Windhoek, he 
                                                 
36  NAN, NAO 25, OTC Price Lists, 1 April 1941 and 26 Jan. 1944; A450, 7, Annual 
Report Ovamboland 1942 and 1943; NAO 21, Quarterly Report Ovamboland, Jan.-
March 1943; NAO 63, Comparative List of Some Articles: Omafo and Endola Stores, 
appendix to NCO to CNC, Ondangwa, 15 Oct. 1947 and Price List SWANLA Ondon-
ga and Omafo Stores, 16 June 1947, appendix to Store Manager SWANLA Ondonga to 
NCO, Ondonga, 16 June 1947. 
37  McCann, People of the Plow. 
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ordered three plows from a South African import firm based in Port Elisabeth 
for seven pounds sterling each.38 An agricultural expert for the Anglican mis-
sion, however, noted in 1924 that plowing would not really be effective in 
Ovamboland because tree stumps and roots routinely were left in the fields.39 
Even in 1938, it appears that little or no use was made of plows: the Council of 
Headmen of the district of Oukwanyama submitted a request for three “single 
furrow ploughs suitable for ploughing sandy loam soil”.40 The plows were first 
used during the agricultural season of 1938-1939. The new colonization area east 
of the Ovambo floodplain, where the overflow of refugees from Angola had been 
directed, received two of them, which were financed through the Tribal Trust Fund 
of the Oukwanyama district. Senior Headman Eliah Weyulu had cleared a number 
of ‘tribal’ fields in the villages of Ohauwanga Munene, Omundaunghilo and 
Eenhana that were successfully plowed. The fields yielded a good harvest, but the 
results with the third plow in the floodplain environment of central Oukwanyama 
were disappointing, which was attributed to the drought conditions that had 
prevailed there during that year.41 While these three plows once again had been 
acquired from a firm in South Africa via the good offices of the colonial ad-
ministration (an elaborate and slow process), in the late 1940s the missions and 
at least one of the two wholesale shops in Ovamboland offered plows.42 
The Assistant Native Commissioner at Oshikango, who was in charge of the 
late 1930s experiments, identified a number of obstacles to the introduction of the 
plow. He cited a shortage of cash to purchase plows and plowing equipment; cash 
could only be earned though migrant labor. A second challenge was a shortage of 
draft animals. Thirdly, he emphasized that cultivation was considered to be the 
work of women, but cattle, which were required to pull the plows, were the do-
main of men. Fourthly, he believed the inhabitants of Ovamboland to be ultra-
conservative, pointing to “[t]he inherent objection of Natives to adopt new ideas 
and abandon old methods”. Lastly, he listed a lack of knowledge about how to use 
plows.43 Nevertheless, by 1943, teams of trained draft oxen were widely enough 
                                                 
38  NAN, RCO 7, Office of the Secretary for the Protectorate SWA to RCO, Windhoek, 1 
Dec. 1917; Managing Director Mangold Brothers Ltd. to RCO, Port Elisabeth, 26 April 
1918; and Administrator SWA to RCO, Windhoek, 23 May 1918. 
39  NAN, NAO 26, Report Ovamboland Cotton Prospects, appendix to Alec Crosby to 
Bishop of Damaraland, St. Mary's Mission, 11 Jan. 1924. 
40  NAN, NAO 11, NCO to Sec. SWA, 24 Aug. 1938. 
41  NAN, NAO 11, O/C Native Affairs Oshikango to NCO, Oshikango, 19 Sep. 1939, and 
NAO 20, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Jan.-Feb. 1939. 
42  On the missions, see NAN, NAO 64, NCO to CNC, Ondangwa, 30 June 1948, and 
ANC, report Barter System of Trade in Native Areas, Oshikango, 28 June 1948. On 
purchasing plows at Ondjondjo Wholesale, Lea Paulus, interview by author, Onan-
djaba, 17 June 1993. 
43  NAN, NAO 11, O/C Native Affairs Oshikango to NCO, Oshikango, 19 Sep. 1939. 
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available amongst Ovamboland’s elite of chiefs and headmen to make it possible 
to employ a light animal-drawn grader to maintain the principal dirt roads across 
Ovamboland.44 
In 1946, Ovamboland as a whole contained an estimated 100 plows although 
four years later, the total number of plows remained unchanged. Still, the 
number of trained draft animals, which would have been used to operate the 
plows, seems to have increased slowly, as is also demonstrated by the increase 
in the use of animal-drawn means of transport. Before World War II, very little 
mention is made of animal-drawn four-wheeled wagons and two-wheeled carts 
except for those that were used by the missions and the administration. The 
1945-1946 Agricultural Census reported 50 wagons and 200 carts in use in 
Ovamboland, while the 1949-1950 Agricultural Census listed 75 wagons and 
only 50 carts.45 It is possible that the census included mission- and government-
owned wagons and carts, but the majority if not all of the vehicles probably 
were owned by Africans because the census was conducted by the Department 
of Native Affairs. 
At the end of 1952, however, the number of plows had increased tenfold, to 
1,073. The availability of trained draft animals again is reflected in the number 
of wagons and carts in use in 1952: 19 wagons and 576 carts. The Oukwanyama 
district accounted for over half of the plows and a quarter of the carts, and 
Ombalantu and Uukwambi each had approximately one-fifth of the total num-
ber of plows while only 39 were in use in Ondonga district. But Ondonga had 
11 wagons (more than half of the total of 19), and 100 of the 576 carts, and it 
was the only district that had motorcars (there were 6 of them). Again, it is not 
entirely clear if the numbers include mission and administration property, but 
King Martin of Ondonga owned at least one motorcar in the early 1940s.46 By 
1952, the use of wagons and carts had become an annoyance to colonial offi-
cials because their metal wheels and the animals’ hooves spoiled the surfaces of 
the sand roads, making them difficult for the motorcars of colonial officials to 
drive on. The official at Oshikango had requested the Oukwanyama headmen to 
keep wagons and carts with iron wheels off “our roads”.47 
Colonial officials considered the small number of plows in Ondonga to be 
evidence of Ovambo resistance to modernization, but the large number of wa-
                                                 
44  NAN, NAO 25, NCO to CNC, Ondangwa, 16 Feb. 1943. 
45  NAN, NAO 103, Censuses of Agriculture Ovamboland 1945-1946 and 1949-1950. 
46  NAN, NAO 103, ANC to NCO, Oshikango, 30 Dec. 1952; Chief Kambonde to NCO, 
Okaroko, 18 Dec. 1953; Council of Headmen Ombalantu to NCO, 25 July 1952; Coun-
cil of Headman Ukuambi to NCO, Ukuambi, 16 July 1952; Chief Ushona Shimi to 
NCO, Okakua, 7 July 1952; and Ikasha Nkandi and Ashimbanga Mupole to NCO, 
Onkolonkathi, 26 June 1952. 
47  NAN, NAO 62, NCO to ANC, 19 Sep. 1952 and ANC to NCO, 22 Oct. 1952. 
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gons and carts in Ondonga, which required trained draft animals, and the 
presence of motorcars suggest that this cannot be the full explanation. 
By 1957, according to the agricultural officer for Ovamboland, the plow was 
used on 20% of the total arable area: 
The reason that the Ovambos increasingly make use of the plough, however, is that 
it requires much less labour and time to cultivate a field with a plough than to raise 
cultivation beds in the same field. Because the plough is also much faster every 
plough owner can take care of a bigger plot (…) Therefore although ploughed land 
produces less per field, the total production is higher because the farm plot can be 
increased.48  
The administration actively promoted the use of the plow, for example by 
renting out tractors and encouraging farmers to purchase them. In 1976, renting 
a tractor with a driver cost ten rand per hour. In 1980, an estimated 100 tractors 
were in private hands and 20,000 ha were cultivated with plows. In the early 
1990s, the large majority of households surveyed relied on plow cultivation.49 In 
promoting the adoption of plows, however, the administration ignored reports 
that plowing, especially deep mechanical plowing, was detrimental to soil 
fertility. Based on 1970s trials in Ovamboland, the territory’s Secretary for 
Agriculture informed the Secretary for Bantu Affairs in Pretoria that tractor 
(deep) plowing could cause the saline subsoil of Ovamboland to be mixed in 
with the thin topsoil, which depressed crop yields.50 
In addition, the dissemination of the animal-drawn plow after the 1940s con-
tributed to arable land scarcity because it facilitated and required the cultivation 
of larger fields per household, at the expense of farm and village pasture and 
bush lands. The labor-saving plow enabled larger fields to be prepared but, in 
combination with an increase in male absence due to migrant labor beyond 
Ovamboland, the use of the plow compounded the weeding bottleneck because 
weeding continued to be done by hoe. Weed competition decreased yields per 
                                                 
48  NAN, BAC 133, Agricultural Report Ovamboland 1956-1957. 
49  NAN, OVA 50, Sec. Agriculture to Sec. Bantu Administration, Ondangwa, 2 April 
1976, and J. Amutenya to Sec. Agriculture, Ombalantu, 30 Aug. 1975 and 13 Oct. 
1976; OVA 6, Annual Report Agriculture Ovamboland 1979-1980; WW A 637, 
report appended to Erasmus to Director Water Affairs, Otjiwarongo, 13 May 1970; 
OMITI A5.2.2. 
50  NAN, OVA 50, Sec. Agriculture to Sec. Bantu Administration, Ondangwa, 2 April 
1976, and OVA 47 f. 6/8/3/1-7, Venn, Loxton & Associates, Mahanene Research 
Station Visit by Research Committee, 23-24 Feb. 1976. See also WW A 644, A. 
Trevor, ACE Planning, 11 July 1972; WW A 640, Report Ovamboland Pipelines, 
Oct. 1977; OVA 49, Meeting Subcommittee Townplanning, 2 Sep. 1970; OVA 93, 
Sec. Agriculture, 13 Sep. 1979. 
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hectare and consequently forced households to increase the area under plow 
cultivation, again at the expense of bush and grazing land.51 
The introduction of plow agriculture also had social repercussions that 
affected the gender division of labor, female control over land and crops, and 
agricultural productivity. In 1993, only 37% of a sample of 54 women had a 
field of their own, although 59% emphasized that they had had their own field 
before they had married.52 The loss of access to the proceeds from their own 
fields meant that women, who increasingly had become the mainstay of agri-
cultural labor because of male absence due to migrant labor, had less incentive 
to invest additional labor in cultivation, for example, to do the extra weeding 
that plowing required. As a result, to some extent, even adult female labor may 
have been disinvested from crop cultivation from the 1950s onward.53 Thus, in 
the social and environmental context of Ovamboland, the introduction of the 
plow had contradictory repercussions related to the intensification of crop cul-
tivation. On the one hand, it led to an intensification of agriculture, with the 
adoption of ox- or donkey-drawn plows. On the other hand, crop cultivation 
became more labor- and land-extensive.54 
Plowing also directly and indirectly affected the use and the availability of 
woody resources. The impact was direct because trees and tree stumps hindered 
plowing and it became more common to burn out tree stumps, especially when 
tractors were used, which, by 1993, was the case for 34% of OMITI survey 
respondents.55 Moreover, the plow meant that saplings were more easily plowed 
under and the root systems of existing trees were damaged. Still, that the 
plowshares cut the roots in some cases actually may have encouraged vegetative 
                                                 
51  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chap. 6. 
52  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chap. 6; OMITI A0.11 and 12 (N=54).  
53  See, for example, Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chap. 5. 
54  Berry emphasizes that agricultural intensification is not a necessary result of, for 
example, population pressure and also notes that it is not irreversible, Berry, No 
Condition Is Permanent, pp. 181-196. Gray notes that despite population pressure, 
agricultural change in southwestern Burkina Faso in modern times has been marked 
by agricultural extensification, Gray, “Investing in Soil Quality”. 
55  Lea Paulus, interview with author, Onandjaba, 17 June 1993, and NAN, NAO 26, 
Report Ovamboland Cotton Prospects, appendix to Alec Crosby to Bishop of Damara-
land, St. Mary’s Mission, 11 Jan. 1924. In the early 1960s, trees were common in fields 
in the eastern side of the middle floodplain and the area directly to its east, BAC 131, 
Deputy Secretary of Forestry, “Report of a Visit by the Deputy Secretary of Forestry 
(…) 17-29 April 1961”, Pretoria, 10 May 1961. On the use of tractors, see OMITI 
A5.2.2. Tractor plowing greatly increased the possibility that tree trunks and roots 
would damage a plow blade, personal observations by author, 1991-1993. 
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regeneration, as occurred, for example, with the marula tree (Sclerocarya 
birrea), because new trees developed from the cut roots.56 
Indirectly, plowing and the entire social and agricultural complex within 
which the use of the plow became embedded affected the on-farm and off-farm 
availability of woody vegetation in the villages. Off-farm, the expansion of 
arable land as a result of an increasing number of farms per village and/or the 
expansion of individual farm plots diminished the total surface of the commons 
that was under woody vegetation. A diminishing village commons reduced the 
local availability of forest products and forage, and the scarcity of the latter in 
turn forced cattle owners and herdsmen to herd the cattle to the cattle posts 
earlier and for longer periods of time, reducing the availability of manure and 
other important cattle-derived products. 
The agricultural report for 1955-1956 noted that the number of farm plots 
was increasing in all villages, and explained “It is not rare to see a native who 
cuts out hundreds of mopane trees in the mopane forests and then just leaves the 
trees to rot while he does not even plant manna [millet] on the clearing area”. 
The author of the report feared that the consequences might be environmentally 
disastrous in the long term. He estimated that each new farm diminished a 
village’s pastureland by 1.7 ha and noted that leaving the trees to rot destroyed 
years worth of potential firewood. Moreover, “[b]ecause the kraal and the field 
is kept clean there is no possibility that the area in the future will produce new 
trees that could be used as firewood (…). The presence of the new kraal also 
means that there is an additional consumer of firewood in the ward”. Finally, he 
expressed concern that the remaining pasturages would be overgrazed, pre-
venting tree regeneration, and he predicted that without trees, soil erosion would 
become a serious menace.57  
Although associated with the social and environmental impacts outlined 
above, the impact of the plow was not unambiguously negative. The intro-
duction of the animal-powered plow to some extent compensated for the in-
creased loss of male labor to agriculture as a result of the growing male 
                                                 
56  Interviews by author: Lea Paulus, Onandjaba, 17 June 1993; Helemiah Hamutenya, 
Omuulu Weembaxu, 17 July 1993; Philippus Haidima, Odibo, 9 Dec. 1992, and 
Pauline Onenghali, 15 Dec. 1992; Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chap. 6. NAN, NAO 
62, Agricultural Report Ovamboland, 30 Nov. 1953; BAC 132, Agricultural Officer 
Ovamboland to NCO, Ondangwa, 1 March 1957; BAC 133, Agricultural Report 
Ovamboland, 1956-1957; WW A 637, report appended to Erasmus to Director Wa-
ter Affairs, Otjiwarongo, 13 May 1970; OMITI A5.2.2. On the weeding bottleneck, 
see Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution, p. 136. 
57  NAN, BAC 133, Agricultural Report Ovamboland 1955-1956. See also interviews 
by author: Joseph Kambangula, Omboloka, 25 Feb. 1993; Nahango Hailonga, Ona-
mahoka, 4 Feb. 1993; Timotheus Nakale, Big Ekoka, 21 Feb. 1993; and Moses 
Kakoto, Okongo, 17 Feb. 1993. 
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employment outside of Ovamboland. Before World War II, men and boys from 
the district of Oukwanyama – the largest supplier of migrant labor to the white 
farms and the mines of Namibia – chose to engage in migrant labor away from 
home, typically after the major household agricultural labor needs had been 
fulfilled. The only exception was during years of drought, which destroyed the 
prospects for a good harvest. During and after World War II, household agricul-
tural production became secondary for men and older boys: the animal-powered 
plow made it possible to divert male labor from household agriculture on a 
massive scale while simultaneously maintaining overall crop production by put-
ting more land into production.58  
Animal-drawn plows also facilitated the cultivation of land that had been 
unsuitable for hoe cultivation. Before the adoption of the plow, the lighter sandy 
soils on the middle slopes of the ‘dunes’ between the seasonal water courses 
were the preferred location for fields because the heavier clayish soils were too 
difficult to cultivate with the hoe. The animal-powered steel plow, however, 
dramatically increased the land available for crop cultivation in the floodplain 
because land closer to water courses and even within the upper flood levels 
could be cultivated. Outside of the floodplain, the plow also made it possible to 
cultivate the heavy soils on the edge of and within pans and other shallow 
seasonal bodies of water.59 The availability of additional land relieved the 
pressure on environmental resources in the densely settled floodplain as people 
migrated east and beyond the floodplain, resulting in a more even distribution of 
the area’s human and livestock populations.  
Still, why is it that plow use was insignificant for decades after plows were 
introduced in World War I, and what caused the technology to be rapidly 
adopted after World War II? One limitation certainly was availability. Plows 
were expensive: in 1918, a plow cost seven pounds sterling while monthly 
migrant labor wages at the Namibian diamond fields were about one pound a 
month.60 Moreover, outlets for acquiring plows were limited before the 1940s. 
The colonial state imported few plows and the missions only sold plows in 
                                                 
58  On migrant labor and the plow as a labor-saving device, see Kreike, Re-creating 
Eden, pp. 81-99. 
59  Erastus Shilongo, interview by author, Olupandu, 21 June 1993; Abisai Dula, inter-
view by author, Oikokola, 25 June 1993; NAN, NAO 101, Senior Agricultural Officer 
Natives, Agricultural Survey of Ovamboland with Reference to Agricultural and Stock 
Improvement in that Area, Windhoek, 26 Oct. 1947. See also Kreike, Re-creating 
Eden, pp. 152-153. 
60  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, p. 89: Petrus Shanika Hipetwa, Oshiteyatemo, 17 June 
1993. 1949: 1s. 6d/day, NAN, NAO 89, NCO to CNC, Windhoek, 22 July 1949. 
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Ovamboland from the late 1940s onwards.61 Until 1939, only three stores ope-
rated in Ovamboland, but between 1939 and 1947, their price lists do not refer-
ence any plows or plowing gear. The inhabitants of the Oukwanyama district 
also had access to traders from across the border and they also purchased 
considerable quantities of goods in Angola, but there is no evidence of any sub-
stantial cross-border trade in plows.62  
Plows became more prevalent during the late 1940s and the 1950s; larger 
numbers of men and boys engaged in wage labor and wages increased while the 
prices of imported steel and iron implements and tools fell. From 1947 onwards, 
plows were included in the price lists of goods sold at the OTC stores; in 1947, 
the price was £5 7s. 6d. In 1938, the annual wage for the highest class of 
workers recruited for the Consolidated Diamond mines was £14 8s. The lower-
paid workers received £5 8s.63 Wages were still around one pound a month after 
the war, although laborers who developed special skills were paid substantially 
more; for example, in the late 1940s, Julius Abraham made five pounds a month 
as a railroad worker.64 During and after World War II, more men and older boys 
engaged in migrant labor for increasingly longer periods and they did so more 
frequently, which provided individuals and households with more money to 
invest in plows and draft animals.65 In the 1940s, when she was an adolescent, 
Lea Paulus plowed her uncle’s fields at Okalongo with an ox plow. Her uncle 
was a schoolteacher with a good salary who was one of the first in the area to 
purchase a plow, which he bought at the OTC’s Ondjondjo shop at Ondangwa 
in the 1940s.66  
Not only did the supply of plows increase and the price drop, but, in ad-
dition, more trained or trainable draft animals became available. Interviewees 
stress that although oxen were used for plowing, donkeys were a much more 
affordable alternative for plowing and for transport. Plowing immediately fol-
lowed the first good rains, before village and farm sources of water and grazing 
had recovered. In years of drought, however, oxen and donkeys were often too 
                                                 
61  On the missionaries selling plows, see NAN, NAO 64, NCO to CNC, Ondangwa, 30 
June 1948; ANC, report on Barter System of Trade in Native Areas, Oshikango, 28 
June 1948. 
62  NAN, NAO 23, NCO to Sec. SWA, Ondangwa, 1 Aug. 1936. 
63  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, p. 217. 
64  On wages, see interviews by author: Paulus Wanakashimba, Odimbo, 10 Feb. 1993; 
Erastus Shilongo, Olupanda, 21 June 1993; Joseph Nghudika, Onamahoka, 3 Feb. 
1993; Julius Abraham, Olupito, 16 June 1993. On higher wages on the South Afri-
can Rand, see NAN, A450, 13, SWA Native Labour Commission 1945-1948, Minutes 
of Meetings and Testimony 1947, vol. 2: Claus C.S. Holdt, ANC, Oshikango, 1 Sep. 
1947. 
65  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 90-99. 
66  Lea Paulus, interview by author, Onandjaba, 17 June 1993. 
 GUNS, HOES AND STEEL  
 
121
weak to plow.67 But donkeys were more expendable than oxen. Moreover, un-
like cattle, donkeys were not part of the dry season transhumance trek to the 
distant cattle posts; they were kept near the villages and thus immediately were 
available. To use oxen for plowing was a high-risk undertaking because the 
cattle posts could be located one to two weeks’ distance from the villages. After 
World War II, migrant laborers imported large numbers of donkeys.68 The 
supply of donkeys thus may have been as much a precondition for the adoption 
of the plow as a consequence of it.  
Another inhibiting factor was that the conventional use of the plow was 
incompatible with the creation and use of arable land. When a plot was cleared 
for a field, floodplain farmers allowed the stumps and the roots of large trees to 
remain behind. The Anglican agricultural missionary Alec Crosby in 1924 
despaired over the “uneconomical” and inefficient way floodplain farmers 
cleared the land: “The usual method is to put a fire around a tree until it falls, no 
effort being made to remove the stump”. He railed against how the method 
destroyed natural vegetation, but the alternative that he proposed can hardly be 
considered more environmentally sensitive: “Before ploughing can be really ef-
fective it will be necessary to stump the ground either by blasting or by digging the 
roots out”.69 When she was an older girl during the 1940s, Lea Paulus “worked 
like a boy because I mounted the 4 oxen on the plow and plowed the entire field 
like the young men (…). It was difficult to plow because if you hit a tree stump 
the handles of the plow could hurt you. When the plow was introduced people 
started to cut down trees and the remainder of the trees was set on fire”.70  
During the late 1930s and 1940s, floodplain farmers invented a variety of 
strategies to combine using the plow with a measure of on-field flood manage-
ment. Ovambo farmers grew their crops on raised beds for several reasons; one 
reason was to drain surplus rainwater away from the fields through the ‘paths’ 
in between the crop beds. Farmers constructed the beds with their hoes after the 
first good rains had fallen. The 1930s experiments with plows conducted by, for 
example, Senior Headman Eliah Weyulu and Lea Paulus’ uncle demonstrated 
the danger of abandoning the raised bed system since it made the crops vul-
                                                 
67  Interviews by author: Erastus Shilongo, Olupandu, 21 June 1993; Kaulipondwa 
Tuyenikalao Augustaf, Odimbo, 10 Feb. 1993; Hendrik Hamunime, Eko, 21 May 
1993; Salome Tushimbeni, Oipya, 19 June 1993. NAN, NAO 100, statement of 
Ruusa Niinkoti Mangundu, appendix to NCO to Chief Kambonde, Ondangwa, 24 
Nov. 1954; BAC 44, Minutes Annual Meeting Ondonga, 1 Dec. 1958, and BAC 45, 
Minutes Tribal Meetings Oukwanyama, 9-29 May 1958. 
68  See chapter 4. 
69  NAN, NAO 26, Report Ovamboland Cotton Prospects, appendix to Alec Crosby to 
Bishop of Damaraland, St. Mary's Mission, 11 Jan. 1924. 
70  Lea Paulus, interview by author, Onandjaba, 17 June 1993. 
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nerable to flooding.71 After World War II, farmers subsequently chose to retain 
drainage paths across their plowed fields, either by crisscrossing their fields in 
checkerboard fashion, effectively imitating the raised bed pattern that marked 
pre-plow cultivation, or by plowing drainage ‘paths’ along the contour lines or 
down the slope to the seasonal flood channels.72  
Social dynamics relating to Christianity, class and gender also converged to 
bring about the adoption of the plow during the 1940s and 1950s, at the same 
time that the plow brought about critical social changes. During the 1930s, the 
elite of headmen and clan elders clashed with the nascent Christian elite of 
pastors and teachers. Missionaries and their Christian followers contested the 
clan elders’ and the headmen’s control over property (in particular land, cattle, 
water and trees) and people through the institutions of female initiation and 
marriage. Christians refused to have Christian girls participate in the initiation 
ceremony and they rejected the notion of paying a bride price, which they 
considered to be slavery. They also rejected the authority of a married woman’s 
clan elders over the woman’s person, her property and her children; typically 
the woman and her children all remained members of her matrilineal clan with 
full rights to her property invested in her clan. With the colonial administration 
strongly supporting the headmen, the Christian elite initially had to back off. 
During the late 1940s and 1950s, however, conflict began anew, only now the 
administration and many headmen as well as many married men were allied 
with the Christian elite. By the early 1960s, opposition by male heads of 
households had weakened the grip of their wives’ clan elders over their wives 
and children and their household property. One of the results was that the 
identification of cattle as an exclusively male domain was strengthened and, 
combined with the plow, which could be bought with wages that only men 
could earn, enabled men to make the ‘ox plow’ an avatar to secure their domi-
nance in a rural agricultural space that they had all but abandoned during the 
1940s and the 1950s, when they were so heavily engaged in migrant labor.73  
Guns and steel in north-central Namibia 
The environmental impact of Western gun and steel technology has been am-
biguous. The proliferation of firearms in the Ovambo floodplain prevented 
European conquest until World War I. Guns made hunting more effective, es-
pecially elephant hunting to obtain ivory which in turn bought more firearms 
                                                 
71  NAN, NAO 11, O/C Native Affairs to NCO, Oshikango, 19 Sep. 1939. 
72  Lea Paulus, interview by author, Onandjaba, 17 June 1993; Erastus Shilongo, inter-
view by author, Olupandu, 21 June 1993; NAN, NAO 62, Agricultural Report Ovam-
boland, Omafu, 30 Nov. 1953. 
73  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 81-128. 
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and horses. The introduction of firearms shaped violence in the floodplain 
beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, and their use increased 
the scope and intensity of cattle raiding, especially after rinderpest decimated 
the herds. Disarmament in the early colonial era allowed a recovery of game 
populations in the region, but also contributed to the maintenance of elaborately 
palisaded homesteads along with fenced fields as a protection against wild 
animals, and thus contributed to deforestation. 
Although Western industrially produced tools were available since before 
World War I, blacksmiths in the Ovambo floodplain held their own with far 
superior steel hoes until after World War II. Similarly, the adoption of other 
Western steel technology was not linear and predetermined. The use of the 
animal-drawn metal plow has ancient origins in the Ethiopian highlands, but 
elsewhere in Africa the plow was not introduced until early in the colonial era. 
The same was true in north-central Namibia, where the animal plow was first 
introduced before World War I, but was not widely adopted until after World 
War II. Moreover, the donkey, not the conventional ox, emerged as the main 
plow animal in north-central Namibia with repercussions for land use. The 
animal-drawn plow caused yet further deforestation and contributed to in-
creased land scarcity, but the technology also relieved environmental pressures 
in the floodplain because it facilitated the settlement of Ovamboland east of the 
floodplain. Socially, increased dependence on imported metal tools such as the 
plow required more of the male population to hire themselves out for wages 
outside the region, while the hoe continued to be used by women to weed ever-
growing plots. The use of both implements affected agricultural production, 
resource management and social relations, with women becoming the de facto 
environmental resource managers, while men struggled mightily to retain de 
jure control. 
 
  
6 
Naturalizing cattle culture:  
Colonialism as a deglobalizing  
and decommodifying force 
Models of environmental change derived from the Nature-Culture dichotomy 
posit a precolonial, undifferentiated Natural subsistence economy that is pene-
trated by a colonial, market economy Culture. In the modernization paradigm of 
environmental change, the interaction is seen as positive: natural resources are 
held to be more effectively used in a market economy. In the declinist and 
inclinist paradigms, the result is perceived as environmental degradation. The 
history of cattle management and use in the Angolan-Namibian border region 
between 1890 and 1990, however, once again complicates unilinear Nature-to-
Culture narratives of environmental change. 
An influential 1980s report by Keith Morrow, an agricultural expert, stated: 
Despite the limited potential within Owambo [Ovamboland] the natural resources 
are being used at a fraction of their potential and much of this involves the misuse 
and deterioration of natural grazing. Livestock production practices are primitive be-
cause of a lack of knowledge and training and the absence of an acceptable market, 
thus minimising the annual offtake (…). [I]n the absence of any acceptable market 
outlets it is not possible to persuade cattle owners to adopt accepted commercial 
practices of animal husbandry.1  
                                                 
1  [Keith Morrow], “A Framework for the Long Term Development of Agriculture 
within Owambo”, Aug. 1989. 
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This statement relegates human livestock management and use in north-
central Namibia to the category of ‘primitive’ and hails modern scientific know-
ledge and the market in tandem as the solution to environmental degradation. 
Human mismanagement of the environment is a major concern of the moderni-
zation, declinist and inclinist paradigms of environmental change. The declinist 
view is that modernity (where Culture dominates and exploits Nature) engen-
ders destructive environmental behavior through a global market-driven over-
exploitation of the local resource base, and/or a cattle population explosion that 
results from the introduction of veterinary science that reduces cattle disease 
mortality. The modernization paradigm identifies tradition as the culprit: pri-
mitive and irrational pastoralist practices lead to an inefficient and wasteful use 
of resources, causing, for example, overgrazing. The inclinist paradigm, by con-
trast, celebrates tradition, based on the premise that only indigenous, small-scale 
cattle management and use that mimics or approximates a ‘state of Nature’ is 
sustainable.2 
Cattle actually were a global market commodity in the Ovambo floodplain 
before the colonial conquest; only during and because of colonial rule were 
cattle reduced to a resource for local trade and subsistence. The alarm about 
overgrazing, deforestation and desertification was raised by colonial officials 
and experts who by their own admission were unwilling and unable to ‘modern-
ize’ the cattle sector. Yet, there is little evidence to support their claims of se-
rious environmental degradation. On the other hand, the record does not support 
the assertion that traditional indigenous management and cattle use in north-
central Namibia were stable and naturally sustainable either. Rather, pastoralism 
in the region was subject to dramatic upheavals caused by war, disease and mi-
gration. 
The case of Ovamboland does not unambiguously support the thesis that a 
livestock ‘population explosion’ resulted in overstocking. Rather, the region’s 
livestock population was subject to radical fluctuations, with overall numbers 
declining in the late 1890s, the 1910s and the 1980s, defying linear models of 
environmental change. In the 1920s and 1930s, cattle became viewed as a health 
threat that had to be strictly quarantined. By the late 1940s, Ovamboland’s cattle 
were considered to be a major environmental obstacle to development, a view 
that persisted well beyond the late 1980s.  
 
 
                                                 
2  On management see Blaikie and Brookfield, Land Degradation and Society, pp. 3, 
27-48, 100-156; and Gibson, McKean and Ostrom, People and Forests, pp. 1-85, 
135-161, 193-226. 
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The cattle complex and environmental degradation 
The idea that African pastoralists did not consider cattle to be commodities, but 
rather cultural objects, for example, as signs of wealth, status, prestige or piety, 
was prominent in explanations of overstocking in colonial Africa in the 1960s. 
Herskovits coined the expression ‘cattle complex’ to describe this phenome-
non.3 As it relates to environmental degradation, the cattle complex argument 
explained that because of the animals’ high cultural value, the management 
objective was to maximize their numbers by minimizing their consumption and 
sale. The practice of hoarding cattle resulted in a cattle population explosion 
and overgrazing and desertification. The theory suggested that if livestock 
managers were to behave ‘rationally’, that is, respond to market opportunities 
and employ modern cattle management practices, the cycle of overstocking-
degradation would be broken because ‘surplus’ cattle could be sold and con-
sumed.4 Africa’s cattle complex, however, may be little more than a recent 
(re)invention of tradition, and indeed the case of Ovamboland suggests that it 
was such a recent invention that it could hardly be called a tradition at all.5 In 
that context it is significant that colonial officials and experts emphasized their 
view that cattle management in Ovamboland was ‘primitive’, but they did not 
employ the cattle complex theory in Ovamboland until the 1980s. 
As elsewhere in Africa, reports for Ovamboland demonstrate that the cattle 
population increased rapidly during the colonial era, but time series figures for 
domestic animal population on the continent are often crude estimates. An 
influential study of cattle raising in the Sahel countries of West Africa, for 
example, uses livestock figures from 1950 and 1983 to demonstrate that the 
numbers more than doubled. If the available figures for 1968 and 1973 are 
added, however, the trends become less linear. In fact, the cattle population of 
Burkina Faso actually declined between 1968 and 1973 and the 1983 figures did 
not dramatically surpass the 1968 level. In South Africa between the early 
1970s and the late 1980s, numbers of small stock were on the whole lower than 
                                                 
3  Herskovits, “The Cattle Complex in East Africa”. 
4  See Scoones, “Range Management Science and Policy”, and Beinart, “Soil Erosion, 
Animals, and Pasture over the Longer Term”. See also Swift, Conghenour and 
Atsedu, “Arid and Semi-Arid Ecosystems”. On livestock overpopulation, see Le 
Houérou, The Grazing Land Ecosystems of the African Sahel, pp. 90-128; and 
Beinroth, “Land Resources for Forage in the Tropics”. For India, see Jha, The Myth 
of the Holy Cow. 
5  Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine; and Cohen and Atieno Odhiambo, Siaya, p. 
76. 
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at any time since the first decade of the century and overall the numbers were 
relatively stable over time.6 
Moreover, assessing the impact of domestic animals on the environment as 
such is a challenge. The key scientific concept of carrying capacity – the 
number of animals an environment can sustain without structural degradation – 
is highly contested.7 An increase in the ratio of unpalatable species in pasturage 
– either poisonous or woody plants (the spread of the latter being referred to in 
southern Africa as bush encroachment) – frequently is used as an indicator of 
environmental degradation.8 Poisonous plants, however, are often a “natural 
part of high condition range communities”. They cannot be defined as ‘bad’ or 
interpreted as an indication of degradation simply because they happen to be 
poisonous to livestock.9 Moreover, some ‘poisonous’ plants are at the same time 
important dry season sources of animal browse, including sorghum in Africa, 
oak in Europe and North America, and the one-time global agroforestry ‘mira-
cle tree’, the native Latin American lead tree (Leucaena leucocephala). Indeed, 
oak and lead tree are among many plants that contain chemicals that have 
poisonous effects if they are digested in large quantities or if they form the bulk 
of a livestock diet. Careful livestock management is the key to preventing 
overfeeding on any of these plants, and increased incidences of cattle poisoning 
may be the result of a deterioration of cattle management rather than an indi-
cator of an increase in the ratio of poisonous plants in pasturage and the deteri-
oration of grazing.10 
                                                 
6  See Le Houérou, The Grazing Land Ecosystems of the African Sahel, pp. 124-126, 
tables 24-28, and Beinart, “Soil Erosion, Animals, and Pasture over the Longer 
Term”, p. 66. 
7  On carrying capacity, see Scoones, “Range Management Science and Policy”, and 
Beinart, “Soil Erosion, Animals, and Pasture over the Longer Term”; Little, “Re-
thinking Interdisciplinary Paradigms and the Political Ecology of Pastoralism in East 
Africa”, pp. 163-164; and Munro, “Ecological ‘Crisis’ and Resource Management 
Policy in Zimbabwe’s Communal Lands”, p. 195. See also Simon, “Sustainable 
Development”. 
8  Le Houérou, The Grazing Land Ecosystems of the African Sahel, pp. 90-128. 
9  Laycock, Young and Uechert, “Ecological Status of Poisonous Plants on Range-
lands”, and Ralphs and Sharp, “Management to Reduce Livestock Loss from Poi-
sonous Plants”. 
10  On oak, see Ralphs and Sharp, “Management to Reduce Livestock Loss”, and Har-
per, Ruyle and Rittenhouse, “Toxicity Problems Associated with the Grazing of Oak 
in Intermountain and Southwestern USA”. On sorghum, see Hanna and Torres-
Cardona, “Pennisetums and Sorghums in an Integrated Feeding System in the Tro-
pics”, esp. pp. 195-196. On Leucaena, Lawton, “Browse in Miombo Woodland”, p. 
30; and Shelton and Brewbaker, “Leucaena leucocephala”. In general, see Huxley, 
Tropical Agroforestry, pp. 39-50. 
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The sections that follow analyze the impact of cattle management and use in 
Ovamboland within the context of Nature-to-Culture narratives of environ-
mental change.  
Ovambo cattle as global commodities 
Before the colonial era and on the eve of the 1896-1897 rinderpest epidemic 
that decimated cattle herds, the inhabitants of the Angolan-Namibian border 
region bred and exported large numbers of cattle. The semi-arid region was free 
of tsetse fly, the vector for sleeping sickness in humans and nagana in cattle 
that severely limits pastoralism across Africa.11 Cattle were kept close to the 
floodplain villages during the rainy season. To conserve precious water and 
forage resources during the long June to December dry season, herdsmen drove 
the cattle to distant cattle posts outside of the Ovambo floodplain until the 
return of the rains. The dry season cattle post areas in the 1890s included the 
Kaokoveld (Kaokoland) to the west of the floodplain, Etosha Pan to the south 
and Oshimolo (in Angola) to the northeast.12 
Cattle were the major export from the Ovambo floodplain in the late 1870s 
through the early 1900s. The kings of Oukwanyama, the largest of the Ovambo 
floodplain’s polities, were the most prominent suppliers of cattle to European 
traders, who shipped the animals to the Cape Colony and the Transvaal as well 
as to Luanda, St. Helena and Gabon. The Oukwanyama kings alone may have 
supplied an annual average of 600 head of cattle in the decade or so before the 
1897 rinderpest and an average of 2,000 head annually in the decade or so 
following the disease, even though the epizootic dramatically decimated cattle 
herds.13 
Human settlement and movement had a critical impact on animal use and 
management while war and violence dramatically affected settlement patterns 
during the early decades of the twentieth century. Portuguese colonial conquest 
and pacification followed in the wake of the rinderpest, causing massive death 
and destruction in the northern Ovambo floodplain as well as further decimating 
livestock herds. Cattle meat was critical for the survival of the refugees from the 
northern floodplain, who found shelter from the violence of war in the unin-
habited wilderness areas in the middle Ovambo floodplain around the modern 
Angolan-Namibian border.14  
                                                 
11  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 21-25. 
12  Kreike, “Architects of Nature”, pp. 107-108. 
13  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chaps. 2-3. 
14  Ibid., chap. 4. 
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Cattle, culture and nature 
Despite the rinderpest, Oukwanyama’s kings and princes more than tripled the 
number of cattle they supplied to the global market in the early 1900s. Higher 
cattle prices and an arms race spurred by the threat of European expansion 
explain the higher level of cattle commodification. The Oukwanyama kings and 
princes obtained much of the export cattle through violent raids against neigh-
boring polities (whose elites responded in kind) and against their own sub-
jects.15 This process mirrors the impact of global markets on indigenous wild 
animal use in general, including, for example, the African elephant and the 
American bison, causing overexploitation, heightened strife over a dwindling 
precious resource and environmental degradation.16 
Cattle were not merely a global export commodity in the early 1900s; they 
were also critical local material and social currencies. As the cattle complex 
theory predicts, cattle were a major source of wealth, indeed wealth was 
measured in cattle and the local millet staple. In his ethnographic manuscripts, 
Native Commissioner C.H.L. Hahn wrote: “[A man’s] richness are [sic] gene-
rally gaged [sic] by the (…) [?] size of his granaries and the extent of his herds”. 
Headman Shimwefeleni was considered one of the wealthiest men in Ovambo-
land because he owned large numbers of livestock and extensive stores of 
millet.17 Annual cattle fests that marked the return of the herds to the villages 
were occasions to acknowledge the expertise of the herdsmen and to display the 
wealth of the cattle owners, in addition to serving as public accounting exer-
cises. In May 1916, a colonial officer witnessed the cattle fest that assembled 
the Oukwanyama King Mandume’s impressive herd. A painful discovery made 
during Ondonga Queen Mtwaleni’s well-attended cattle fest in July 1938 was 
that her husband had absconded with many of her cattle.18 
But cattle were not only hoarded and bred for display. Cattle were also 
redistributed to enhance and maintain social networks as well as to spread risk 
by not concentrating all a person’s cattle in one pen. In keeping with the moral 
economy thesis, faced with the ever-present threats of drought and disease, 
people maximized investment in social networks (household, family, clan, 
village, patrons) that they tapped in times of need.19 Rather than simply hoard-
                                                 
15  Ibid., chaps. 2-3. 
16  MacKenzie, The Empire of Nature, and Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison. 
17  NAN, A450, 10, Family Life, and vol. 7, Annual Report Ovamboland 1938. 
18  NAN, UNG, UA 1, Fairlie, Information re the Property of the late Chief Mandume, 
Namakunde, 24 April 1917, and NAO 19, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, July-Aug. 
1932. 
19  See Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, and Spear, Mountain Farmers. 
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ing or selling ‘surplus’ cattle, owners used the animals to cement relationships 
through feasting, gifting (bridewealth) and lending arrangements.20 
The moral economy framework is compatible with the cattle complex model 
because it emphasizes local culture and initiative alongside resistance to mar-
keting cattle. But the moral economy approach stresses the social roots of the 
unwillingness to market cattle whereas the cattle complex thesis highlights 
vague and ahistorical cultural roots. The moral economy model enriches the 
cattle complex analysis because it shifts the emphasis from hoarding to circu-
lation of cattle. The cattle complex thesis highlights maximizing the number of 
cattle in the hands of individuals; the moral economy model introduces nuances 
beyond sheer numbers: for example, cattle can be exploited beyond the actual 
number of animals because the increased circulation of cattle multiplies social 
relations within society. 
The moral economy framework in and of itself does not explain, however, 
why before 1915, cattle in the Ovambo floodplain region were so readily sold to 
global markets, or why in the 1910s, 1920s and 1930s, northern floodplain Por-
tuguese colonial subjects eagerly offered cattle for sale. In 1910, the Portuguese 
colonial official in charge of the recently occupied Ombadja polity in the 
northwestern Ovambo floodplain complained that his subjects too readily parted 
with their cattle to pay their taxes, thus evading the need to engage in wage 
labor to pay the taxes in cash. He recommended prohibiting paying colonial 
taxes with cattle. In 1914, the supply of cattle remained high: in Humbe, a 
major Portuguese commercial center in southern Angola, located just across the 
Kunene River from the Ovambo floodplain, local cattle owners went from tra-
der to trader to sell their cattle. Because there was not enough money available 
to purchase all the cattle on offer, many of the cattle owners took their cattle 
‘elsewhere’.21 
‘Elsewhere’ was down south in the Ovambo floodplain. After 1915, South 
Africa-occupied Ovamboland became a net importer of cattle and the principal 
market for cattle from the northern floodplain. Another source of import cattle 
was Namibia, south of Ovamboland and Etosha Pan, an area that was occupied 
by white settler ranchers and farmers and that was referred to as the Police 
Zone. From the 1920s, the Portuguese officials in south-central Angola only 
accepted tax payments in cash. Rather than selling their animals for artificially 
low prices to Portuguese traders, Angolan cattle owners sold their cattle to 
young men from south of the border who had earned money as migrant laborers 
                                                 
20  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 101-128, 158-176. 
21  CNDIH, Avulsos, Caixa 739 “Huila” (1885-1929), 16, Governo do Distrito da Hui-
la, o Governador, Relatório, Lubango, 29 Oct. 1910; and Codices No. 2339/347, 
cota 8-2-28, Serviços de Fazenda, Antonio Maria Meirdes e Vasconcelos, Inspecção 
ao Distrito da Huila, Mapas e Documentes 1913-1914, No. 50. 
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in the mines in the Police Zone. South-central Angola’s cattle holders had 
plenty of cattle to sell: a 1935 Portuguese colonial report estimated the cattle 
population in their Lower Kunene district at 1.2 million head, nine times the 
number in South African-controlled Ovamboland. The figure has some validity 
because the Portuguese registered the stock owned by their African subjects.22 
Like young men throughout early twentieth-century Africa, migrant laborers 
from Ovamboland invested part of their hard-earned wages in cattle. This was 
especially the case amongst laborers originating from the refugee communities 
that had established themselves in the middle floodplain wilderness along the 
Angolan-Namibian border. By the late 1930s, migrant laborers could purchase a 
head of cattle for one to two pounds sterling, the equivalent of one to two 
months’ wages in the mines. The supply of northern floodplain cattle kept 
prices so low in Ovamboland’s border district of Oukwanyama that its cattle 
owners complained about unfair competition. In 1934, two residents from 
Ovamboland ventured across the border and bought an ox and a cow in southern 
Angola for only five shillings each, less than half the going price in Ovam-
boland. In the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, cattle continued to be a major purchase 
for returning migrant laborers.23 
As a result of the continuous import as well as of natural increase, the 
estimated 60,000 cattle in 1925 had grown to the total of 386,000 cattle that 
were vaccinated in 1957.24 Native Commissioner Hahn commented in 1924 on 
what he perceived to be the pastoralization of Ovamboland: 
In former years the Ovambos were regarded as an agricultural people but they are gra-
dually becoming a pastoral people also. Their cattle herds are not only fast increasing 
but the standard of their small and interbred stock is gradually being improved through 
the Ovambos having received every facility and assistance from the Administration to 
introduce into their country a much bigger and better class of stock from the south. In 
recent years considerable herds have found their way to Ovamboland. It is not un-
common to hear of Native headmen owning herds numbering from one to two thousand 
head. The ordinary rank and file are too today possessed of stock and much better off 
than they have ever [been] before.25  
                                                 
22  For the Angolan cattle numbers, see “Okuwah-ah-kana mosi-oa-tunia (Um Esboço 
da Regiào Kalahariana e dos Territórios do Sul de Angola)”, Boletim da Sociedade 
de Geografia de Lisboa 62(7-8) (July-Aug. 1944): 461-471. On cattle registration, 
see NAN, NAO 16, O/C NAO to Sec. SWA, Ondangwa, 15 Jan. 1927. For the 1935 
Ovamboland number, see Kreike, “Architects of Nature”, p. 112, table 6.1. 
23  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 64-65, 81-82, 89-98. For Angolan prices, see NAN, 
NAO 20, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, July-Aug. 1938, and NAO 16, NCO to 
Chefe de Posto Namakunde, Ondangwa, 16 April 1934. 
24  Kreike, “Architects of Nature”, p. 112, table 6.1. 
25  NAN, NAO 18, Hahn, Notes on Ovamboland for the Administrator, Windhoek, 15 
May 1924. 
 CHAPTER 6 
 
132 
While the inhabitants of the South African-occupied southern Ovambo flood-
plain were characterized as traditional agriculturalists who diversified into pasto-
ralism, the inhabitants of the Portuguese-occupied northern floodplain were con-
sidered to be real pastoralists.26 
Although Ovamboland’s inhabitants rebuilt their cattle herds, they did not 
regain access to global markets. In an undated 1920s or 1930s document, Native 
Commissioner Hahn stated that the inhabitants of Ovamboland had sufficient 
land and cattle to be “practically self-supporting” but that they had no markets 
outside the Ovamboland reserve. As a consequence, Hahn argued, Ovambo-
land’s cattle owners saw no need to improve their livestock-raising methods 
which had remained stagnant for the last 150 years.27 In Hahn’s estimation, in 
the absence of markets, cattle were at best a source of subsistence. Given 
Hahn’s three decades as Native Commissioner and his prominence as an ethno-
grapher and the leading contemporary authority on the Ovambo and Ovambo-
land,28 it is no wonder that some of Hahn’s pre-World War II sentiments were 
echoed as late as the late 1980s (including the statement quoted at the beginning 
of this chapter). 
Although Hahn viewed livestock management in Ovamboland as primitive, 
he disagreed that the Native Reserve was overstocked in the 1920s and 1930s. 
He acknowledged that a certain degree of environmental deterioration was 
occurring, but he believed that any current or future grazing pressure in Ovam-
boland could easily be relieved by developing water resources in the unin-
habited areas surrounding the floodplain. He maintained his optimism even as 
his Portuguese counterparts increasingly obstructed Ovamboland’s inhabitants’ 
access to Angola’s dry season cattle pastures north of the border. Hahn identi-
fied the physical absence of a cattle market as a potential source for overgrazing 
rather than any cultural inhibitions against selling cattle, as would be the case in 
the cattle complex model.29 
Whereas Hahn encouraged the import of Angolan and Namibian cattle into 
Ovamboland and turned a blind eye to the export of cattle and cattle products 
from Ovamboland to Angola, he kept colonial Namibia strictly off limits to 
cattle and cattle products from the Native Reserve. No cattle from Ovamboland 
                                                 
26  Aperçue historique: Chronique des missions confieés à la Congrégation du Saint 
Esprit, p. 285; and AGCSSp 485-A-III, “Cubango-Angola: Reprise de la Mission du 
Cuanyama [1923?]”. 
27  NAN, A450, 10, “Agriculture”. 
28  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 85, 102, 109, 118-120, and Hayes, “‘Cocky’ Hahn 
and the ‘Black Venus’”. 
29  NAN, A450, 12, South West Africa Commission, Minutes of Evidence, vol. 12, 
Ukualuthi, 13 Aug. 1935, Evidence Hahn, and vol. 10, Agriculture”; Kreike, Re-
creating Eden, pp. 129-176. 
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were allowed to enter either Namibia’s white settler areas to the south (the 
Police Zone), or the Native Reserves to the west (the Kaokoveld) from the late 
1920s onward and to the east (the Okavango) from the late 1930s onward.30 
Even as Hahn cited the prevalence of lungsickness as a pretext for prohibit-
ing the export of cattle, he believed that Ovambo cattle largely were resistant to 
the disease and he therefore settled for isolating Ovamboland’s cattle.31 As has 
been noted above, however, in the early 1940s Hahn appears to have been 
changing his mind about the environmental impact of livestock, at least in 
private. In what appears to be a draft of his 1942 annual report for Ovamboland, 
he wrote that ‘overstocking’ was increasingly obvious.32  
Overstocking and biological time bombs 
Following Hahn’s retirement in 1946, the idea that Ovamboland was over-
stocked quickly gained currency. Increased conflicts over access to water and 
grazing for cattle during the last years of Hahn’s tenure added to concerns about 
the environmental impact of livestock, and ‘overstocking’ became a central 
theme in colonial reports during the 1950s.33 A 1952 report concluded that the 
large Oukwanyama district of Ovamboland was overstocked, and the 1953 
annual health report for Ovamboland noted that “the overgrazing of areas 
denuded of trees, will amongst other things interfere with the water supply and 
multiply the danger of fly and tick borne diseases”.34 
Ovambo cattle were not only depicted as a disease time bomb, but were also 
re-imagined as a neo-Malthusian overpopulation and environmental time bomb. 
Colonial statistics were marshaled to demonstrate that between 1925 and 1975, 
the cattle population had increased by a factor of nine, from 60,000 to 530,000 
animals. The figures are guesstimates, although the 1960s and 1970s data are 
more reliable because they are based on the actual numbers of vaccinated 
                                                 
30  NAN, NAO 18-20, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Nov. 1926, Nov.-Dec. 1936 and 
May 1940; AGR 25, Senior Veterinary Surgeon to Sec. SWA, Windhoek, 13 Nov. 
1941; NAO 11, O/C NAO to NCO, 19 Sep. 1939. On export to Angola, see A450, 
10, “Agriculture”, and NAO 58, Director of Agriculture to Secretary SWA, 24 Dec. 
1946. 
31  NAN, NAO 18 and 20, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Nov. 1926, May 1939, and 
Annual Report Ovamboland 1929. 
32  NAN, A450, 10, [Ms., 1942?]. 
33  NAN, A450, 7, Annual Reports Ovamboland 1941 and 1943; BAC 133, Agricul-
tural Officer to NCO, Report of travel to the northwestern part of Ovamboland, 20-
22 June 1956, Ondangwa, 4 July 1956 and Agricultural Report Ovamboland, 1956-
1957. 
34  NAN, NAO 60, Quarterly Report Ovamboland Oct.-Dec. 1952, and NAO 65, An-
nual Health Report Ovamboland 1953. 
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animals. Overall, the figures suggest a steady increase of Ovamboland’s cattle 
population from its 1915 low to the mid-1980s, followed by a sharp decline.35 
Upon Hahn’s retirement, a senior agricultural expert conducted a survey of 
the agricultural potential in Ovamboland. Unlike Hahn, the expert was totally 
unimpressed by Ovamboland’s indigenous cattle: “The average Ovambo large 
stock are the poorest grown animals I have ever seen and are a fine example of 
what toll nature will exact for poor grazing, uncontrolled inbreeding, non-
selection and internal parasitic infection”. The scientist thought that Ovambo-
land’s cattle breed was of such poor quality and size that it was impossible to 
improve it through crossbreeding with Afrikander bulls.36 
Hahn’s successor as Native Commissioner for Ovamboland, Harold Eedes, 
concurred but was determined to tear the reserve from the grip of the forces of 
Nature. He scorned the idea that Ovamboland’s pastoralist and agricultural 
sector could be developed before livestock diseases were eradicated. In 1949, 
Eedes publicly dismissed a report with recommendations from a senior South 
African agricultural expert who had toured Ovamboland before it had even been 
published. Eedes commented: “As long as these Native areas remain ‘closed 
areas’ with several cattle diseases such as Lungsickness, etc. etc., it does not 
seem to me that any useful purpose will be served by attempting the improve-
ment of native-owned stock”.37 
Eedes had led a 1938 inoculation campaign that successfully eradicated 
lungsickness in the Okavango Native Reserve, and he was determined to repli-
cate his success in Ovamboland. By the 1950s, however, increasingly frustrated 
in his efforts, Eedes had recast indigenous Ovambo cattle from a subsistence 
asset into a dangerous and contagious liability. After alleged outbreaks of foot 
and mouth disease in the late 1940s, his administration created the Red Line, a 
veterinary cordon between Ovamboland and the remainder of Namibia to its 
south.38 
Eedes’ measures intersected with 1940s and 1950s Portuguese attempts to 
create an indigenous cattle-breeding industry in south-central Angola, which led 
to large-scale cattle vaccination projects. Cattle epidemics in the 1940s and 
1950s on both sides of the border consolidated an image of Ovambo cattle as a 
                                                 
35  Kreike, “Architects of Nature”, pp. 111-113. 
36  NAN, NAO 101, Senior Agricultural Officer Natives, Agricultural Survey Ovambo-
land, Windhoek, 26 Oct. 1947. 
37  NAN, NAO 60, Quarterly Report Ovamboland, July-Sep. 1949. 
38  NAN, NAO 15, Veterinary Officer to Director Agriculture, Investigation: Foot and 
Mouth Disease, Jan. 18, 1946; NAO 106, Diary NCO 1949-1954, entry 13 Feb. 1950; 
OVA 49, Chief Agricultural Officer to Director Agriculture, Ondangwa, 25 June 
1969. 
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source of disease and an obstacle to development, resulting in further con-
straints on cattle movements across the Angolan-Namibian border.39 
While most colonial experts and officials highlighted the ‘explosive’ in-
crease in cattle numbers as Nature run amuck, other colonial sources paradox-
ically stressed that the high annual local livestock take-off due to consumption, 
disease and drought posed severe limits to growth.40 Reports on beef con-
sumption estimated that between 1966 and 1975 approximately 20-30% of the 
total herd was slaughtered annually. For every five head of cattle that Ovambo 
households ‘disposed of’, roughly one head was consumed by the household 
and four were sold.41 
Households that slaughtered cattle consumed part of the meat and sold or 
dried the remainder, and cattle and beef were widely traded, even across the 
Angolan border. In 1956, fourteen more or less formal ‘native’ butcheries ope-
rated in the Oukwanyama subdistrict of Ovamboland alone.42 In 1942 (a year of 
severe drought), a live ox cost eight pounds sterling (sixteen rand) while in 
1954, official prices in the Union of South Africa for a good quality head of 
Ovambo cattle varied from two to seven pounds (four to fourteen rand). Cattle 
and beef readily were exchanged for the staples millet and sorghum.43 Cattle 
hides were also sold. During drought years in the 1940s and 1950s, cattle 
owners from Ovamboland annually smuggled 5-10,000 tanned hides to Portu-
guese traders across the border, receiving one pound sterling apiece. Although 
                                                 
39  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 171-176. See also chapter 3. 
40  NAN, AHE (BAC) 1/352, Annual Reports Agriculture Oukwanyama 1964 and 
1968; OVA 49, Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Village Planning, 2 Sep. 1970; 
OVA 9, Statistics 1967, appendix to Director-in-Chief Economic Affairs to Director 
Agriculture, Ondangwa, 25 March 1969, and Director Agriculture to Director-Gene-
ral Cooperation Pretoria, [Ondangwa], 5 May 1981; OVA 61, Monthly Reports 
Agricultural Officer: Andreus Ndeitwa, Aug. 1976; OVA 6, Annual Report Agricul-
ture Owambo, 1979-1980. On the ‘backwardness’ of Ovambo cattle management, 
see AHE (BAC) 1/346, Chief Bantu Commissioner SWA to Principal Agricultural 
College Arabie, Transvaal, Windhoek, 13 July 1965. 
41  Kreike, “Architects of Nature”, p. 114. 
42  NAN, BAC 133, Agricultural Report Ovamboland, 1955-1956. 
43  NAN, NAO 98, ANC to NCO, Oshikango, 11 June 1947, and statement Mululu 
Kalongela, Ondangwa, 12 May 1948; NAO 64, Minutes of Ukwanyama Tribal 
Meeting [12 July 1954]; AGR 897, statement Elizabeth Ikau, 27 Nov. 1961; BAC 
133, Agricultural Report Ovamboland, 1955-1956. For other examples of the 
exchangeability of cattle and grains, see NAO 98, ANC to NCO, Oshikango, 11 June 
1947, and statement Mululu Kalongela, Ondangwa, 12 May 1948; A450, 23 D4 
(1924) and 24 D19. 
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formally prohibited, the export of cattle hides to southern Angola continued 
until at least the early 1970s.44 
The sale of cattle and cattle products was not the only factor that limited 
cattle population growth. Estimated losses due to drought and disease were 30% 
in 1941, 5% (12,500 head) in 1945-1946, and 10% (40,000 head) in 1979-
1980.45 With annual consumption levels as high as 20-30%, combined with 
years with disease- and drought-induced losses of up to 5-30%, it seems re-
markable that there would be any livestock left at all, let alone that there would 
be any increase. As is the case with the statistics for the actual number of cattle, 
however, these figures are estimates. More important is that the consumption, 
sale and loss numbers overlapped because the owners consumed the meat of 
perished livestock and sold the hides. In addition, cattle owners routinely 
slaughtered drought- or disease-weakened animals.46 
Still, the figures demonstrate that at the very least, some colonial officials 
had the impression that cattle and cattle products were important consumption 
and trade goods within Ovamboland and across the Angolan border. In other 
words, cattle retained a substantial level of commodification locally, despite 
having been decommodified at the level of the formal colonial and international 
markets after the imposition of colonial rule in 1915.47  
 
 
                                                 
44  NAN, BAC 133, Agricultural Reports Ovamboland, 1955-1956 and 1956-1957; 
NAO 27, NCO to Sec. SWA, Ondangwa, 15 Nov. 1941; NAO 103, Censuses of 
Agriculture Ovamboland, 1945-1946 and 1949-1950; NAO 70, statement Nehala 
Nangoro, Oshikango, 23 Dec. 1948; NAO 64, Minutes of Ukwanyama Tribal Meeting 
[12 July 1954]; BAC 122, Famine Relief Schemes, Chief Bantu Commissioner to 
Minister for Bantu Administration, Windhoek, 26 June 1959; BAC 44, minutes 
meetings, Ombalantu, 15 June 1960 and Onkolonkathi, 16 June 1960; OVA 50, Mi-
nutes Ukuanyama Tribal Government Meeting, 7 Dec. 1971. 
45  NAN, BAC 133, Agricultural Reports Ovamboland, 1955-1956 and 1956-1957; 
NAO 103, Census of Agriculture Ovamboland, 1945-1946, and NCO to Sec. SWA, 
Windhoek, 8 March 1946; BOS f. “Oshikango”, Agricultural Officer Ovamboland to 
Native Commissioners Ondangwa and Oshikango, [Ondangwa], 17 Aug. 1956; 
OVA 6, Annual Report Agriculture Owambo, 1979-1980; A450, 7, Annual Report 
Ovamboland 1941. 
46  On eating dead cattle, see NAN, NAO 60, Quarterly Reports Ovamboland, Jan.-
March 1948, Jan.-June 1949, Jan.-March 1951, Jan.-March 1954; NAO 59, Kaibi 
Mundjele to NCO, Ombalantu, 2 May 1950; NAO 37, Annual Health Report Ovam-
boland 1937; NAO 20, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, March-April 1940; NAO 62, 
Agricultural Report Ovamboland 1953. 
47  In western Kenya similar local cattle markets operated below the colonial radar 
screen, see Cohen and Atieno Odhiambo, Siaya, pp. 76-81. 
 NATURALIZING CATTLE CULTURE  
 
137
Colonial barriers: Conservation and fences 
In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, vaccinations and fences became the primary 
mechanisms for containing Ovamboland’s presumed livestock problem. The 
objectives were to conserve Ovamboland’s environment and to protect from 
contamination the livestock in the white settler farming areas to the south of 
Ovamboland, in Angola and in neighboring Kaokoland and Okavango, and to 
protect the wildlife in Etosha Park. Considerations of scientific management 
thus legitimized and institutionalized the idea of confining Ovamboland’s cattle 
resources to an increasingly smaller space, inhibiting the cattle’s mobility and 
access to dry season cattle posts and perpetuating the animals’ decommodifica-
tion in any markets outside of the reserve. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the colonial administration erected fences along the 
Angolan border, the western Kaokoland border and the Red Line to the south of 
Ovamboland in order to contain diseases and to prevent the re-infection of 
vaccinated animals by unvaccinated livestock and wild animals. Most of the 
Etosha Park boundary with Ovamboland proper was fenced between 1971 and 
1974. Although the fences proved to be far from ‘cattle-proof’ or ‘game-proof’, 
they seriously hampered seasonal animal movements.48 The impact of colonial 
fencing on livestock management in Ovamboland was dramatic because it cut 
herdsmen and herds off from some of the most important dry season forages 
beyond the Ovambo floodplain. The fences changed the transhumance system 
and the population’s access to cattle and cattle products. 
Transhumance treks became longer during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, even 
before the fences were erected, for at least two reasons. First, Portuguese offi-
cials often interfered with herders who engaged in cross-border transhumance to 
the cattle posts along the Kunene and Kavango rivers and in Oshimolo. After 
the delimitation of the Angolan-Namibian colonial boundary, however, herds-
men from the villages south of the border continued to take their animals across 
the border to cattle posts along the Kunene River and to Oshimolo. Second, the 
expanding village landscapes of Ovamboland encroached on the uninhabited 
wilderness of the middle floodplain and beyond, including in areas that former-
                                                 
48  NAN, AGR 125, Director Agriculture to Director Veterinary Services Pretoria, [On-
dangwa], 27 Aug. 1959; BOS, “District Record Book Oshikango”, 1965; AGR 897, 
Director of Agriculture to Cattle Inspector Oshikango, [Ondangwa], 8 Nov. 1961, 
and to Secretary SWA, [Ondangwa], 13 Jan. 1961; BAC 40, Director Agriculture to 
Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Windhoek, 15 March 1963; AGR 95, Veterinary 
Inspector to Director Agriculture Windhoek, Omafo, 15 May 1963; AHE (BAC) 
332, State Veterinarian to Director Agriculture, Ondangwa, 23 Sep. 1966; AGR 298, 
memo Director Veterinary Services to Secretary OTC, 19 May 1968 and Director 
Agriculture to Administrator SWA, 1 Nov. 1968; OVA 56, Chief Bantu Commis-
sioner SWA to Chief Director Ovamboland, 18 Dec. 1968, appendices I-II. 
 CHAPTER 6 
 
138 
ly had been sites for cattle posts. As a consequence, cattle were kept away from 
the villages for increasing periods, and critical cattle products (manure, dairy 
products and meat) were less readily available. By the mid-1950s and 1960s, a 
household’s cattle often remained at remote cattle posts during the entire dry 
season.49 In August 1966, livestock kept near villages reportedly was losing 
“condition” while livestock in the less densely inhabited areas remained in good 
“condition”.50 Herding the cattle back to the villages after the rainy season 
began was a top priority even in the face of veterinary restrictions. In early 
1967, for example, temporary veterinary cordons along the Angolan-Namibian 
border to contain an outbreak of cattle diseases proved impossible to maintain 
because owners persevered in bringing their cattle back from the Angolan cattle 
posts to their Namibian homesteads.51 
Before the 1960s, Ovamboland’s cattle itself were identified as a severe 
obstacle to pastoral development because they were considered to be a poor, 
disease-ridden species. But new research in the late 1960s and 1970s demon-
strated that the region’s indigenous cattle were so well adapted to the extreme 
environmental conditions there that they were potentially more efficient repro-
ducers and beef producers than any other breed. In addition, the research sug-
gested that selective breeding had the potential to further improve the breed.52 
When the administration’s measures to enhance veterinary services and propa-
gate modern cattle management techniques faltered in the 1970s and 1980s, 
however, colonial officials and experts even more explicitly than previously 
blamed the failure on the ‘primitive’ nature of Ovamboland’s cattle holders, 
claiming that the latter simply refused to cooperate with the administration’s 
selective breeding and grazing rotation programs, or to offer their animals for 
sale at the new Development Corporation’s meat-processing plant at Oshakati. 
Indeed, between its opening in 1976 and 1981, the Oshakati plant purchased 
                                                 
49  NAN, BAC 133, Agricultural Report Ovamboland 1955-1956; BAC 132, Trust 
Farming Projects, Agriculture Officer to Bantu Commissioner, Grootfontein, 1 Feb. 
1962, Monthly Report for Jan. 1962; Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chap. 8. 
50  NAN, AHE 1/351, Report of Activities Agriculture Ovamboland, July-Sep. 1966 
and monthly report Aug. 1966. 
51  NAN, AGR 47, Director Agriculture to Director Animal Research Institute Pir-
bright, England, n.p., 23 Feb. 1967. 
52  NAN, AGR 538, Director Agriculture to Bishop of Damaraland, Windhoek, 26 May 
1961; OVA 40, Ovambo Government, Verhoging van die Beesvleis produksie in 
Ovambo deur seleksie en teling, 5 Aug. 1971; OVA 26, H. Hamburger, C.W.B. 
Armstrong and J. Swanepoel, “Adaptability and Reproductive Efficiency: The Value of 
Indigenous Sanga Cattle in the National States of South Africa and Namibia”, Republic 
of South Africa: Department of Co-operation and Development [1979 or 1980?]. 
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over 50,000 head of cattle, but only 500 came from Ovamboland’s cattle 
holders, who were the intended suppliers. White ranchers supplied the bulk.53 
Given the circumstances, it is somewhat unsurprising that a 1986 report 
phrased the challenges to the development of colonial Namibia’s livestock 
sector in terms of a cattle complex: “In traditional areas cattle are considered to 
be a cultural asset of the community and as such it is difficult or even im-
possible to exploit cattle farming commercially”.54 Keith Morrow, the author of 
the 1988 report that opened this chapter, however, blamed the policies of 
colonial Namibia’s Department of Agriculture as well as the ‘primitive’ atti-
tudes of Ovamboland’s inhabitants. For example, on the one hand, Morrow 
chided the parastatal Development Corporation for offering below-market 
prices to its potential Ovambo sellers; on the other hand, he attributed over-
grazing in Ovamboland to the drive to maximize cattle numbers to enhance 
individuals’ social status.55  
Grazing pressure and desertification 
The concept of carrying capacity is based on the presumption that capacity to 
sustain (‘carry’) livestock of any given amount of land has natural limits, an 
idea that is expressed in terms of how many hectares are required to sustain a 
single head of livestock. Colonial research during the 1970s concluded that 
western Ovamboland could support 1 Cattle Unit (CU), i.e. one head of cattle, 
per 12 ha. Central and eastern Ovamboland had a carrying capacity of only one 
CU per 16 ha. Actual grazing pressure in central Ovamboland, however, was 
thought to be as high as one CU per 3.5 to 5 ha, four times the carrying 
capacity. In 1974, the carrying capacity of Ovamboland as a whole was set at 
463,941 CU, but the total livestock population was 564,135 CU. In 1977, based 
on a 1975 count, Ovamboland’s 5,567,400 ha were thought to support 660,704 
CU, giving a stocking rate of one CU per 8.14 ha instead of the optimal one CU 
                                                 
53  NAN, AHE (BAC) 1/352, Annual Report Agriculture Oukwanyama for 1964 and 
Annual Report for Agriculture Ovamboland for 1968; AHE (BAC) 1/346, Chief 
Bantu Commissioner SWA to Principal Agricultural College Arabie, Marble Hall, 
Transvaal, Windhoek, 13 July 1965, and Travel Report Chief Agricultural Officer, 
April 25-27 1966; AHE (BAC) 332, State Veterinarian to Director Agriculture, On-
dangwa, 23 Sep. 1966; OVA 49, Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Village Plan-
ning and Development and Agricultural Planning of the Planning and Coordinating 
Committee on 2 Sep. 1970; OVA 40, Gresse to Director Agriculture, Ondangwa, 30 
March 1971 and travel report 8-12 March 1971; OVA 9, Director Agriculture to 
Director-General Cooperation and Development Pretoria, [Ondangwa], 5 May 1981. 
54  Proposed Agricultural Strategy for SWA/Namibia, Aug. 1986. 
55  [Keith Morrow], A Framework for the Long Term Development of Agriculture 
within Owambo (Aug. 1989). 
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per 12-16 ha derived from the research mentioned above.56 As a result, 
desertification was thought to be imminent. According to one report, “The soil 
destruction (…) in the densely populated parts of Ovamboland is shocking and 
if this degradation is not halted soon, it can not be prevented that large parts of 
the area [Ovamboland] will be transformed in a unhospitable desert”.57 Conse-
quently, during the early 1970s, colonial extension workers strongly urged live-
stock owners to take action against overstocking and overgrazing by adopting 
modern management practices, including grazing rotations and selective cattle 
breeding.58 
However, the assessment of severe overstocking and the conclusions derived 
from that analysis are problematic at best. Estimates of the carrying capacity of 
Ovamboland varied considerably. For example, although in the early 1970s the 
acceptable carrying capacity for Ovamboland was set at one CU per 12-16 ha, a 
mid-1980s assessment set it much lower at one CU per 8-10 ha, allowing for a 
much higher livestock population.59 The very concept of carrying capacity is in 
itself controversial.60 Moreover, presumptions about the grazing impact for 
South Africa and colonial Namibia were based on trials with Afrikaner and 
exotic cattle. The indigenous Sanga cattle, despite their lower body mass, were 
not differentiated from such heavier cattle breeds as Afrikaner. Yet, an overall 
10 to 20% lower body mass for Sanga cattle should result in a correspondingly 
lower environmental impact. Of the 560,000 CU in the previously mentioned 
report, 488,000 consisted of cattle and 72,000 of other stock.61 Based on a 
                                                 
56  NAN, OVA 26, Sec. Agriculture to Sec. Bantu Administration Pretoria, Ondangwa, 
10 March 1977. 
57  NAN, BAC 133, Agricultural Report Ovamboland 1955-1956; OVA 57, Dr. H.A. 
Lueckhoff, report on a visit to South West Africa, 3-15 Nov. 1969, appendix to 
Regional Forester to Director-in-Chief Bantu Administration Pretoria, Grootfontein, 
3 April 1970; OVA 56, Sec. Bantu Administration to Director Agriculture Ondan-
gwa, Pretoria, 11 June 1971; OVA 46, Director Agriculture to Sec. Bantu Affairs 
Pretoria, Ondangwa, 17 Nov. 1971; OVA 45, Sec. Agriculture to Foreign Affairs 
Pretoria, Ondangwa, 16 Jan. 1974. 
58  See, for example, NAN, OVA 61, Agricultural Officer Moses Nadjebo, Monthly 
Reports 1971. 
59  See Proposed Agricultural Strategy for SWA/Namibia, Aug. 1986. 
60  Sanford, Management of Pastoral Development in the Third World, pp. 104-105; 
Little, “Rethinking Interdisciplinary Paradigms and the Political Ecology of Pasto-
ralism in East Africa”, and Munro, “Ecological ‘Crisis’ and Resource Management 
Policy in Zimbabwe’s Communal Lands”. 
61  NAN, OVA 45, Sec. Agriculture to Foreign Affairs Pretoria, Ondangwa, 16 Jan. 
1974; OVA 26, H. Hamburger, C.W.B. Amstrong and J. Swanepoel, “Adaptability 
and Reproductive Efficiency: The Value of Indigenous Sanga Cattle in the National 
States of South Africa and Namibia”, RSA, Department of Co-operation [c. 1979]; 
OVA 55, le Roux, “A Progress Report on Indigenous Cattle in SWA”, 20 June [c. 
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Sanga-adjusted 0.8 CU, for example, the CU aggregate comes to 468,000, 
which is very close to the 1974 figure for Ovamboland’s carrying capacity of 
463,941 CU. Thus the colonial carrying capacity data offer little or nothing to 
support the assertion that overgrazing was a major cause of environmental de-
gradation before the mid-1970s. Moreover, during the 1980s, the cattle popula-
tion of Ovamboland declined.  
Livestock and deforestation 
In the 1970s and 1980s, foresters and other experts perceived the relationship 
between livestock and ‘forest’ in Africa in negative linear terms: increased 
livestock numbers caused increased deforestation.62 In Ovamboland as in other 
semi-arid and arid environments across the globe, woody vegetation was and 
continues to be an important dry season source of browse for cattle and other 
livestock.63 Towards the end of the dry season, as the vegetation dries, the 
grasses’ nutritional quality rapidly drops. In Southern African parlance, the 
grasses turn ‘sour’. Browse from trees and bush, including mopane leaves, re-
mains easier to digest and loses mineral content much more slowly.64 Moreover, 
trees and bushes turn green before grasses and herbs at the turn from the dry to 
the rainy season.65 
Foresters feared that livestock browsing on trees in north-central Namibia 
would result in deforestation and soil degradation.66 Yet, evidence of livestock-
induced environmental degradation is hard to pinpoint. First, north-central 
                                                                                                                       
1980]; BOS f. “Oshikango”, Agricultural Officer Ovamboland to Native Commis-
sioners Ondangwa and Oshikango, [Ondangwa], 17 Aug. 1956. A 1972 report 
specified that the CU standard was based on a head of cattle of 800 lb., see AGR 
541, Director [Nature Conservation?] SWA to Sec. Agriculture, Technical Service 
Pretoria, n.p., 16 Oct. 1972. 
62  Le Houérou, The Grazing Land Ecosystems of the African Sahel, pp. 90-128; H. 
Gillet, “Observations on the Causes of Devastation of Ligenous Plants in the Sahel 
and Their Resistance to Destruction”, in Le Houérou, Browse in Africa, pp. 127-129; 
Westoby, Introduction to World Forestry, pp. 172-173. 
63  See Le Houérou, Browse in Africa, p. 3, and the contributions there by Walker, “A 
Review of Browse and Its Role in Livestock Production in Southern Africa”, p. 12; 
McKell, “Multiple Use of Fodder Trees and Shrubs”; and Le Houérou, “The Role of 
Browse in the Management of Natural Grazing Lands” 
64  This aspect is discussed in more detail in Kreike, “De-Globalization and Deforest-
ation in Colonial Africa”. 
65  Personal observations, 1991-1993, and Walker, “A Review of Browse and Its Role 
in Livestock Production in Southern Africa”, p. 16, table 9. For West Africa, see Le 
Houérou, The Grazing Land Ecosystems of the African Sahel, pp. 49-50, 82. 
66  NAN, OVA 57, Le Roux to Sec. Agriculture, Supply Inventory: Indigenous Forests 
Ovamboland, Ondangwa, 5 Nov. 1976. 
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Namibia today is not a treeless desert; far from it. Moreover, two indicators of 
degradation caused by overgrazing that are widely used are rarely employed in 
the case of Ovamboland. For example, while bush encroachment has not been 
identified as an issue in Ovamboland, it is cited as a major problem in the white 
settler ranching areas to the south as well as in the former Native Reserves in 
Namibia and South Africa. In addition, veterinary officials identified poisonous 
plants as being a problem in Ovamboland. The mere presence of such plants, 
however, is an unreliable proxy for overgrazing because even if the plants truly 
were nefarious invaders, herdsmen can prevent livestock from eating them and 
the animals apparently learn to avoid them. An increase in the incidence of plant 
poisoning is thus a poor indicator of vegetation degradation because it may 
result from a decline in the quality of herd management as opposed to stemming 
from overgrazing per se. This was clearly the case in Ovamboland as the 
demand for migrant labor shifted the burden of herding cattle in the villages and 
cattle posts to increasingly younger and less-experienced boys.67  
Commodification, deglobalization and deforestation 
South African colonial officials’ and experts’ concern that the explosive growth 
of the cattle population in Ovamboland would set the territory on a destructive 
course towards overgrazing, deforestation and desertification predates World 
War II. Yet, despite a surge in cattle population beginning in the early 1920s, by 
1990, north-central Namibia was neither a treeless desert, nor bush-encroached, 
nor was it overrun by poisonous plants. Moreover, even if colonial cattle statis-
tics are compared with the colonial concept of carrying capacity to quantify the 
environmental impact of Ovamboland’s cattle, the outcome is ambiguous, and it 
certainly does not support the conclusion of dramatic overstocking.  
Paradigms of environmental change that are derived from a Nature-Culture 
dichotomy typically use as their point of departure a local, precolonial, state-of-
Nature subsistence economy that is threatened by an invasive colonial global 
market economy. But the 1890-1990 history of Ovamboland inverts (and 
subverts) the Nature-to-Culture narrative. The region’s cattle were a global 
commodity before colonial conquest in 1915, and colonial rule transformed the 
region’s cattle from a global commodity into a local subsistence resource, 
although colonialism typically is regarded as an agent of market capitalism. 
Moreover, no global market-driven overexploitation of the region’s indigenous 
cattle resources followed in the wake of colonial occupation as might have been 
theorized by a Marxist-inspired declinist model. While the colonial-era recovery 
                                                 
67  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, pp. 155-176; NAN, NAO 59, Dr. Zschokke, Survey of 
Cattle Diseases in Ovamboland: Oct. 1948, 5 Nov. 1948, and OVA 6, Annual Report 
Veterinary Service Owambo 1975-1976. 
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of the cattle herds raised fears about a neo-Malthusian cattle population and 
disease time bomb, the specter of an imminent environmental catastrophe was 
exaggerated.  
Ultimately, colonial officials and experts did not attribute the rapid increase 
in cattle numbers to the prohibition against exporting cattle or to the intro-
duction of modern health and management practices, which purportedly reduced 
mortality and caused the neo-Malthusian trap. Instead, they singled out the 
persistence of ‘primitive’ (precolonial) cattle management practices in 
Ovamboland: ‘primitive’ pastoralism was identified as the reason that cattle 
holders resisted, for example, veterinary programs to eradicate cattle diseases. 
By extension, ‘primitive’ pastoralism consequently forced the colonial admini-
stration to impose the Red Line and to prohibit the export of cattle from the 
reserve. Except for a short period in the 1980s, from 1890 to Namibian in-
dependence in 1990 South African colonial officials and experts on the ground 
did not invoke the classic cattle complex explanation that local cattle owners 
were resistant to marketing cattle. Rather, they formulated the more general 
argument that Ovamboland’s cattle holders resisted modern scientific improve-
ments because they were unwilling or unable to embrace the colonial techno-
logy that would help them to overcome the local environmental limits that were 
imposed by Nature.  
Was the Ovamboland case unique? It seems unlikely. Cattle were a major 
export across the subcontinent before the consolidation of colonial rule. Lung-
sickness, rinderpest and war decimated cattle herds, causing crisis and famine 
throughout late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Africa. Young men 
across the continent invested migrant labor wages in rebuilding the herds, even 
as colonial rule closed export markets. In the name of conservation and devel-
opment, colonial governments in southern Africa imposed veterinary and other 
measures that restricted the movement of cattle and the ways in which people 
could manage and use them. Except in Botswana, indigenous cattle breeders 
remain cut off from global markets. Colonialism, therefore, neither unambi-
guously promoted a market economy transition from Nature to Culture, nor was 
colonialism an unequivocal harbinger of economic globalization and its at-
tendant environmental consequences. 
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The Palenque paradox:  
Beyond Nature-to-Culture 
The urban environment is often seen as the consummate cultural landscape, and 
a polar opposite of pristine Nature or wilderness. Aboriginal people such as, for 
example, the ‘bushmen’ or San of southern Africa frequently are viewed as 
indicators of unspoiled wilderness and their lifestyles are considered to be the 
antithesis of Western urbanism.1 But the wilderness expanses of Central Ame-
rica, Africa and Asia contain the ruins of a large number of ‘lost’ cities.2 The 
San and their environments similarly may have not been as ‘wild’ as sometimes 
has been assumed. At the same time that European travelers uncovered Palen-
que and Great Zimbabwe, the San of southwestern Africa engaged in activities 
that seemed in sharp contradiction to the behavior expected of archetypical 
nomadic Stone Age hunters and gatherers. Armed with the latest firearms tech-
nology, they engaged in commercial hunting; they were involved in mining 
copper and iron; and they lived in permanent villages. Within the reigning 
                                                 
1  A good example of the popular image of simple ‘Stone Age’ life of ‘Bushmen’ and 
its juxtaposition with modern urban life is the film The Gods Must Be Crazy. Sahlins 
stresses that San/Bushmen and other similar communities rejected the “Neolithic 
revolution”, in Stone Age Economics, p. 27. See also Lee, “What Hunters Do for a 
Living”. 
2  For the ‘discovery’ of stone structures in Central America and Africa in particular, 
see, for example, Stuart and Stuart, Lost Kingdoms of the Maya, and Venning, 
“Notes on Southern Rhodesian Ruins in Victoria District”. On Asia, see below, note 
4. 
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paradigms of environmental change premised on a Nature-Culture dichotomy, 
the presence of urban ruins in the jungles and plains of Central America and 
Africa, and the degree to which San society was in fact embedded in Culture 
rather than Nature, are problematic. At the very least, these phenomena consti-
tute a paradox.3  
Bush cities and the bush 
The ‘jungles’ or ‘bush’ of Central America, Southeast Asia and Africa are not 
only treasure troves of biodiversity, but also are home to some of the most 
impressive remnants of urban civilizations, including Palenque in Mexico, 
Angkor Wat in Cambodia and Great Zimbabwe in Zimbabwe.4 Such national 
parks and reserves as South Africa’s Kruger Park serve as the last sanctuaries of 
an African Eden. But conservation areas seldom contain pristine Nature. Many 
if not all of Africa’s national parks and reserves were converted into ‘wilder-
ness’ by forcibly removing the local populations and prohibiting them access to 
the local resources.5 This phenomenon was not confined to Africa: clearing out 
populations and denying them access to forest reserves and other conservation 
areas in Asia especially has been marked by fierce resistance, frequently making 
conservation at best precarious.6 
Evidence of the cultural landscapes in what at present is defended as the last 
relics of pristine Nature is paradoxical: how can the site of the historical city of 
Palenque be pristine Nature? Two conceptions have somewhat eased the 
tension. One is the idea that premodern societies somehow ‘lived by Nature’, 
that they were sustained within the bounds and limits of their natural environ-
ment. This idea is expressed most explicitly in the literature about Native 
                                                 
3  For the classic study on the history of the concept of wilderness, see Nash, Wilder-
ness in the American Mind. Cronon rejects what he calls the human-natural and 
urban-rural dichotomies and White points to the ‘blurring’ of the wild-domesticated 
dichotomy. See Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, pp. 17-19; and White, The Organic 
Machine, pp. 105-109. Merchant criticizes both the progressive (here: moderniza-
tion) and declinist paradigms as linear and unidirectional, in Reinventing Eden, pp. 
4, 6, 215. See also Pimentel, Westra and Noss, Ecological Integrity, pp. 7-8; and 
Huxley, Tropical Agroforestry, p. 301. 
4  On Great Zimbabwe, see Hall, The Changing Past, pp. 91-116; and Beach, The 
Shona and Zimbabwe, pp. 1-52. On Palenque, Stuart and Stuart, Lost Kingdoms of 
the Maya, pp. 19, 31, and Perera and Bruce, The Last Lords of Palenque, pp. 10-26. 
On Angkor Wat, see Audric, Angkor Wat and the Khmer Empire, and Chandler, A 
History of Cambodia. 
5  See Carruthers, The Kruger Park; Stevinson-Hamilton, South African Eden; and de 
Villiers, Land Claims and National. For East Africa, see Neumann, Imposing 
Wilderness. 
6  Guha, The Unquiet Woods, and Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People. 
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Americans, the San, the Batwa (‘pygmies’) and other ‘aboriginal’ hunters and 
gatherers.7 On the other hand, however, indigenous settled agricultural societies 
are sometimes perceived as being environmentally destructive: theories about 
the decline of Central American urban societies, for example, attribute their de-
mise to environmental overexploitation.8 
The second conception is much more implicit. Urban vestiges in ‘Wild’ 
Africa and the ‘rainforests’ of Central America are depicted as though they are 
entirely isolated from the surrounding natural ecosystems. The most dramatic 
image is the view that greets visitors to Palenque: the white stone buildings 
contrast sharply with the towering green jungle that envelops them. The ruins 
seem an anomaly, vulnerable even, their frailty punctuated by machete-wielding 
crews of men who engage in an endless battle to keep the wilderness at bay. The 
human corruption of Nature thus seems quarantined. In addition, an archae-
ological bias towards the spectacular and the monumental led to a disregard for 
the mundane, including details of the daily functioning of residential sites and 
due appreciation for the size of the population.9 Another bias that prevented 
recognizing (sub)tropical large-scale societies as ‘urban’ stemmed from their 
striking climatic, geographical and demographic traits as compared to societies 
in the temperate zones. Precolonial urban centers in the (sub)tropics often were 
subject to a climate with a sharp dry-rainy season variability. They also tended 
not to be located along major (permanent) rivers, and settlement may have been 
less concentrated than in temperate zones.10 
In Nature’s Metropolis, Cronon argues against the separation of urban and 
nonurban and of human and natural worlds. He demonstrates that urban 
                                                 
7  For critiques of the concept of a premodern human-nature “balance” in North Ame-
rica, see, for example, Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison, esp. pp. 2-10. For a 
similar critique regarding Central America, see, for example, Wingard, “Interactions 
between Demographic Processes and Soil Resources,”; and MacLeod, “Exploitation 
of Natural Resources in Colonial Central America”. Balée in the latter volume offers 
a countercritique and argues that Indians did not cause any dramatic biodiversity 
losses, “Indigenous History and Amazonian Biodiversity”. 
8  Stuart and Stuart, Lost Kingdoms of the Maya, pp. 63-64, and Vlcek, Garza de 
Gonzalez and Kurjack, “Contemporary Farming and Ancient Maya Settlement: 
Some Disconcerting Evidence”, esp. pp. 218-220. 
9  Hartland was one of the first to claim that the temples were the centers of cities and 
towns, in “Maya Settlement Patterns”, p. 37. See also N.P. Dunning, “A Reexami-
nation of Regional Variability in the Pre-Hispanic Agricultural Landscape”, in 
Fedick, The Managed Mosaic, pp. 53-91. On the archaeological bias, see Graham 
and Prendergast, “Maya Urbanism and Ecological Change”; and Stuart and Stuart, 
Lost Kingdoms of the Maya, p. 32. 
10  Scarborough, “Reservoirs and Watersheds in the Central Maya Lowlands”. This idea 
is also very valuable in looking at African precolonial urbanization: Great Zimbab-
we, for example, was also not located near a major river. 
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Chicago and its rural and wilderness hinterland were part of a continuum, and 
that they were mutually dependent upon one another. Nineteenth-century Chi-
cago’s urban growth led to a cutover of the forest regions to the north and 
transformed the bison prairies to the west into wheatfields and cattle range.11 In 
perhaps less spectacular ways, Central American, Southeast Asian and African 
urban centers similarly were connected to and dependent on large hinterlands.12 
Precolonial urban centers in the Americas were large and numerous. The Aztec 
capital of Tenochtitlan boasted 250,000 inhabitants, or five times the population 
of contemporary London when Cortés first laid eyes on it. Tikal in the eighth 
century was surrounded by expanses of suburbs. Nohmul’s remains cover an 
area of 35 square kilometers. Precious little vacant land remained in the area 
immediately around the central pyramid group at Chunchumil; the site con-
tained 2,400 housing complexes with a total estimated population of 12,000 on 
a mere 6 square kilometers. Mexico alone has 10,000 known sites of Meso-
American cities and towns and Guatemala has another 1,400. Great Zimbabwe 
had a population of up to 30,000 and over 50 other associated sites that also 
have significant ruins.13 
Construction and maintenance of the urban structures and their populations 
must have been a severe drain on the hinterlands. The Incas had a centralized 
system that supplied urban centers with firewood originating from the Andean 
forests.14 The stone used to construct Angkor Wat came from quarries 30 
kilometers away. Maintenance was costly: 80,000 people in 3,140 villages were 
assigned to the upkeep of a single temple in Angkor Wat that was built by King 
Jayavarman VII in the twelfth century.15 In addition, intricate networks of 
exchange connected urban centers and their hinterlands to one another. This was 
as true for Tikal, Palenque and Great Zimbabwe as for nineteenth- and twen-
tieth-century Chicago. Great Zimbabwe traded as far southwest as Toranju, near 
                                                 
11  Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, pp. 17-19. 
12  Graham and Prendergast argue that “pre-industrial tropical urbanism” sheds new 
light at the ways environmental change is studied, in “Maya Urbanism and Ecolo-
gical Change”. This hints at the issues at the heart of Cronon’s argument, since the 
nature of precolonial ‘urbanism’ in Central America and Africa in many ways chal-
lenges the Eurocentric models of ‘urbanism’: for example, African and Central 
American urbanism may have been less nucleated and less discrete. 
13  On Tenochtitlan’s population and the number of Meso-American ruins, see Foster, A 
Brief History of Central, pp. 20-21. On Chunchumil, see Vlcek, Garza de Gonzalez 
and Kurjack, “Contemporary Farming and Ancient Maya Settlement”, pp. 212-217. 
On Nohmul, see Pyburn, “The Political Economy of Ancient Maya Land Use”, pp. 
242-243. On Tikal, see Stuart and Stuart, Lost Kingdoms of the Maya, p. 32. On 
Great Zimbabwe, see Hall, The Changing Past, pp. 91-116. 
14  Gade, Nature and Culture in the Andes, p. 52. 
15  Higham, The Archaeology of Mainland Southeast Asia, pp. 333, 339-340. 
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the Makgadigadi pans in central Botswana and as far north as Ingombe Ilede in 
the Zambezi Valley, and it was a core area in an Indian Ocean trade system that 
stretched as far east as China.16 
Food production requirements to sustain the urban populations also support 
the concept of an urban-rural continuum. Mayan cities and towns contained 
garden plots for intensive horticulture.17 Much of the food, however, must have 
originated from rural areas. Before the late 1970s, pre-Columbian agriculture 
was thought to have been dominated by milpa, or temporary fields in a slash-
and-burn cultivation system. Research in the 1970s and 1980s, however, found 
evidence of much more intensive forms of cultivation, based on raised fields 
and intricate systems of irrigation and water harvesting and storage, suggesting 
levels of environmental manipulation that contradict notions that pre-Colum-
bian Indian populations simply lived by Nature.18 In addition, fields were not 
necessarily close to the main residences.19 Minerals and forest products were 
acquired even beyond the agricultural hinterlands of the cities and towns. 
Upland forests, for example, were long considered to be of minor importance to 
                                                 
16  On trade, see Vlcek, Garza de Gonzàlez and Kurjack, “Contemporary Farming and 
Ancient Maya Settlement”, pp. 222-223; and Puleston, “Terracing, Raised Fields, 
and Tree Cropping in the Maya Lowlands”, p. 244; Dunham, “Resource Exploita-
tion and Exchange among the Classic Maya”; Foster, A Brief History of Central 
America, pp. 17, 28, 36-37. On Great Zimbabwe, see Hall, The Changing Past, pp. 
91-116. 
17  For in-town garden plots, see Vlcek, Garza de Gonzalez and Kurjack, “Contempo-
rary Farming and Ancient Maya Settlement”, pp. 212-217; and Puleston, “Terracing, 
Raised Fields, and Tree Cropping”, pp. 226-227, 229-230. See also Dunning, “A 
Reexamination of Regional Variability in the Pre-Hispanic Agricultural Landscape”. 
Dunning defines the ancient communities in the Puuc hill country of Yucatán and 
Campeche as “garden cities”. 
18  Graham and Prendergast, “Maya Urbanism and Ecological Change”, pp. 102-109; 
and Hoffmann, “La importancia ecológica y económica de las tecnologías tradicio-
nales en la agri- y silvicultura en áreas de bosque tropical humido en México”; 
Puleston, “Terracing, Raised Fields, and Tree Cropping in the Maya Lowlands”; and 
Matheny, “Northern Maya Lowland Water Control Systems”, pp. 195, 205. For 
water harvesting, see also Scarborough, “Reservoirs and Watersheds in the Central 
Maya Lowlands”. For raised fields and irrigation works in the pre-Columbian Andes 
highlands and lowlands, see Denevan, Cultivated Landscapes of Native Amazonia 
and the Andes. For “the myth of the milpa”, see Fedick, The Managed Mosaic, p. 2. 
For the degree of environmental management involved in the case of Angkor Wat, 
see Frédéric, La vie quotidienne dans la Péninsule indochinoise à l’Epoque d’Ang-
kor, 800-1300, pp. 137-138; Higham, The Archaeology of Mainland Southeast Asia, 
pp. 321, 325, 329, 337, 341, 348-352; and Audric, Angkor and the Khmer Empire, 
pp. 125-132. 
19  Vlcek, Garza de Gonzàlez and Kurjack, “Contemporary Farming and Ancient Maya 
Settlement”, p. 220. 
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the Maya, but they were relatively close to urban centers. The upland forests 
100-150 kilometers from Tikal, in fact, were the source of many sought-after 
minerals, and wherever water was available, sizable settlements were estab-
lished to extract forest resources.20 The evidence suggests that much of Meso-
America may have been a domesticated environment. Indeed, the seemingly 
‘pristine forests’ of the Maya lowlands are less than four hundred years old.21 
‘Primordial’ forest wilderness in Latin America such as that found at La Selva 
research station in Costa Rica revealed human use as evidenced by pre-
Columbian sites with charcoal and ceramic remnants.22 In brief, every forested 
landscape bears evidence of human interventions over the course of the 
millennia.23 
The above is even more true for Africa, which is considered the ‘wild’ 
continent par excellence. Africa’s game parks and nature preserves are rarely 
pristine; most of the protected areas have long histories of human use. As any-
one who has flown between Johannesburg and Maputo can attest, the southern 
Kruger Park is pockmarked by the remnants of human settlements. When much 
of the South African Lowveld along the Mozambican border was transformed 
into what became the Kruger Park, some of the inhabitants were expelled while 
others initially were retained as gamekeepers and other staff. The Makuleke 
were forcibly expelled from the Parfuri Triangle in the far northern part of the 
park during the 1960s. Thus, although the first game warden of the Kruger Park 
propagandized the park as an African Eden, it was hardly pristine Nature.24  
Wilderness in another remote corner of southern Africa similarly could not 
be considered to be ‘pristine’. In the late 1800s, the Okalongo region in the 
middle Ovambo floodplain was described as an uninhabited hunters’ paradise. 
                                                 
20  Dunham, “Resource Exploitation and Exchange among the Classic Maya”, pp. 320-
325. 
21  Leyden, Brenner, Whitmore, Curtis, Piperno and Dahlin, “A Record of Long- and 
Short-Term Variation from Northwest Yucatán: Cenote San José Culchacá”. Fedick 
stresses that ancient Maya agriculture supported millions of people over centuries in 
a marginal environment, in The Managed Mosaic, p. 10. See also Wingard, 
“Interactions between Demographic Processes and Soil Resources in the Copàn 
Valley, Honduras”. 
22  Pierce, “Environmental History of La Selva Biological Station”, esp. pp. 47-48. See 
also Konrad in the same volume, who argued that the dense forests of the Mayan 
peninsula formally came to be seen as “uninhabited” only since the late 1800s, 
“Tropical Forest Policy and Practice during the Mexican Porfiriato”, p. 124. 
23  Rietbergen, The Earthscan Reader on Tropical Forestry, pp. 1-2; and Boyce, 
Landscape Forestry, p. vii. 
24  Adams and McShane, The Myth of Wild Africa, pp. 1-13; Neumann, Imposing Wil-
derness. On the Kruger Park, see Carruthers, The Kruger Park. On the Makuleke 
and the forced removals, see de Villiers, Land Claims and National Parks, pp. 45-
57. 
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Yet, when refugees from the northern Ovambo floodplain settled the area in the 
1920s and 1930s, they encountered evidence of the presence of earlier settle-
ment: fruit trees, water holes, water reservoirs and pottery fragments. They 
attributed these relics of a past humanized landscape to the prosperous kingdom 
of Haudanu, which was abandoned after a destructive war in the early 1800s. 
By the 1960s, the refugees and their descendents had once more transformed the 
Okalongo wilderness into a thriving and densely settled village landscape.25  
Whereas war and population dislocation led to the recolonization of the 
Okalongo wilderness, the same processes had an opposite effect just north of 
Okalongo on the Angolan side of the border with Namibia. By the 1990s, local 
inhabitants designated large areas directly north of the Angolan-Namibian 
border on the western side of the Ovambo floodplain as wilderness.26 Yet, less 
than a century earlier, the same areas had been described as lush, fruit tree-
shaded expanses of adjoining farms and fields.27 Indeed, the early twentieth-
century northern Ovambo floodplain that supported the Ombadja and Oukwany-
ama kingdoms was amongst the most densely settled areas of what is modern 
Angola. The estimated population of pre-World War I Oukwanyama was from 
60,000 to 120,000 inhabitants. The estimated population of the smaller Om-
badja kingdoms, located on the western side of the northern floodplain, may 
have been between 15,000 and 60,000 inhabitants.28  
Warfare, famine and disease associated with colonial conquest, and heavy 
taxation and forced labor between 1900 and 1930, led to massive mortality and 
flight, decimating the northern floodplain populations and triggering the aban-
donment of entire villages and districts, especially in the southern parts of the 
Ombadja region. By the 1930s, many of the formerly most densely populated 
Ombadja districts were uninhabited and entirely overgrown by bush vegetation. 
A Portuguese official report from 1919 claimed that the pre-1915 population 
density in Oukwanyama was 8 persons per square kilometer and for the 
Ombadjas, 12 persons per square kilometer. The figures may be inflated be-
                                                 
25  See interviews by author: Julius Abraham, Olupito, 15 and 16 June 1993; Petrus 
Shanika, Oshiteyatemo, 17 June 1993; and Mathias Malaula, Onandjaba, 15 June 
1993. See also E. Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chaps. 2, 4, and 7. 
26  See interviews by author: Julius Abraham, Olupito, 15-16 June 1993; Petrus Shani-
ka, Oshiteyatemo, 17 June 1993; and Mathias Malaula, Onandjaba, 15 June 1993. 
Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chaps. 2, 4, and 7. 
27  For the Ombadjas, see especially Lima, A Campanha dos Cuamatos. See also Wülf-
horst, Von Hexen und Zaubern, pp. 6, 13, and 17; AGCSSp, Duparquet 1879 jour-
nal, entries Aug. 12-14, 19-20, and 5 Sep. 1879; Veth, Daniel Veth’s Reizen in 
Angola, pp. 340-341; Möller, Journey in Africa, pp. 110-112. 
28  AGCSSp, Duparquet 1879 journal, 8 Aug., 9 and 10 Sep. 1879; Duparquet 1882 
journal, 14 July 1882; Ferreira Diniz, Negocios Indigenas, pp. 14-15. For a more 
detailed discussion, see Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chap. 3. 
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cause they were used to legitimize indemnity claims against Germany, but they 
nevertheless illustrate that the region was considered to be fairly densely settled. 
In the context of the descriptions of the kingdoms as expanses of farms, fields 
and villages with an extensive water infrastructure, these reports emphasize the 
extent to which barely a century earlier, the 1990s wilderness had appeared to 
be very much like a semi-urban environment, or, at the very least, a ‘managed 
mosaic’ environment similar to that of ‘rural’ lowland Central America.29  
‘Bushmen’ and the bush 
Even the ‘last wildernesses’ that are home to ‘Stone Age’ hunter-gatherers, the 
San and Batwa, are not true wilderness.30 San communities in the late nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century border region in south-central Angola and 
north-central Namibia significantly shaped their environment. The San commu-
nities in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Botswana and Namibia were not 
isolated, small-scale, subsistence, nomadic hunter-gatherer societies. Namibian 
‘bushmen’ controlled Tsumeb copper mining and engaged in commercial hunt-
ing.31 San communities in the Mupa area were involved in iron smelting, and in 
central African myths the Batwa were associated with fire and iron, links that 
further undermine the image of the Batwa (‘pygmies’) and San (‘bushmen’) as 
Stone Age relics living by Nature.32 Ovambo kings supplied ammunition and 
the most advanced firearms to their ‘bushmen’ business partners and the king 
and the hunter each received half of the ivory.33 To qualify the region’s San as 
Stone Age subsistence hunter-gatherers seems untenable given the significant 
evidence that they were entrepreneurs involved in mining and in commercial 
elephant hunting in addition to hiring themselves out to Ovambo kings as 
bodyguards and executioners.34 
Moreover, the San who lived in or adjacent to the Ovambo floodplain may 
have contributed significantly to the demise of elephant herds in southern Ango-
                                                 
29  Luiz de Mello e Athayde, “O Perigo de Despovoamento de Angola”, pp. 229-230, 
AHU, Sala 8, Praca 115, Angola, Prejuizos causados pela guerra de 1914-18, Luan-
da, 14 Aug. 1919. For more details, see Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chaps. 3-4. Kjek-
hus describes similar processes in late nineteenth-century Tanzania, in Ecology Con-
trol and Economic Development in East African History, pp. 126-180. 
30  See, for example, Vansina, Paths in the Rainforest, p. 46. 
31  Wilmsen, Land Filled with Flies, and Gordon, The Bushmen Myth, pp. 15-43. For a 
classical study of the San, see Lee, The !Kung. 
32  Herbert, Iron, Gender, and Power, p. 63, and Klieman, “The Pygmies Were Our 
Compass”, pp. 137-139. 
33  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chap. 2. 
34  In 1928, King Martin of Ondonga in the southeastern floodplain employed San as 
hunters, messengers, and spies, NAN, NAO 18, Annual Report Ovamboland 1928. 
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la and northern Namibia during the second half of the nineteenth century (and 
probably to the overhunting of other game) because they were the main elephant 
hunters in the region.35 The decimation of the region’s elephant population in 
the late nineteenth century, which was hastened by the 1897 rinderpest 
epizootic, coincided with a dramatic decline in the fortunes of the region’s San 
communities – another indicator of how dependent the San had become on the 
commercial hunt and the global market in game products. By the early twentieth 
century, San inhabitants of the region sometimes quite literally had become the 
hunted instead of the hunters.36 
As the northern floodplain war refugees transformed the ‘wilderness’ into 
landscapes of farms, fields and villages, colonial officials voiced concerns that 
the middle floodplain environment was becoming overpopulated and was 
threatened by deforestation and desertification. Unwilling to stop in-migration 
from Angola because of the increasing demand for migrant labor from Nami-
bian and South African white farms, mines and industries, they cast their eyes 
on the area east of the Ovambo floodplain and south of the Angolan border: a 
land they deemed to be so inhospitable that it was said to be devoid even of 
flies. A 1928 report that highlighted the barrenness of the wilderness east of the 
Ovambo floodplain suggested that the San must have fled there: “he [‘the’ 
‘bushman’] has certainly not voluntarily chosen the Sandveld for his home”.37 
The presence of the San was acknowledged only to confirm that the area was 
consummate ‘wilderness’, pristine, untamed and therefore potentially suitable to 
settle new refugees from Angola as well as migrants from the ‘overpopulated’ 
Ovambo floodplain.38  
In the eyes of 1920s colonial officials, the San ‘wildness’ was underscored 
by acts of violence. This perception may in part have been a reflection of in-
creased competition between different groups of San and between them and 
Ovambo hunters, herdsmen or migrants who moved into the wilderness east of 
the floodplain. In 1927, San reportedly attacked a group of thirty returning 
Angolan migrant laborers near the border.39 In 1928, an expedition sent by the 
colonial administration to survey the east and to dig water holes was forced to 
turn back because, as its leader explained, “his natives were afraid of the 
                                                 
35  Cf. Isenberg who argues in The Destruction of the Bison that the Plains Indians 
contributed to the demise of the bison, and Foster who links the extinction of large 
mammals in Central America to Indian overhunting, A Brief History of Central 
America, p. 10. 
36  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chaps. 2-3, 7. 
37  NAN, KAB 1, W. Volkmann, 30 Oct. 1928, Report on the Agricultural and Political 
Conditions at the Angola Boundary. 
38  Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chap. 7. 
39  NAN, NAO 36, District Surgeon Ondangwa, Monthly Reports Aug.-Sep. 1927. 
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Bushmen”.40 In 1929, a group of San was reported to have robbed two groups of 
migrant laborers from Angola, killing several. When King Martin of Ondonga 
sent an armed detail to investigate the incidents, his men clashed with the San 
perpetrators in their far eastern hideout, killing their leader. King Martin’s men 
also reported “that the Bushmen had a fight amongst themselves over certain 
rights and that one man had been killed as a result of a wound from a poisoned 
arrow and one young girl wounded”.41 In 1930, San from Ongandjera in western 
Ovamboland northwest of Etosha Pan attacked migrant laborers from Uukwa-
luthi district.42 
The perception of the region’s San as living in a state of upheaval is also 
punctuated by evidence of a crisis in terms of livelihoods. The late 1920s and 
early 1930s were drought years that triggered famine in the Ovambo floodplain 
and led to San behavior that colonial officials described as being “very rare”. In 
August 1927, for example, seven San men from Angola applied at the re-
cruitment center at Ondangwa for work as migrant laborers. In September 1927, 
another four “Ondonga-Bushmen” followed suit. Two of the seven San recruits 
from Angola were diagnosed as having light cases of scurvy, suggesting nutri-
tional stress.43 It is unclear whether the colonial officials were surprised because 
they had never heard of San men engaging in migrant labor, or because the San 
whom they perceived to lead a simple but idyllic existence were forced to en-
gage with ‘civilization’.44 
How could the San, who were an integral part of the ‘wilderness’, be so 
dramatically affected by a subsistence crisis that they resorted to theft and wage 
labor? Colonial reports from the 1930s and 1940s explicitly distinguished 
between the ‘wild Bushmen’ who were nomadic hunter-gatherers and the ‘tame 
Bushmen’ who were being absorbed within Ovambo culture. The 1,300-1,600 
San who lived east of the Ovambo floodplain largely were considered to be as 
‘wild’ as the Kalahari San and they were perceived to “lead a carefree, though 
at times in drought seasons, a hard life”. The 1928 annual report for Ovambo-
land mentioned that the eastern Ovamboland San “when they feel the pinch of 
hunger, move towards the Ovambo settlements, where they generally manage to 
                                                 
40  NAN, NAO 17, Eedes to Hahn, Namakunde, 9 April 1928. 
41  NAN, NAO 11, O/C NAO to Clarke, Ondangwa, 6 June 1929. See also NAO 18, 
Annual Report Ovamboland 1928. 
42  NAN, NAO 18, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, May-June 1930. 
43  NAN, NAO 36, District Surgeon Ondangwa, Monthly Reports Aug.-Sep. 1927. 
44  Lee argues that the San and hunter-gatherers in general are much less vulnerable to 
subsistence crises than agriculturalists because their main food consists of wild 
vegetables and fruits which he considers a “stable” resource, Lee, “What Hunters Do 
for a Living”, pp. 30-43. 
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barter a little grain or other food stuffs”.45 A 1948 report stated that the San 
suffered from venereal disease and “habitual coughs” with a high death rate, but 
added that “[they] seem happy and care free”.46 In contrast, the several hundred 
San in western Ovamboland, whom the colonial administration had forced to 
resettle closer to the floodplain in order to facilitate colonial control, engaged in 
agriculture and raised livestock including goats, sheep, cattle and donkeys, and 
they were consequently no longer considered ‘wild’.47 
If hard times indeed had fallen upon the San as a result of the decline of 
regional game populations, violence, social dislocation and physical displace-
ment, then it is all the more surprising that their 1920s and 1930s home environ-
ment was deemed a ‘wilderness’ despite being neither pristine nor ‘natural’. 
Although the ‘wilderness’ east of the floodplain and south of the Angolan-
Namibian border does not contain any known remnants of ancient cities or 
densely populated centers, it was to a significant extent a domesticated environ-
ment. San communities constructed the water holes that formed the basis for 
their settlements, some of which were permanent. Digging and maintaining wa-
ter holes was extremely labor-intensive; excess sand and litter had to be cleared 
away every year. Indeed, the Assistant Native Commissioner of Ovamboland, 
Bourquin, distinguished between San camps which were temporary, and San 
villages: in late May 1940, his party failed to locate two San camps and was 
forced to spend the night at Omboto, where he discovered a “large permanent 
Bushmen settlement”, which he identified as “the Bushmen village of old Ule, 
the leader of the group of that area”.48 In a subsequent report, however, although 
Ule is referred to as a “clan” leader whose authority extended over several San 
groups in the Omaheke, suggesting that they were organized in a chiefdom, the 
inhabitants of the area were thought to have been “untouched by civilisation and 
must be considered as typical wild bushmen living in their natural environ-
ment”.49 The San water holes provided critical stepping stones for the Ovambo 
floodplain migrants who expanded settlement into the eastern Ovamboland 
                                                 
45  NAN, NAO 18, Annual Report Ovamboland 1928. The 1934 annual report also em-
phasizes that San acquired grain, beans and tobacco, NAO 19. 
46  NAN, NAO 61, Annual Report Ovamboland 1948. 
47  NAN, NAO 20, Annual Reports Ovamboland 1938, and 1942; NAO 61, Annual 
Report Ovamboland 1948. 
48  NAN, NAO 10, ANC to NCO, Oshikango, 30 July 1940, Report on Development 
Work undertaken in Eastern Ukuanyama during 1940, and NAO 20, Monthly Report 
Ovamboland, May 1940. 
49  NAN, NAO 20, Annual Report Ovamboland 1942. 
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wilderness.50 For example, in 1941 the Assistant Native Commissioner re-
ported: 
When we reached Ombongolo on 29/8/41 we found that the Ukuanyamas had 
cleaned and enlarged the Bushman waterhole at the spot (…). at Okulukila a dry 
Bushman waterhole was found but unfortunately time did not allow us to have it 
cleaned (…). At Shikome (…) two small Bushman waterholes about six feet deep 
were found in use. These were cleaned and enlarged and gave a good supply of 
water (…). Further shallow Bushman waterholes were found at Omboto and Oshiti 
and there is no doubt that it will be possible to sink many waterholes in this lo-
cality.51  
In the same year, another report mentioned Kules or Kures [Kudis?], forty to 
fifty miles northwest of Tsintsabis Police Station, where there were more or less 
permanent water holes, “and where there are always Bushmen. The present 
leader is Nainabab”. Yet another report talked about a San “Chief” called Ham-
keteb in the Omaheke.52 
San communities in eastern Ovamboland temporarily abandoned their settle-
ments for the duration of the dry season in order to follow migrating wildlife. In 
1942, the Assistant Native Commissioner reported: 
the Omaheke bush is bushmen country. For generations Bushmen have lived here 
and have established more or less permanent settlements. Each group has its well de-
fined territory ant [sic] it moves from waterhole to waterhole within its boundary.53  
Despite the observation that San settlements were permanent and despite the 
explicit association of important water holes with San communities, colonial 
                                                 
50  A 1928 sketch map indicates eight locations with water holes between Ohinengena 
(Ohangwena; just east of the inhabited zone of Oukwanyama at the time) and Otufi-
ma (Outafima), including one location in Angola. A San settlement is explicitly indi-
cated at Nehova Pan. Some of these water holes may have been San water holes 
and/or water holes dug by herdsmen. See map accompanying NAN, NAO 17, Act-
ing UGR to O/C NAO Namakunde, 25 Feb. 1928. On a sketch map dating from 
1932, a San water hole and settlement are indicated at Ombongola, south of beacon 
40. Another San water hole is indicated between beacons 37 and 38, and a third near 
Outafima between beacons 29 and 30. See NAO 17, Officer Commanding Oshikan-
go (McHugh), Oshikango, March [date illegible], 1932. 
51  NAN, NAO 10, ANC to NCO, Oshikango, 6 Sep. 1941, Proposed Extension of 
Ukuanyama up to and including Ombongolo Muramba. 
52  NAN, NAO 21, NCO to Deputy Commissioner South African Police, Windhoek, 31 
Dec. 1941, and Station Commander SAP to District Commander SAP Omaruru, 
Tsintsabis, 20 Feb. 1942. 
53  The ANC added that “[n]o reliable information could be obtained from the local 
Bushmen who do not appear to travel far afield but remain in more or less well 
defined areas in the Omaheke country”. NAN, NAO 10, ANC to NCO, Oshikango, 
10 July 1942, Proposed Extension of Ukuanyama Area: General Report Develop-
ment Work Eastern Ukuanayama. 
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officials nevertheless considered these water holes to be open-access natural 
resources and colonial officials and ethnographers alike maintained that owner-
ship of environmental resources was an alien concept within San culture.54 In 
the Ovambo concept of water ownership, a water hole was either owned by the 
person who dug it, by his or her descendants, or by the person who maintained 
it. The Ovambo conceptualization meshed with the views of colonial officials, 
who believed the San were at best ‘underutilizing’ the land, while the Ovambo 
agro-pastoralists were considered to be able to use the land much more effi-
ciently. The subsequent colonization of the region east of the Ovambo flood-
plain by Angolan refugees and migrants from the floodplain, legitimized by 
Ovambo and colonial officials’ (re)definition of the San as ‘wild’ and their 
environment as ‘wilderness’, thus set in motion a process that marginalized the 
San as environmental, economic and social actors. San groups and individuals 
lost control over much of the eastern ‘wilderness’ and its resources. For exam-
ple, Matias Kafita, a San, hunted and gathered with his father and other San 
during his youth but as an adult was merely relegated to assisting horse-
mounted Ovambo hunters.55 
The structural erosion of San livelihoods by the 1950s became obvious even 
to colonial officials. Whereas the 1948 annual report for Ovamboland had 
distinguished ‘tame Bushmen’ and ‘wild Bushmen’, the 1951 annual report only 
used the term ‘semi-tame Bushmen’ to categorize 2,500 people in the census 
that year.56 During the 1952 drought, Ovamboland’s San were the primary reci-
pients of free food aid, while in 1953, the eastern San temporarily received 
government assistance, including medical aid at what was effectively a famine 
refugee camp at Omundaunghilo.57 At the same time, officials recruited the few 
San remaining in the Namutoni (Etosha) Game Reserve in a project to collect 
animal bones. The scheme was initiated in 1950 to allow the San to earn some 
cash and to supply the bone meal factory at Okahandja. San bone collectors 
received 2s. 6d. per 100 pounds. By the end of 1950, almost 50,000 pounds had 
                                                 
54  NAN, NAO 10, ANC to NCO, Oshikango, 8 Oct. 1942. Lee acknowledges that the 
Dobe-San of the Botswana Kalahari Desert were not truly nomadic and notes that 
main San camps were located at a permanent water hole, Lee, “What Hunters Do for 
a Living”, in pp. 31, 35. 
55  Matias Kafita, interview by author, Ekoka laKula, 23 Feb. 1993. See also Moses 
Kakoto, interview by author, Okongo, 17 Feb. 1993. 
56  NAN, NAO 61, Annual Reports Ovamboland 1948 and 1951. 
57  NAN, NAO 60, Quarterly Report Ovamboland, 4th Quarter 1952, and NAO 64 f. 
19/1, Medical Officer Ovamboland, Monthly Reports Aug.-Sep. 1953. 
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been purchased.58 In 1954, however, all San residents in the park were ex-
pelled.59 
During the 1950s, the San remaining on both sides of the border east of the 
floodplain received food aid and tobacco as incentives to assemble at the 
stations of the Finnish Mission, which in turn resettled them at Okongo and 
Ekoka in mission villages where they were trained in crop cultivation.60 A 
missionary took Matias Kafita and his family from their Eenhana home first to 
Okongo and subsequently to Ekoka. When they arrived at Ekoka,  
there was another tribe of San called Ovakwagga !Kung ([they] call themselves 
Kwagga). My community [was] called Ovagongolo (…). The Kwagga were like us 
also in the forest and were hunting animals. The Kwagga left when the Mission [the 
FMS] came here. At that time [there] were no wild animals around. They gave us 
the garden; it was for us not for the Mission. We got enough food from the big 
garden and maize (…). At the beginning the garden was cultivated as one garden for 
everybody. When the missionaries found out that we could do the work properly 
they divided the garden among the people. [There was] only one Kwanyama house-
hold headed by Johannes Namidi. He was the village headman of Ekoka. He was 
looking after the San and was given that task by Eliki [Erik, an FMS missionary].61  
It was during this stage in the history of the San in eastern Ovamboland that 
they became the focus of a surge in academic interest. During 1951, for 
example, the Portuguese ethnographer Martin Gusinde engaged in research on 
the region’s San and a research group led by Laurence Marshall visited the area. 
The government’s Bushman Commission conducted research in Ovamboland 
during 1952.62 By that time, however, the alienation of the San’s environmental 
resource base in the central Angolan-Namibian border region had been justified 
and the San marginalized in the name of colonial development and moderniza-
tion.  
That entire ecosystems and individual species, including humans, historically 
can vacillate between the categories ‘wild’ and ‘domesticated’ challenges the 
Nature-Culture dichotomy. Not only were the San Naturalized, but the same 
                                                 
58  NAN, NAO 59, NCO to Sec. SWA, Ondangwa, 8 Dec. 1950, and NCO to Station 
Commander SAP Namutoni, Ondangwa, 14 Jan. 1950; Station Commander SAP 
Namutoni to NCO, Namutoni, 20 Dec. 1950 and Director Agriculture to Sec. SWA, 
Windhoek, 22 Oct. 1952. 
59  NAN, NAO 61, Annual Report Ovamboland 1953. 
60  Interviews by author: Matias Kafita, Ekoka laKula, 23 Feb. 1993 and Moses Kakoto, 
Okongo, 17 Feb. 1993. 
61  Matias Kafita, interview by author, Ekoka laKula, 23 Feb. 1993. 
62  NAN, NAO 60, Quarterly Reports Oukwanyama, April-June and July-Sep. 1951. 
On the Bushman Commission, NAO 106 Diary NCO 1949-1952, entries 30 July, 2 
and 3 Aug. 1952. 
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was true for the floodplain’s human and domestic and wild animal populations 
and indeed its entire environment. And colonialism imposed the Naturalization: 
after a late precolonial era of profound engagement in global and regional 
markets (ivory, iron, copper) in the late nineteenth century. By the mid-twen-
tieth century, however, the region’s San had become vagabonds surviving on 
food aid. The experience is identical to the deglobalizing, localizing and Natu-
ralizing process that affected Ovambo floodplain cattle owners but, ultimately, 
it was far much more destructive to the San in its economic and social 
consequences. The situation is all the more ironic because in a Nature-Culture 
dichotomy, colonialism is the major agent and mechanism for dislodging ‘non-
Western’ societies and environments from the grip of Nature, and launching 
them toward development on a Nature-to-Culture path. While the modernization 
paradigm qualifies this pathway as being for the best, the declinist and inclinist 
paradigms judge it as being for the worse. The environmental history of 
Ovamboland sheds grave doubts on the validity of any paradigm that con-
ceptualizes environmental change as a unilinear and irreversible path from a 
state of pristine wilderness/Nature to a state of domestication/Culture with the 
urban landscape at the apex. Such a conceptualization results in a paradox 
whereby environments defined as ‘wilderness’ have been marked and shaped by 
intensive human use in a deeper or more recent past, as was the case, for 
example, at Palenque. And the Palenques are only the tip of the iceberg: the 
semi-urban and rural humanized environments that sustained similar urban 
centers must have stretched over much of the modern forest and savanna wil-
derness landscapes of Central America and Africa, including such an ‘African 
Eden’ as the Kruger National Park in South Africa. 
 
  
8 
The Ovambo paradox and  
environmental pluralism 
The modernization, declinist and inclinist paradigms portray environmental 
change as unilinear, irreversible and homogenous. As the previous chapters 
demonstrate, the paradigms are unilinear because they describe change in linear 
fashion that occurs along a Nature-to-Culture (or wilderness-humanized land-
scape) gradient. Depending on the paradigm, change is progressive, for the 
better or for the worse, as well as cumulative, and often irreversible. The para-
digms homogenize analysis because they depict environmental change as an 
undifferentiated single process with a singular outcome: degradation, improve-
ment or a stable state. 
Descriptions of the early twentieth-century Ovambo floodplain environment 
are strikingly similar to those of the late twentieth century: both depict settle-
ments characterized by farms neighboring each other, with towering fruit trees 
and dense woody vegetation located on the edges of the farms and between the 
villages. At first glance, the similarities suggest a stable state or environmental-
ly sustainable land use. An alternative interpretation might be that any changes, 
for the worse or the better, essentially canceled each other out over the course of 
the twentieth century. Yet, population pressure, the colonial project, biological 
invaders and technological and economic changes caused dramatic environ-
mental transformations throughout the last century. 
Before World War II, tens of thousands of refugees fled from the northern 
floodplain villages into the wildernesses of the middle floodplain and beyond. 
From the 1920s onward, following the end of a long era of violence and inse-
curity, southern floodplain settlers fanned out from their fortified and congested 
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villages into the surrounding landscapes, where they came into contact with the 
refugees from the north, as well as with recovering wildlife populations. The 
northern floodplain refugees and the southern floodplain migrants deforested 
the land to construct new farms, fields and eventually new villages. The South 
African colonial administration encouraged the colonization of the wilderness 
which was shaped by the creation of virtual and actual temporary or permanent 
inter- and intracolonial boundaries that limited the movement of people, animals 
and goods, especially beyond the new borders of the Ovamboland reserve. The 
boundaries were imposed where necessary through displays of military power 
as evidenced, for example, by orders to shoot animals on sight to prevent the 
spread of lungsickness and foot and mouth following the establishment of vete-
rinary cordons. The result was a reconcentration of local, refugee or ‘invader’ 
human populations. Deprived of firearms, the refugee-settlers were exposed to 
new diseases and supplied with new tools (notably the plow) in a shrinking phy-
sical space that intensified concerns about environmental degradation. These 
concerns in turn shaped the political, social and moral ecologies of the flood-
plain. 
The human and animal populations in Ovamboland increased overall, but 
inconsistently, and with staggering contradictions. Until the 1950s, rough esti-
mates indicated that cattle populations fluctuated enormously from year to year. 
Interannual variation was at least in part probably a reflection of a combination 
of high take-off rates and the impact of disease and drought. The 1980s wit-
nessed a decline in cattle numbers. The number of donkeys, a species intro-
duced in the floodplain early in the century, languished for several decades, 
only to increase rapidly after World War II, mainly as a consequence of their 
import into Ovamboland. While gun technology and guns were adopted rapidly 
in the floodplain after their introduction in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, imported metal hoes and plows did not have much of an impact until 
after World War II. From the 1950s onward, however, the adoption of the plow 
had a strong direct and indirect environmental impact. Overall, the impact of 
population pressure, green and biological imperialisms, the market economy 
and Western technology in Ovamboland was neither linear nor straightforward. 
The reforestation that followed in the wake of deforestation is a dramatic 
illustration of this point. As refugees and migrants transformed their new 
environments, they propagated pre-existing and new woody vegetation. When 
perceived in cyclical terms, the occurrence of successive deforestation and 
reforestation is neither unique nor new. The waxing and waning of forests 
characterized, for example, Ghana (forest clearing between 1000 and 1600 and 
again in the 1900s), the Ethiopian Highlands, the miombo bush savannas of 
eastern and southern Africa (with expansion and contraction spanning at least 
the last 22,000 years) and the forests of the Midwestern and Eastern United 
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States (where oak forests have repeatedly expanded and contracted during the 
last 10,000 years).1 
But this was not simply cyclical change, as in a return to a (vegetation) 
climax. In the United States, for example, Native American use of fire fostered 
a forest dominated by such fire-resistant species as oak, hickory and chestnut. 
When the use of fire was suppressed, such fire-sensitive species as red maple 
and sugar maple replaced oak; moreover, forest encroached and continues to 
advance on what used to be savanna or barrens. The composition of the Central 
American forests of today is also dissimilar to that of the forests that marked the 
pre-Mayan environment. Furthermore, Japan saw massive reforestation in the 
wake of World War II, but two-thirds of its mountain forests are industrial 
monoculture forests.2 Processes of afforestation that do not directly result from 
human agency, as occurs in forest plantations, for example, but rather from 
natural regrowth, as in the case of the re-establishment of forests and woodlands 
on abandoned lands or as the result of fire suppression, also highlight Nature’s 
role as an actor rather than a victim of or backdrop to human initiative.3 
Thus, whereas many areas were heavily deforested and reforested, the 
process of environmental change was neither cyclical nor neatly sequential, but 
rather highly ambiguous in terms of its baseline, dynamics and outcome. While 
acknowledging ambiguity in the record of environmental change is not new, 
such ambiguity may be attributed to different valuations of what constitutes 
degradation and of what may be considered to be improvement. Moreover, 
interpretations of the significance of the process of environmental change and 
                                                 
1  On Ghana, Fairhead and Leach, Reframing Deforestation, pp. 76-77. On Ethiopia, 
McCann, Green Land, Brown Land, pp. 79-107. On the miombo, see Campbell, The 
Miombo in Transition, pp. 5-6, and Misana, Mung’ong’o and Mukamuri, “Miombo 
Woodlands in the Wider Context”. On the United States, see McShea and Healy, 
“Oaks and Acorns as a Foundation for Ecosystem Management”, pp. 4-5; and 
Abrams, “The Postglacial History of Oak Forests in Eastern North America”. See 
also Williams, Deforesting the Earth, pp. 3-4, 12. 
2  On the United States, see Abrams, “The Postglacial History of Oak Forests in 
Eastern North America”; and D. Dey, “Fire History and Postsettlement Disturbance” 
and “The Ecological Basis for Oak Silviculture in Eastern North America”. See also 
Brown, Curtin and Brathwaite, “Management of the Semi-Natural Matrix”, pp. 331-
336. On Namibia, see Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chap. 8, and “Architects of 
Nature”, pp. 57-62. On Central America, see Leyden, Brenner, Whitmore, Curtis, 
Piperno and Dahlin, “A Record of Long- and Short-Term Variation from Northwest 
Yucatán: Cenote San José Culchacá”. On Japan, see Knight, “From Timber to 
Tourism”, pp. 335-336. 
3  See for example Cronon, Changes in the Land. McCann points out that the role of 
climate is relatively understudied in the recent environmental historiography of 
Africa, see “Climate and Causation in African History”. 
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its outcome may differ.4 For example, a case study of a former ranch in southern 
Chiapas in Mexico from the 1960s through the 1990s identified a “simultaneous 
recovery of degraded forest lands and intensification of maize cultivation”.5 
Both afforestation and environmental decline occurred in Wällo, Ethiopia.6 In 
1950s to 1980s northern Ivory Coast, a decline in wildlife (unambiguous de-
gradation) coincided with a simultaneous increase of cropland and woodland (or 
afforestation) at the expense of open bush land.7 A baseline survey of 1,800 
households in a Zimbabwean afforestation project revealed that deforestation 
was strongly correlated with clearing land for crop cultivation, but that the non-
arable land was not deforested and might in fact have gained woody biomass.8 
In the example of the former ranch in Chiapas, the ranch was construed as a 
land use system which served as the spatial unit of analysis. The paradoxical 
findings of intensification of agriculture and afforestation, however, may have 
been partly an artifact of the relatively abstract scale of the analysis, because the 
study lacked specific data to illuminate the step-by-step processes of environ-
mental change.9 Scale of analysis is a critical variable for analyzing the process 
of environmental change and for evaluating its outcome. Larger-scale outcomes 
                                                 
4  Moore and Vaughan, Cutting Down Trees; and Fairhead and Leach, Misreading the 
African Landscape. Blaikie and Brookfield stress that a multidisciplinary approach 
and a sensitivity to multicausality are required for environmental study but regard 
environmental change as monoprocessual, in Land Degradation and Society, pp. 14-
16. Meggers attributes the conflicting interpretations about environmental change in 
the Amazon to a lack of communication between scholars from different discipli-
nary backgrounds, in “Natural Versus Anthropogenic Sources of Amazonian Bio-
diversity”, p. 89. See also Mazzucato and Niemeijer, Rethinking Soil and Water 
Conservation in a Changing, pp. 114-116; and Gibson, McKean and Ostrom, 
“Explaining Deforestation”, p. 2. Schama notes that the impact of humans on Nature 
is not an unmixed blessing, but he stresses that the ways humans affect Nature do 
not constitute “unrelieved and predetermined calamity” either. See Schama, Land-
scape and Memory, pp. 9-10. 
5  Van der Haar, “Peasant Control and the Greening of the Tojolabal Highlands, 
Mexico”, pp. 110-112. Emphasis added. 
6  Crummey and Winter-Nelson, “Farmer Tree Planting in Wällo, Ethiopia”, esp. p. 
119. See McCann, People of the Plow. 
7  Bassett, Koli Bi and Okattara, “Fire in the Savanna”, esp. p. 64. On Zimbabwe, see 
Kerkhof, Agroforestry in Africa, pp. 69-73. A. Erkkilä notes both deforestation and 
regrowth in woody vegetation cover in some areas, in “Living on the Land”, pp. 73-
75, 99-101. Gibson et al. attribute the disagreement that exists concerning the under-
lying causes of deforestation to the possibility that multiple processes are at work, to 
knowledge gaps or to both, Gibson, McKean and Ostrom, “Explaining Deforesta-
tion”, p. 2. 
8  Kerkhof, Agroforestry in Africa, pp. 69-73. 
9  Van der Haar, “Peasant Control and the Greening of the Tojolabal Highlands, Mexi-
co”, esp. p. 110-112. 
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average out outcomes at smaller scales. For example, on a global scale, the 
second half of the twentieth century witnessed severe deforestation, but the 
United States and Western Europe actually experienced reforestation.10 Twen-
tieth-century Bangladeshi farmers planted trees on homestead mounds but at the 
same time cleared trees in the surrounding floodplain to make fields.11 If the 
homestead mound gardens were the unit of analysis, the outcome of the process 
of environmental change would have been afforestation; if, on the other hand, 
the actual floodplain were the focus, the assessment would have been one of 
deforestation. If the Bangladeshi floodplain land use system as a whole were to 
be evaluated, the outcome would depend on the amount of afforestation on the 
mounds and the extent of deforestation in the plain. The scale of analysis thus 
may significantly influence the outcome of the assessment. Multiscale analysis 
may partially counter this issue; as Huxley notes, however, “research activities 
are nearly always confined to a single scale level”.12 
Alternatively, the ambiguity in the record of environmental change may be a 
reflection of the plural nature of the process of environmental change. Different 
readings of the process and outcome of environmental change are not merely 
misreadings or divergent interpretations of a singular, homogenous process of 
environmental change from various points of view, inspired by, for example, the 
modernization, declinist or inclinist paradigm, or by a population pressure, 
political ecology or biological imperialism approach. Rather, the differences 
may result from the need to analyze environmental changes as multiple (sub)-
processes of environmental changes – occurring at different scales and even 
within a single scale – that, moreover, are neither synchronized, nor discrete, 
nor fully interlinked.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10  Williams, Deforesting the Earth, pp. 412-431. 
11  Leuschner and Khaleque, “Homestead Agroforestry in Bangladesh”. 
12  Huxley, Tropical Agroforestry, p. 302. On multiscale analysis, see Gibson, McKean 
and Ostrom, “Explaining Deforestation”. Gibson et al. note contradictions in en-
vironmental trends and the need to differentiate environmental change. G. Varu-
ghese, for example, studied eighteen villages in the middle hills of Nepal and found 
radically different environmental trends: in seven villages the forest was degrading, 
in six villages it was improving and in five the forest conditions were stable, 
Varughese, “Population and Forest Dynamics in the Hills of Nepal”, esp. p. 204, 
table 8.2. Gibson and Becker noted enormous variation in how individuals in 
Western Ecuador used their forest plots: some clear-cut their plots and others 
encouraged regrowth, Gibson and Becker, “A Lack of Institutional Demand”, esp. 
pp. 135-136, 156. 
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Deforestation in Ovamboland 
Ovamboland in the twentieth century saw both deforestation and reforestation. 
Wood use was neither naturally sustainable, nor did reforestation gains simply 
cancel out deforestation losses over the long run, an outcome that might suggest 
equilibrium and the absence of fundamental environmental change. The exact 
opposite was true: environmental change was dramatic. Deforestation in Ovam-
boland from the 1920s through the 1950s was only too real. As people fled 
south across the colonial border from the northern floodplain or fanned out from 
the heartlands of the occupied southern floodplain polities, they cut woody 
vegetation to construct homesteads and to clear fields. For example, Native 
Commissioner Hahn wrote in 1931: 
The Ovambos, who are agriculturalists, when they established themselves in the first 
instance, cut away into the bush and cleared spaces to make room for their fields. 
The timber and scrub thus cut away is firstly used to build their pallisaded [sic] kraal 
and secondly to enclose the borders of their lands, etc.13  
Officials and missionaries, especially in the 1920s and 1930s, witnessed a 
conjuncture of deforestation as thousands upon thousands of refugees and 
migrants streamed into the wilderness areas of Ovamboland. The specter must 
have appeared similar to the massive forest clearing that threatens the forests of, 
for example the Amazon and Indonesia today. In Ovamboland’s wilderness, 
settlers not only cut down large amounts of poles to construct huts, palisades, 
kraals and fences, but also obliterated most of the tree and bush vegetation on 
their prospective farm plots. Fire was the settlers’ most powerful tool when 
clearing land for farms and fields. A concerned agricultural expert commented 
in 1924: 
Natives are very destructive of the natural bush & their method of clearing ground is 
not economical. The usual method is to put a fire around a tree until it falls, no effort 
being made to remove the stump (…). The destruction of the bush, without any 
effort to replant in suitable places will mean at an early date the extension of the 
desert & it is a problem requiring immediate & careful attention.14  
 
                                                 
13  NAN, SWAA 3, NCO to Sec. SWA, Ondangwa, 20 April 1931. 
14  NAN, NAO 26 Report Ovamboland Cotton Prospects, appendix to Alec Crosby to 
Bishop of Damaraland [Ms.], St. Mary’s Mission, 11 Jan. 1924. See also O/C NAO 
Oshikango to NCO, Oshikango, 20 June 1938; NAO 10, ANC to NCO, 31 Oct. 1940; 
Hahn’s handwritten notes on the letter “Also in regard to indiscriminate burning of 
Mopane trees in Ukuambi and Ukuanyama lands”; SWAA 3 f. Forestry: Indigenous 
Forests Ovambo A1/2 (I), NCO to CNC, Ondangwa, 2 June 1941; BAC 131, Agri-
cultural Officer Ovamboland to Bantu Commissioners Ondangwa and Oshikango 
[Ondangwa?], 28 Jan. 1957. 
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Photo 3 New Homestead, c. 1928. A large number of poles cut from the surrounding area were 
used to construct the palisades and the frames and walls of huts, leaving the fields 
bare. This large newly constructed homestead where fruit trees have not established 
themselves yet may have belonged to the Oukwanyama senior headman Nyukuma 
Shingelifa. Encouraged by Native Commissioner Hahn, the headman settled at 
Omhedi in the middle floodplain wilderness in 1927 or 1928. Hahn showcased 
Nyukuma’s homestead to dignitaries and other visitors  
(National Archives of Namibia, Hahn Collection) 
 
 
Assuming that the average farm size was between 0.5 and 2 ha, the ap-
proximately 18,000 households that were counted in the 1933 census meant that 
over time, between 9,000 and 36,000 ha had been cleared of woody vegetation 
in order to make room for homesteads, kraals and crop fields. But since much of 
the wood for the actual construction of the farms had been obtained elsewhere 
than on the farms themselves, the creation of 18,000 farms theoretically would 
have led to the deforestation not only of the 9,000-36,000 ha of farm plots but 
also of an estimated 9-18,000 ha of mopane bush land required for construction 
materials, for a grand total of approximately 18-54,000 ha of affected bush land or 
‘forest’. Deforestation was most dramatic in Ovamboland’s Oukwanyama district, 
which was located directly south of the Angolan border, where the approximately 
6,000 new farms that were established between 1916 and 1933 consumed between 
3,000 and 6,000 ha of mopane bush land and resulted in the further clearing of 
3,000-12,000 ha of farm plots. Deforestation thus affected 6,000-18,000 ha in a 
seventeen-year period, for an average of 353-1,059 ha affected per year.15 
Moreover, most of this dramatic deforestation took place in a relatively small area 
                                                 
15  On wood consumption for constructing homesteads, see Kreike, “Architects of Na-
ture”, pp. 96-98 and 141-146. 
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in the middle floodplain. In the second half of the 1920s, the impact was especially 
concentrated in the area directly west, south and east of Oshikango along the 
border, right under the nose of the Assistant Native Commissioner of Ovamboland 
who was based there. The dramatic nature of deforestation was also heightened by 
the fact that all the new farms were located on the low ridges in between the 
watercourses, with farm plots cleared on the lower slopes and construction wood 
obtained from the upper slopes. The watercourses themselves could not be used 
for habitation or cultivation because they flooded.16 
As the population of Ovamboland grew from 107,000 in 1933 to 126,000 in 
1938, then to 197,000 in 1951 and 618,000 in 1991, the amount of land that was 
cleared for fields commensurately increased.17 Based on a small survey sample, 
a 1991 report estimated the average farm size to range from 2 to 5 ha, with 
farms in eastern Ovamboland being larger on average than in the actual flood-
plain.18 Thus, with 90,918 ‘traditional’ rural homesteads having been counted in 
1991, an estimated 181,836 to 454,590 ha of the total area of Ovamboland’s 
4,200,000 ha, i.e. from 4.3 to 10.8%, had been transformed into farm plots, 
compared to 9,000-36,000 ha or 0.21-0.86% in 1933. The colonial administration 
estimated aggregate farmland in Ovamboland to be 27,606 ha in 1950, 71,961 ha 
in 1957, 59,968 ha in 1958, 88,400 ha in 1966, 94,000 ha in 1968 and 150,000 ha 
                                                 
16  NAN, NAO 104, Anderson to Hahn, diary Jordan, and A233, J. Chapman, 1903-
1916, 1876[?], pp. 61-62; Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chap. 2; Lima, A Campanha 
dos Cuamatos, pp. 132-14; AVEM, RMG 2518 [?] C/h 52, Speiker, Visitations-
bericht, Namakunde 13-18 July 1906; AGCSSp, Duparquet, journal, no. 6, 1878, 
1881, information from Carlston; Petrus Shanika Hipetwa, interview by author, 
Oshiteyatemo, 17 June 1993. NAN, KAB 1 (iii), W. Volkmann, 30 Oct. 1928, “Report 
on the Agricultural and Political Conditions at The Angola Boundary”. See also AHE 
(BAC) 1/346, Report of the SWA Planning Committee for Agricultural Training 
Centers, appendix to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner SWA to Bantu Affairs 
Commissioners Ondangwa, Runtu and Oshikango, [Windhoek], 8 April 1965. This 
situation is also borne out by regular reports of flooded fields and destroyed crops, 
see, for example NAN, NAO 18, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, March and April 
1925. See also NAO 19, Monthly Reports Ovamboland, Feb., June and July 1934, 
Jan. and Feb. 1937, and NAO 21, Quarterly Report Ovamboland, Jan.-March 1944. 
Similar conditions marked 1950, NAO 60, Quarterly Report Ovamboland, Jan.-
March and April-June 1950. 
17  NAN, OVA 53, Sec. SWA to Sec. Agriculture Owambo, Windhoek, 24 June 1974, 
Appendices A-C. 
18  Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit, “Land related Issues in the Communal 
Areas, 1: Owambo” (Windhoek: Paper for the National Land Conference, 1991). 
The author’s personal observations (19 Feb. 1993) bear out the impression that es-
pecially in the far east, in such villages as, for example, Ehafo, Oshikuni and Big 
and Little Olukula, farm plots were considerably larger than in the floodplain. The 
plots were usually fenced with wire or branches and there were very few trees in the 
fields. 
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in 1978-1979. The figures for 1957 forward all seem to have been estimates of the 
actual surface area that was being cultivated, rather than of the total available farm 
area, and they therefore underestimate the total land cleared.19 
The creation of new and larger farms and fields, facilitated by plow techno-
logy, led to heavy and often dramatic deforestation. On-farm deforestation was 
more destructive than cutting construction wood off-farm because most woody 
vegetation was burned, a method of clearing that limited regrowth.  
Reforestation in Ovamboland 
Paradoxically, as deforestation of the wilderness areas of Ovamboland pro-
gressed from the 1920s through the 1940s, a process of reforestation followed in 
its wake. What is most striking about reforestation in Ovamboland is that the 
farms and fields that were the locus of the most destructive deforestation simul-
taneously were the areas where the most spectacular reforestation occurred. In a 
matter of decades, majestic fruit trees towered over homesteads and crops. 
Moreover, reforestation was not confined to the farms or to fruit trees. Although 
wood harvesting had been especially severe in the 1920s and 1930s when refu-
gees and migrants streamed into the wilderness area along the Angola-Namibian 
colonial border, clearing farm plots and constructing palisaded homesteads, 
deforestation beyond the actual farm plots had been somewhat less destructive: 
poles and branches had been removed without killing the plants, and many 
woody vegetation species in Ovamboland had the ability to resprout. In addi-
tion, the original woodlands of new villages partially were retained, albeit in the 
form of a heavily managed bush coppices.20 
Although the striking presence of on-farm fruit trees figures prominently in 
colonial and postcolonial descriptions of Ovamboland’s vegetation, colonial 
officials and experts and their postcolonial successors found it difficult to 
imagine that the existence of the fruit trees constituted reforestation. Despite 
noting that fruit trees occurred on farms and fields, and that they were mostly 
absent from wilderness areas, colonial officials do not seem to have been 
shaken in their belief that, for example, marula and birdplum were wild trees. 
But marula (Sclerocarya birrea) and birdplum (Berchemia discolor) trees, and to a 
lesser extent the real fan palm (Hyphaene petersiana), by and large only began to 
appear in the middle floodplain wilderness after the area was settled during the 
                                                 
19  Figures provided in morgen are given in hectares. See NAN, NAO 103, Census of 
Agriculture Ovamboland 1949-1950; BAC 133, Agricultural Report Ovamboland 
1956-1957 and Quarterly Report Agriculture Ovamboland for the Quarter ending 30 
June 1958; AHE (BAC) 1/352 [1/357], Annual Reports Agriculture Ovamboland, 
1966 and 1968; OVA 6, Annual Report Agriculture Ovamboland 1978-1980. 
20  Kreike, “Architects of Nature”, pp. 150-180, 208-219. 
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1920s and 1930s. Moreover, although they sometimes occurred randomly, the 
phenomenon was confined to a highly specific and private space: farms and fields, 
where they were protected by palisades, fences and/or herdsmen from people, 
livestock and the elements. 
Oral histories confirm that the introduction of marula and birdplum trees in the 
middle floodplain wilderness accompanied settlement. In early 1930s Omupanda, 
marula trees were confined to only two of the eight existing farms, and one of 
the two was located on the farm of the first person who had settled there around 
1900. In the Ombalantu and Uukwambi districts, many marula and birdplum 
trees had likewise been planted by the households who had constructed new 
villages in the uninhabited stretches that had separated the precolonial polities.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 4 Mature Homestead and Fields, 1993. The homestead is partly hidden behind the trees 
to the left. This is an old farm in the southern floodplain, witness the large trees 
(including real fan palm and marula) that tower over the fields  
(Photo by author) 
 
                                                 
21  Interviews by author: Mateus Nangobe, Omupanda, 24 May 1993; Paulus Wanaka-
shimba, Odimbo, 10-11 Feb. 1993; Paulus Nandenga, Oshomukwiyu, 28 April 
1993; Kulaumoni Haifeke, Oshomukwiyu, 11 May 1993. On Uukwambi, personal 
communication from Joseph Hailwa, Regional Forester Ovamboland, 24 March 
1992. On the occurrence of marula and birdplum in late 1960s Ombalantu, see 
NAN, OVA 57, Lueckhoff, Report on Visit to SWA, 3-15 Nov. 1969, appendix to 
Regional Forester to Chief Director Bantu Administration, Grootfontein, 3 April 
1970. 
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Paulus Wanakashimba attributed the introduction of marula and birdplum 
trees in his village to the women who had collected the fruit in older villages 
further north; some of the pits that had been discarded after the fruit had been 
consumed had developed into seedlings. Paulus Nadenga, however, emphasized 
that careful human management facilitated the ‘natural’ propagation of fruit 
trees: “[Seedlings] only survived because during the dry season [they] lose their 
leaves and animals cannot eat them. During the rainy season, if they are located 
in the fields, people will till the soil and prevent the goats from entering”.22 
Indeed, although Paulus Wanakashimba’s village had few marula trees when he 
was a young boy during the early 1920s, by the mid 1930s, both his and the 
neighboring village boasted many marula and birdplum trees. After clearing his 
own farm in 1947, he fenced new seedlings with thorn bush to protect them 
from livestock, and by the early 1990s, his farm contained birdplum, marula and 
real fan palm trees.23 
Beginning in the 1930s, a fruit tree frontier advanced beyond the Ovambo 
floodplain into eastern Ovamboland. Omundaunghilo, east of the floodplain, was 
already a fully fledged village by 1923 with birdplum, marula and real fan palm 
trees. But in most of the region, mature floodplain fruit trees appeared later be-
cause settlement only really took off during the early 1920s. A 1934 report on 
settlement in the east stated: “The usual fruit trees are, of course, not as plentiful 
as in the actual tribal area but natives are being encouraged to plant them 
whenever possible”.24 Kalolina Naholo observed settlers in the east seeding 
marula, birdplum and jackalberry (Diospyros mespiliformis). Marula could also 
be propagated by cutting off a green branch and planting it in moist soil.25 
While the floodplain filled with farms, fields and fruit trees during the 
1950s-1990s, the fruit tree frontier advanced into far eastern Ovamboland, 
towards the border with Okavango.26 In 1993, small birdplum trees could be 
found as far east as Olukula. Beyond Olukula, however, birdplum, marula and 
real palm trees were rare.27 Moses Kakoto settled in Okongo on an existing farm 
                                                 
22  Paulus Nandenga, interview by author, Oshomukwiyu, 28 April 1993. 
23  Paulus Wanakashimba, interview by author, Odimbo, 10-11 Feb. 1993. 
24  NAN, A450, 7, Annual Report 1935. 
25  Interviews by author: Kalolina Naholo, Ohamwaala, 26-27 Jan. 1993; Paulus Nan-
denga, Oshomukwiyu, 28 April 1993; Franscina Herman, Odibo, 12 Dec. 1992; cf. 
Helemiah Hamutenya, Omuulu Weembaxu, 17 July 1993. On eastern Ovamboland, 
see Kreike, Re-creating Eden, chap. 9. 
26  Tree propagation in the older villages continued. See, for example, Philippus Hai-
dima, interview by author, Odibo, 9 Dec. 1992. 
27  Werner Nghionanye, interview by author, Olukula laKula, 18 Feb. 1993, and perso-
nal observations, 20 Feb. 1993. In a survey of 35 crop fields in the west of eastern 
Ovamboland, Erkkilä found that marula, birdplum and real fan palm trees occurred 
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during the late 1960s. Although the birdplum trees on his farm had grown 
‘naturally’, he had planted palm seeds from the floodplain in his first home-
stead.28 Timotheus Nakale stressed that fruit trees were more numerous in fields 
in the west, i.e. the floodplain, because they grew “naturally”; in the east, how-
ever, people had had to plant the seeds. During the 1960s and 1980s, he had 
planted marula and birdplum seeds that he had brought from further west, and 
these grew into large trees. In 1992, when he moved his homestead to a new 
location, he successfully seeded more birdplum in addition to palm seeds; he 
had obtained the latter from Uukwambi. Some of the fruit trees, notably jackal-
berry, had not grown at all.29 
People actively and passively propagated fruit trees on-farm because the sur-
rounding fenced farm plots and the palisaded homesteads were the locations 
where they prepared, consumed and prepared fruit, and where they discarded 
the seeds, for example on middens and through defecation, or planted seeds and 
cuttings. Fences and palisades kept browsing goats, cattle and donkeys at bay 
and provided shade. The inhabitants discarded used water and other waste on-
farm, and organic matter from decaying poles and other construction materials 
enriched the soil.30 
The twentieth-century history of environmental change in the Ovambo 
floodplain constitutes an enormous interpretive challenge if it is approached 
within a binary deforestation/reforestation framework. The modernization, de-
clinist and inclinist paradigms frame change in terms of a singular process with 
a singular outcome: either environmental degradation or improvement. The pa-
radox in Ovamboland is that environmental change is characterized by a process 
of environmental degradation in the form of deforestation that simultaneously is 
accompanied by a process of environmental recovery in the form of reforesta-
tion, creating a paradox.  
Environmental pluralism: Multiprocessual asynchronous 
environmental change 
Colonial officials and experts ‘misread’ Ovamboland’s landscape. By pre-
suming that the majestic fruit trees that marked Ovamboland were wild and 
wilderness trees, they failed to understand the full extent to which the local 
                                                                                                                       
with the highest frequency, and that these trees only occurred near or on crop fields, 
see Erkkilä, “Living on the Land”, pp. 96-97. 
28  Interviews by author: Kalolina Naholo, Ohamwaala, 26 and 27 Jan. 1993; Kaulika-
lelwa Oshitina Muhonghwo, Ondaanya, 2 Feb. 1993; Moses Kakoto, Okongo, 17 
Feb. 1993. 
29  Timotheus Nakale, interview by author, Ekoka laKula, 21 Feb. 1993. 
30  Kreike, “Architects of Nature”, pp. 157-180. 
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inhabitants had shaped the environment, through both deforestation and 
reforestation. The officials and experts also described a population that was 
entirely subjected to Nature and too ‘primitive’ to embrace the blessings of 
colonial development, causing overgrazing and desertification. But colonial 
claims about environmental degradation were grossly overdrawn. Moreover, 
colonial actions had in fact (re)Naturalized aspects of local land use. Colonial 
policies resulted in the deglobalization of pastoralism and hunting and the de-
commodification of domestic and wild animals, while conservation and dis-
armament led to a resurgence of wild animal predation. 
Still, colonial assessments of the region’s environment were not entirely mis-
readings: the observations of massive deforestation in the 1920s and 1940s, for 
example, were to a significant degree correct. Thus, exclusively reading colo-
nial records against the grain might be counterproductive. The crux of the 
matter is to accept the ambiguities for what they are, rather than attempting to 
average them out, and to be alert to the shortcomings of the paradigms that 
dominate the analysis, conceptualization and representation of environmental 
change. 
The process of environmental change cannot, in fact, be understood solely in 
terms of a linear Nature-to-Culture (or wild-to-domestic) dichotomy. This argu-
ment has been made by, amongst others, William Cronon and Richard White, 
but it needs to be made more explicit, because the dichotomy lies at the core of 
the modernization, declinist and inclinist paradigms. The paradigms, their 
concepts and their vocabulary by definition re-introduce the Nature-Culture 
dichotomy into the analysis and description. Moreover, as conceptualized here, 
the process of environmental change is not necessarily singular, homogenous, 
synchronous, self-contained, or even coherent. Rather, environmental dynamics 
inherently are complex and plural, consisting of multiple strands, trajectories 
and subprocesses that may converge and diverge in asynchronous asymmetry. 
Pathways of environmental change may be contradictory: the record of de-
forestation and reforestation is but one, though perhaps the most dramatic, 
example of contradictory trajectories of environmental change in twentieth-
century Ovamboland. Human population pressures (first population redistribu-
tion and subsequently natural increase) triggered and shaped both the nature and 
the extent of deforestation and reforestation. At the same time, cattle population 
pressures had no appreciable direct effect on the environment, even while co-
lonial officials cried wolf about overgrazing and desertification. The indirect 
impact, however, was significant because colonial anxieties about overgrazing, 
desertification and livestock diseases fueled green imperialism and led to 
tremendous changes in livestock use and management in the floodplain. Green 
imperialism in Ovamboland in turn was far from homogenous, despite a high 
level of continuity amongst its main protagonists. Two successive Native 
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Commissioners (Hahn and Eedes) ruled the colonial administration of Ovam-
boland for three and a half decades. Both men championed wildlife conserva-
tion while openly refusing to implement or enforce most of the other conserva-
tion measures that were standard practice in South Africa’s Native Reserves. 
Eedes practiced green imperialism, but he also undercut it by successfully 
deflecting challenges to his personal and autocratic rule by a new generation of 
scientifically trained colonial agricultural and forestry experts. 
The impact of the modern market economy in Ovamboland was equally 
diffuse. After the imposition of colonial rule, floodplain men were more tightly 
sucked into a regional (and global) labor market, especially from the 1940s 
onward, but at the same time floodplain society was cut off from global live-
stock, game, slave and small arms markets. Such biological invaders as lung-
sickness and rinderpest had a devastating virgin soil epidemic impact (even as 
Africa supposedly shared the Old World disease environment with Europe), but 
foot and mouth did not, even though it served to legitimize the draconian 
intensification of green imperialism. Finally, Western technology offers a mixed 
record: guns were rapidly adopted and then disappeared almost as fast following 
disarmament, leading respectively to a quick decline of large game populations 
in the floodplain, and to its subsequent resurgence. 
The subprocesses of environmental change often were also asynchronous 
and their outcomes fleeting. Floodplain wildlife and livestock populations in the 
early 1900s were at an unrepresentative low as a result of rinderpest and the 
global demand for ivory and cattle. Wildlife populations increased until the 
1940s, even as the population of Ovamboland soared due to in-migration, and 
then declined. The floodplain populations rapidly adopted guns as soon as they 
were introduced in the late 1800s, but imported metal tools and implements 
only replaced locally produced agricultural tools from the late 1940s, although 
they had been introduced at least two decades earlier. Lungsickness, rinderpest, 
measles, influenza and plague had an immediate impact, but the effect of 
another biological invader – the donkey – was minimal until the late 1940s. The 
subsequent proliferation of donkeys was less a product of the resetting of an 
innate biological switch than of its newfound utility as a draft and transport 
animal. 
Analysis based on the modernization, declinist and inclinist paradigms does 
not fully capture these and other intricacies of environmental change. When 
used as absolute benchmarks, such State of Nature-derived concepts as (natural) 
climax (vegetation) and (natural) biodiversity obscure as much as they reveal. 
The wilderness, the wildlife and the ‘wild Bushmen’ in Ovamboland were not 
in a state of nature in the immediate precolonial era. In fact, in the late 1890s, 
the wilderness of Ovamboland barely hid the ruins of a once prosperous king-
dom, hunting and disease had reduced its wildlife populations to a low, and the 
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local San engaged in commercial hunting. Present-day states of Nature (or states 
of Culture) are equally problematic benchmarks. Upon closer examination, 
presumed relic islands of natural vegetation may be far from pristine. Using the 
present as a absolute benchmark ‘state of Culture’ outcome along a Nature-to-
Culture gradient of environmental change is also unacceptably teleological 
because it treats the present as the only or the necessary outcome of past 
processes that in fact may not fully have run their course. 
An alternative method for assessing environmental change is to establish a 
series of empirically derived analytical benchmarks.31 These multiple and histo-
rical benchmarks are by definition relational, not absolute. As demonstrated by 
the case of Ovamboland, comparing a 1890s state of the environment with a 
1990s state may at first glance suggest that little or no change has occurred. The 
apparent continuity between the two moments in time, however, conceals 
dramatic vegetation change: deforestation and reforestation in the time frame of 
less than a century. Only the use of multiple measuring points and a focus on 
the processes of change facilitates detecting environmental changes. Such 
change can be gradual but it can also occur quite rapidly: the 1896-1897 
rinderpest epizootic, for example, decimated susceptible wild and domestic 
animal populations across the African continent. 
The presence of human settlement ruins in pristine nature, the evidence that 
wild plants have been planted, and simultaneous deforestation and reforestation 
constitute contradictions only if environmental change is conceived as a uni-
linear, irreversible and singular process with a singular outcome within the 
framework of a Nature-Culture dichotomy that has Nature as the point of 
departure. Rather, environmental change should be imagined as a series of 
subprocesses that can be asymmetric and asynchronous. Differentiating the 
process of environmental change requires a more open-ended research focus: 
for example, assess environmental change(s) rather than measure deforestation 
or reforestation. Rejecting Nature in its various incarnations of pristine Nature, 
relic Nature, (biological) climax and biodiversity, as a useful benchmark to 
study environmental change does not entail an aesthetic rejection of Nature per 
se. It also does not mean the death of Nature. Furthermore, it does not mean that 
everything is Culture in the sense that humanity dominates Nature and that 
previously natural environments have been irreversibly polluted (in a declinist 
perspective) or improved (in a modernization perspective). 
In addition, treating ecosystems like closed and independent systems can 
result in framing ecosystemic change in terms of a zero-sum game, in which one 
organism’s gain is by definition another’s loss because the total resources 
                                                 
31  For examples of such an approach, see Harms, Games against Nature; McCann, 
People of the Plow; and Knapen, Forests of Fortune? 
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within the system are finite. External dynamics are as critical in evolutionary 
terms as internal dynamics. Energy flows are the most dramatic example: eco-
system Earth is energized by solar radiation either directly, through photo-
synthesis, climate and the weather, or indirectly, through fossil fuels as stored 
solar energy. Yet, humanity’s capacity optimally to utilize the terrestrial and 
extraterrestrial resources available without destroying itself and the organic and 
inorganic forms with which it shares the earth is a product of the historical 
context of any particular point in time. Whereas the modernization paradigm 
inspires unbridled optimism in this respect, the declinist paradigm engenders 
morbid pessimism. The inclinist paradigm offers a more guarded optimism. All 
three paradigms, however, present the Nature-Culture struggle as a zero-sum 
game: natural resources are limited and careful stewardship is seen to be es-
sential. In brief, in the declinist paradigm, good stewardship is seen to be 
lacking (resulting in degradation); in the modernization paradigm, good ste-
wardship is defined as (Western) scientific stewardship; and in the inclinist 
paradigm, good stewardship is defined as indigenous stewardship. 
Evolution as a process is a product of internal and external dynamics, the 
dynamics and the fostering conditions of which are time-specific; they are 
historic (including in the wider meaning of geological time-depth), and thus by 
definition subject to change. Thus, in every moment in time, the evolutionary 
process displays an array of entities and a series of interactions between entities 
that cannot be seen only as (fleeting) outcomes of the process, and the genetic 
and behavioral precursors of the next phase of the process, but which are also 
unique to that moment in time (and decisively so if an entity were to become 
extinct). 
In addition, each historical moment is marked by a unique biodiversity. This 
means that even if no (pristine) Nature is left, each moment in history is 
valuable not only in purely historical terms, but also in terms of biodiversity and 
genetic diversity. Thus, historicizing Nature and Culture highlights the need to 
preserve the earth’s bionic inheritance not only for its historical and aesthetic 
significance, but also because preserving a variety of historical landscapes, 
ecosystems and organisms provides access to historical biodiversity and gene 
pools. Moreover, there is no convincing evidence that biodiversity was signifi-
cantly higher in a ‘State of Nature’ (if it ever existed) than it is today; rather, 
evolutionary theory and genetics suggest the opposite: organisms and genes 
became more diverse over time. Yet, even if the former were true and bio- and 
genetic diversity have narrowed between a hypothetical ‘State of Nature” and 
the present, for example, through ecocide, the cumulative bio- and genetic 
diversity produced throughout history would be infinitely larger than that of any 
single moment in time, whether it be the era of pristine Nature or the present. 
Even if much of the sum of history’s bio- and genetic diversity probably has 
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been lost, today’s ecosystem Earth and its bio- and genetic diversity are not the 
static outcome of one genealogical line of evolution. Rather, ecosystem Earth at 
all its levels reflects a huge variety of more or less related processes of 
environmental changes that are sometimes synchronized, and sometimes not. In 
fact, in the context of evolution-as-history, a static outcome may result in an 
evolutionary dead end and extinction. 
This does not mean that concern about the state of the environment is un-
warranted; to the contrary. What is preserved because it is thought to represent 
Nature or the (more) Natural is not less pleasing aesthetically because it actually 
may not be as pristine as was presumed. Moreover, environments that have been 
rejected as unworthy of careful management and preservation because they 
were seen to be all Culture, or, worse, as neither Culture nor Nature, may need 
to be integrated in biopreservation. Select environments are singled out for 
preservation as Cultural Heritage; however, the environments that are neither 
fully Nature nor fully Culture typically are neglected, even though they have 
their own unique richness of bio- and genetic diversity. How to preserve them is 
a challenge: applying conventional conservation formulae that severely limit 
human use and management of these environments is socially, politically, 
economically and logistically impossible. Moreover, eliminating or proscribing 
the actions of one set of human agents (and substituting them by another: the 
conservation experts) from those environments would change the environmental 
dynamics, and cause environmental change as a result of the very intervention 
that is meant to preserve the environment. Instead, analyses of environmental 
change and extinction should seek to go beyond conceptualizations of Nature-
to-Culture and homogenous processes and outcomes and focus on understand-
ing environmental pluralism as a means for addressing the environmental chal-
lenges that confront Earth, both in Africa and elsewhere on the planet. 
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